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Abstract 
Digital cultures engage users’ social, creative and emotional labour – a process that can be 
described as affective. For some theorists and artists, this dynamic is inherently exploitative. 
However, within this exploitation is the potential, particularly in social media and games, to 
provide fuel for playful critique. The concept of ‘play’ is frequently used to describe users’ 
engagement within such cultures. This phenomenon evokes a long history in the arts of 
deploying ‘critical play’ modalities. In light of this situation, how might we begin to sketch a 
broader portrait of a ‘player’ engaging with the site of ‘critical play’?  
 
This PhD project explores this question through a mapping of artists’ critical play within 
digital environments. With the focus upon affective engagement in digital environments, I 
argue that it is the reflection and interrogation of processes of identity representation that, in 
turn, drive much of the motivation for ‘playing critically’ as a productive probe. More 
generally ‘Critical Affection, an expanded portrait of the artist-as-player in digital cultures’ 
seeks to contribute to play debates at the intersection of games studies, new media and 
contemporary art. 
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1 Introduction 
 
About this Dissertation 
This dissertation accompanies a body of practical artwork produced for a PhD project titled 
“Critical Affection: An Expanded Portrait of the Artist-as-Player in Digital Cultures”, for the 
award of Doctor of Philosophy (Media and Communication) at RMIT University, Melbourne, 
Australia. The project reflects my situatedness between three fields as an academic and 
practicing artist – contemporary art, games studies, and digital media. Developed separately 
from various segments of writing in this dissertation, the following articles that I have written 
or contributed to have been published. These include: 
• “Playing the Subject”, 2017, in Cermak-Sassenrath, D (ed.) The Playful Disruption of 
Digital Media, Springer, Singapore.  
• “Digital Face-ism and Micro-Fascism”, 2016, in Wilson, S (ed.) The Official: 
International Journal of Contemporary Humanities, vol.1, no.1 
• “The Art of Play: Ethnography and Playful Interventions with Young People”, 2016, 
with Hjorth, L, Balmford, W, Greenfield, S, Gaspard, L, Naseem, A, in Hjorth, L, 
Horst, H, Galloway, A and Bell, G (eds) The Routledge Companion to Digital 
Ethnography, Routledge, London 
• “Faceism and Fascism in Gay Online Dating”, 2015 in Proulx, M (ed.), .dpi Feminist 
Journal of Art and Digital Culture, no.32  
• “The Radical Productivity of Play”, 2015 with Nash, A in The Philosophy of 
Computer Games Conference, conference proceedings, BTK University of Art and 
Design, Berlin, 14 – 17 October 2015 
• “Bodies Under Glass: Gay Dating Apps and the Affect-Image”, 2014 in Green, L and 
Pink, S (eds) Media International Australia Incorporating Culture and Policy: 
quarterly journal of media research and resources, no.153, November 2014. 
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Exhibitions 
This dissertation discusses work shown in two exhibitions. These were: 
• Radicalism at the Newport Substation, Melbourne, Australia, 17th January – 23rd 
February, 2014 
• Tabularium at Slopes Projects (Utopian Slumps), Melbourne, Australia, 21st August 
– 13th September, 2014 
 
Practical Component 
An accompanying body of work to this dissertation is available in a zipped folder alongside 
this PhD submission, as well as online at www.tompenney.com.au/phd/index.html. This 
constitutes the practical component of the project. Instructions for accessing interactive 
works can be found in the root folder of the zipped file contents, or as a link at the top of the 
webpage “index.html”, found either within the zipped contents or at the direct web link. 
 
Motivation 
Just prior to the beginning of my PhD research, art theorist and historian Claire Bishop 
published her essay “Digital Divide” on Artforum in 2012. Over the past few years, the 
premise of Bishop’s article has persisted while technology has increasingly empowered ‘non-
artists’ and ‘non-experts’ online and seen artists either resist technology entirely or fully 
embrace the internet, sometimes uncritically, as a response. Bishop articulates a division 
between “new media art” and “the mainstream art world” (Bishop, 2012, p.1). The premise of 
this division is that while mainstream artistic practices seemingly avoid contemporary digital 
technology (Bishop uses the examples of works that focus on analogue media and social 
practice), the disavowal of, and thus the ghostly presence-in-absence of, the digital is in fact 
what underpins and sets the political project of all contemporary artwork. Bishop essentially 
makes the point that, whether participating in digital cultures, or opting out, the embrace or 
denial of digital technology here marks the impetus for the majority of contemporary art. 
However, Bishop finds it odd that new media art, while openly associating itself with digital 
technology, uses but does not effectively critique the digital state of culture we find ourselves 
in. Therefore Bishop’s central question becomes:  
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While many artists use digital technology, how many really confront the question of what it 
means to think, see, and filter affect through the digital? How many thematise this, or reflect 
deeply on how we experience, and are altered by, the digitization of our existence? (Bishop, 
2012, p.1) 
 
I want take Bishop’s question seriously. Many artists and art theorists reacted strongly to 
Bishop’s article. For example, Italian art theorist Domenico Quaranta retorted:  
 
There are legions of artists responding to the digital age […]. These artists are neither new 
media artists nor mainstream contemporary artists: they are artists that sometimes use digital 
media [...] sometimes spread their work on the internet (2012, para.3). 
 
The premise of many critiques of new media art is that technology is already present, by 
default, in any works that are produced in the social context of such technologies, and that 
“New Media as Grand Project has already been done, and arguing the transformative 
potential of technology should be superfluous in a world of smartphones.” (Watz in Quaranta, 
2013, p.iii). In this dissertation, ‘technology’ refers to contemporary advancements in digital 
networked technology, such as social media, games, apps, smartphones, and online dating. 
Artists may exhibit a disavowal of technology (often for political reasons) however both 
artists and everyday users find themselves using the same systems and participating 
creatively in an indiscernible way. Today both artists and non-artists are participating in a 
creative, vernacular use of creative tools in digital cultures and the boundary between art and 
‘non-art’ is blurred as a side effect of this mass-availability. Social media, apps, and games 
are ever-present ‘listeners’ for anyone’s creative input. The “sharing, storing and saving… 
of… ‘banal’ everyday content” (Hjorth 2013a, p.99) has become a mode of existence.  
 
In this environment of sharing and narcissistic intimacy everyone becomes some sort 
of artist engaging in normalised creative behaviours that enable the dissemination of extimate 
content. Photographs of food, cats and selfies construct personally curated digital 
environments. This is enabled by sharing features on Facebook, apps, and image platforms 
like Instagram. Jean Burgess has referred to ‘vernacular creativity’ as a term for the 
incorporation of ‘folk’ practices into digital cultures (Burgess 2006, p.1). Within the digital 
vernacular, everyone can operate as a producer of content, a creative user. On the internet, the 
practices of artists and non-artists collide in a content free-for-all; “vernacular creativity”’ is 
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not “placed in opposition to the mass media; rather, it includes as part of the contemporary 
vernacular the experience of commercial popular culture” (Burgess 2006, p.1). 
  
The critical power of art might appear somewhat impotent within this structure, where 
artists and users appear to operate using a similar expressive logic. The work of artists has 
long appeared narcissistic and is a central quality to their output. Centring artwork on the self 
has been a strategy to interrogate subjective experience and shift power from external 
systems to the individual. Hjorth (2013a, p.100) writes “some artists are productively using 
Facebook to send out invitations, others are using it to perform a type of public intimacy in 
which messages, photos and newsfeeds all catalogue and cultivate the image (and aura) of the 
artists”. At a glance this does not seem to be a trend divergent to that of regular, creative 
users, rather, that artists in this scenario are complacent, participating narcissists.  
 
Indeed, even the current generational movements of Post-Internet Art, or of the 
“Diamond Generation” (Obrist 2014, para.4), have seemingly resigned to structures that 
compose this expressive circuitry. Of the “Diamond Generation” (artists born after 1989) 
Harry Burke (2013, para.8) states it is “…no longer viable to maintain a binary between 
insider and outsider art practices, that sooner or later all forms of oppositional culture will 
have to interface with the mainstream”. In the article “The Image Object Post Internet” by 
Artie Vierkant, recent art is also defined as: “art responding to [a condition] described as 
'Post Internet' – when the Internet is less a novelty and more a banalit.” (Vierkant 2010, p.3). 
In resigning to banality, there is a pervasive acceptance of the normalization of ‘the Internet’ 
as a powerful and dominant affective structure. We know from movements of internet 
criticism, such as that written and edited by Geert Lovink and Rasch (2013), that the internet 
is far from banal in the implications it has for any of its users and their identities. Lovink 
reflects particularly on social media as “closed systems” (2013, p.13) that keep users as far 
away as possible from understanding how they work, and lauds that “dismissing social media 
as neutral platforms with no power” is “implausible” (2013, p.11). Given these trends, Claire 
Bishop’s questions of critical engagement or resistance appear well-founded and provocative.  
 
Play and Labour 
Why should we be critical of technology when producing art? We should be acutely aware 
that the internet is not a banal or impotent system, and, particularly in terms of our identities, 
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every creative action has implications when produced within that system, When we are  
hooked into expressing ourselves on internet platforms, we become participants within the 
agency of systems designed by others. This can happen in non-digital systems too, but in 
digital systems in particular we have the impression that we are empowered inside them. In 
Communities of Play (2009, p.280), Celia Pearce claims: 
 
While people [including artists] may feel empowered by their new communities in the global 
playground, the bottom line is that their communities, their property, indeed their very bodies, 
are owned by corporations. 
  
Julian Kücklich has discussed ‘playbour’; labour as it relates specifically to social media and 
games. As Küchlich puts it “the relationship between work and play is changing, leading, as 
it were, to a hybrid form of ‘playbour’” (Küchlich 2005, para.4). This is essentially a labour 
that feels like play, where users create their own content playfully. As such, we are 
encouraged as creative users to enact our subjective voices in social media and games 
through ‘play’. This is often for the benefit of the structures we play in, not only ourselves. 
Largely this is so that content can be sold back to us through the analysis of the ‘big data’ 
being gleaned from users through playbour. Trebor Scholz has identified that the internet is 
riddled with paradoxes; it is both a “playground and a factory” (Sayers, 2013, para.4). Mark 
Nunes (2013) has written about the effects of this. For Nunes, social media encourages 
people to express a self; selves affirm their individuality at all costs. On Facebook, for 
example, this is sold as a kind of  “social good; to contribute to society now becomes an act 
of contributing content within communicative capitalism’s ‘fantasy of abundance’” (Nunes, 
2013, p.10). Mark Zuckerberg, co-founder owner of Facebook, speaks of a scenario where 
“the world will be better if you share more” (Nunes, 2013, p.10).  
 
Take Google’s recent change in privacy policy as an example, which collects 
information from its array of services (including Gmail, YouTube, Google+) and merges 
them into a single account in order to “provide better services… from figuring out basic stuff 
like which language you speak, to more complex things like which ads you’ll find most 
useful or the people who matter most to you online” (Van Zoonen, 2013, p.47) we gain a 
picture of how services are defining us as specific ‘types’ of user through our playbour. The 
service is sold as supporting individual subjects through a user-friendly interface that “gives 
us what we want”, however Google uses this data in a similar way to Facebook, to define a 
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user in a network in order to sell content back. Adam Nash (2014) who refers to users as 
“digital anxiety slave workers” says here: 
  
At the same time that the cult of individual empowerment is promoted through the networks 
of digital capitalism, the only measure of success that is held up is necessarily an advertiser-
friendly quantitative one of generifying demographics, the bigger and more generic the 
demographic group the better [...]. The valorisation and empowerment of the individual (what 
we might broadly term the selfie culture), seductively masks the genuine goal of quantifying 
individuals into demographic clumps in order to advertise products or services that have been 
designed for just such clumps (Nash 2014, p.7). 
  
The internet here has an impact on notions of identity as essentialising rather than 
diversifying subjects. We can consider that through the closed feedback loops that Google 
sets up, a compounding of the individual takes place. Within the frame of Facebook, for 
example, content not only legally belongs to Facebook, but users are understood as a “vertex 
or node… [that]… marks an identity” (Nunes 2013, p.15). Rather than a multiple the user is 
an aggregate; a whole combined from disparate elements that are the relationships or “actions 
and associations” that converge upon the “vertex” (Nunes 2013, p.14-15). The individual is 
understood through an “algorithmically generated data profile of contacts and keywords that 
defines a user as ‘dividual’ or ‘instance’ within a larger relational database” (Nunes 2013, 
p.12).  
While we are encouraged to creatively communicate ourselves at great speed, and this 
behaviour may seem fragmenting, the multiplicity of these performances constitute a whole 
from the invisible perspective of the digital systems we subject ourselves to. This serves to 
define and limit our identities despite certain claims for subjectivity, i.e., that users can 
communicate through social networking “as they so desire” (Nunes 2013, p.13). Van Zoonen 
acknowledges “diversity as a desirable goal for social and cultural policy” (2013, p.44) but 
questions whether this is being achieved. We can consider these aggregate data selves, if fed 
back to us through algorithmic marketing systems, as ‘compounding’ the individual through 
decreasing the scope of one’s content. We may feel like we are players playing in the utopia 
of digital media, but the more we play, the more we are understood by the system we play in.  
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Aim 
I seek to build an alternative profile of what it means to be a player or ‘the one who plays’ as 
it pertains to digital cultures given how artists, and particularly how myself as an artist, plays 
critically. The aim of my research, therefore, is to reflect deeply through practice, as Bishop 
suggests, on the experience of affect in my, and other artists’ engagement in digital cultures. I 
am motivated to examine a situation in culture, where subjects engage with affective 
structures, the differences between artists and users are hard to discern, and a degree of 
exploitation occurs that has implications for individual subjectivity. Play, like improvisation 
and experimentation, is a feature of practices of both artists and non-artists within this 
situation, but to what degree is it critical? Moreoever, to what extent can play critique as a 
form of artistic engagement?  
 
Here I expand and build on strategies that are outlined in Mary Flanagan’s Critical 
Play (2009) that investigate how this cultural situation can be ‘played’ by artists. I use 
Flanagan’s ideas to motivate practical research, and develop those ideas further as a 
contribution to other digital artists, and to digital culture debates occurring in areas such as 
play studies and digital media criticism more generally. By engaging with a variety of such 
critical play strategies, I aim to articulate an understanding in my dissertation of how the 
notion of play functions critically for artists and how, or if, play can create a space for critical 
distance. As I build this list of strategies, potential frictions – even paradoxes – between 
notions of ‘play’ and ‘critical distance’, complicate the need for this question to be answered. 
I explore these notions through using art as an “enquiry machine” (Jungnickel 2015, para.1), 
which includes critical play (including artists’ doll play, re-skinning, un-playing, and re-
writing) and identity play as well as perversity, queerness, humour, and caricature. These 
frictions and paradoxes can be tested or thought-through, via the practical creation of art as 
research, as discussed in Chapter 2.   
 
Research Question 
What exactly does it mean for artists to ‘play critically’ within affective digital cultures? 
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Key terms and concepts 
Digital Art 
I wish to use the term ‘digital art’ from now on, rather than ‘new media art’, which invokes a 
certain hangover from the 1990s. As Lev Manovich puts it: 
 
As digital and network media rapidly became an omni-presence in our society, and as most 
artists came to routinely use it, the new media field is facing a danger of becoming a ghetto 
whose participants would be united by their fetishism of latest computer technology, rather 
than by any deeper conceptual, ideological or aesthetic issues – a kind of local club for photo 
enthusiasts (Manovich 2003, p.5). 
 
I wish to use ‘digital art’ to distance myself from this identification, and more appropriately 
include the nuances surrounding digital art, be it in the form of games, curated Instagram 
feeds, or gallery-based artworks. This takes into account the shifting boundaries and contexts 
into which digital art plays. Having said this, and although it appears to have similar aims, I 
additionally wish to distance myself from the category of Post Internet Art in which I have 
been placed as an artist numerous times by people in my artistic community. Although this 
term generally represents many of my peers and a context I am responding to (the works of 
Ryan Trecartin or Oliver Laric have much in parallel to my own), the conceptualisation of the 
movement is flawed given temporal assumptions embedded in the prefix ‘post’.  
 
Artie Vierkant’s proposition that the internet is banal does not go far enough for me in 
terms of critical value. Vierkant does however present a case for the redundancy of the term 
‘new media’, where “New Media is here denounced as a mode too narrowly focused on the 
specific workings of novel technologies […] It can therefore be seen as relying too heavily on 
the specific materiality of its media” (Vierkant 2010, p.3). In a well-known interview on post-
internet-ism with seminal post-internet artist Marisa Olson by Regine Debatty, Olson states: 
 
There doesn't seem to be a need to distinguish, any more, whether technology was used in 
making the work – after all, everything is a technology, and everyone uses technology to do 
everything (Debatty 2008, para.12). 
 
While this kind of thinking is very useful in terms of accepting technology as an inevitable 
influence in the practice and evolution of art, it has also become part of a trend in post-
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internet-ism that excuses and minimizes analysis of the actual systems and influence that ‘the 
Internet’ has over the work and art in general. The notion that we are somehow ‘post’ the 
internet; that it is banal, just a tool, a blank-canvas, or a no-brainer, dangerously elides 
serious contextual considerations. We see the result of this today in the wake of the 2016 
American election, fake news, alternative facts and echo-chambers – this influence cannot be 
taken for granted. In post-internet-ism such ‘banal tools’ can (but don’t always) serve as 
justification for quite self-absorbed practices. It seems the only real criteria for art under this 
term is that it is ‘internet-aware’ (Debatty 2008, para.12), a status that can mostly be achieved 
by employing visual internet tropes. Indeed, post-internet “objects” (Vierkant 2010, p.3) are 
more “developed with concern to their particular materiality as well as their vast variety of 
methods of presentation and dissemination” (ibid.) which is a quite loose and formal way to 
frame its outcomes. I don’t mean to say that Olson or Vierkant believe that artists should 
engage with the internet in such a flippant manner, but I think that it has played a part in 
justifying quite superficial work in this way. 
 
Being Critical and Critical Distance 
‘Being critical’ is more of a general sentiment here than one that can be tied to specific 
definitions or authors. In art it can mean a number of things: challenging or subverting 
institutions, the status quo, language, provoking questions, encouraging reflection and 
revealing new experiences. It is important for this dissertation that ‘being critical’ is also 
understood as a function of play, where “critical play” according to Mary Flanagan means:  
  
[...] to create or occupy play environments and activities that represent one or more questions 
about aspects of human life. These questions can be abstract, […] or concrete […]. Critical 
play is characterized by a careful examination of social, cultural, political, or even personal 
themes that function as alternates to popular play spaces (Flanagan 2009, p.6).   
 
Flanagan’s research addresses play for the most part from the development of “radical game 
design”. I do not however focus on game design, as I am using her reflections on play to 
consider art. Flanagan’s is also an art historical approach that looks to the past in considering 
critical approaches to play. Games and new media art researcher Ragnhild Tronstad critiques 
Flanagan’s research in his article “The Productive Paradox of Critical Play” (2010): 
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Flanagan does provide loose definitions of ‘play’ and ‘games’ […] leaving both terms rather 
open for associated meanings. However, she doesn’t address the apparent paradox in the 
concept ‘critical play,’ or how these two terms, put together like this, must necessarily 
influence each other. What happens to play when it becomes critical? And how might critical 
content be influenced by play? (Tronstad 2010, para.6). 
 
As I articulated in my aims above, I hope that my own research builds on Flanagan’s and can 
help her to respond to such a criticism, as I believe Flanagan does in fact address the paradox 
that Tronstad identifies. It is the very nature of critical play as a paradox which has lead to the 
production and proliferation of many artworks in the past, including within my own practice. 
I believe critical play is a legitimate and rigorous form of enquiry that can yield interesting 
results through further articulation. 
 
‘Critical distance’ is a term I use in consideration of jokes and humour, especially in 
terms of producing playful judgements or comic contrasts. Drawing on Sigmund Freud, 
Henri Bergson, and Jack Babuscio (see Chapter 3) I take into account the notion that we 
distance ourselves through laugher, in order to be ‘in’ and ‘out’ of something at the same 
time, and that this is similar to the paradox of ‘critical play’. We could say that being playful, 
or telling jokes, produces ‘critical distance’. I draw out this concept more fully in my 
discussion of perversity and perverse play (Chapter 3). 
 
Affect and Affection 
When Bishop speaks of affect, she is referring to the way artists might interrogate how users 
come to be changed (affected) by internet culture. I have raised this in terms of implicit 
narcissism, which can link us into affective circuits; “men [sic] at once become fascinated by 
any extensions of themselves in any material other than themselves” (Fisher n.d, para.2). In 
this case, digital networks are the ‘material’ carrying such representations of self in digital 
culture.  
 
In Baudrillard’s terms (1988, p.12) “The scene and the mirror have given way to a 
screen and a network”. Like looking into a mirror, the screens of digital culture provide us 
with many opportunities to exercise our fascination with our own extended image; video 
games, social networking sites, and online dating systems are but a few general examples of 
environments that involve representations of ‘self’ participating in networks beyond a 
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physical bodies. Individuals seek to maintain, act through and present these external ‘selves’ 
to others. These ‘selves’ might be game avatars, personal profiles, profile pictures, or 
blogging identities. Through creative engagement in digital cultures, individuals can both 
change, and are changed by, what appears on (mostly) screens in the contemporary world. As 
for contributing to Bishop’s claimed disavowal of an interrogation of affect, this is a form of 
circuitry that all users in digital culture participate in – whether they are an artist or not.  
  
 My deployment of the concept of ‘affect’ in this dissertation draws from its definition 
in Benedict de Spinoza’s The Ethics (1677). In his thought, affect is closely bound to 
emotion. ‘Affect’ refers to modifications and variations produced in a body, including in the 
mind (which should not be seen as separate to the body), by an interaction with another body 
that increases or diminishes the body’s power of activity (Negri 1988, p.xv). Affect is 
therefore about power, or the capacity to act. Both Spinoza and Deleuze are interested in 
what a body can do, rather than what it is. For Deleuze and Felix Guattari, affect stands 
independently of any affected subjects and are pre-personal as transitional states of bodies. 
This is important in Deleuze’s definition of art, because an art object represents a bloc of 
affects in an objective state (Young, Genosko and Watson 2013, p.25). This aspect of the 
term ‘affect’, however, as it concerns a definition for art, is beyond the scope of the 
dissertation and is left alone in terms of analysis.  
 
To differentiate it from affect, affection more specifically refers to encounters 
between two specific bodies; an affected body and an affecting body according to Brian 
Massumi (Shouse, 2005). Affection refers to an encounter where affects are exchanged, and 
therefore to power relations between individual bodies. In digital cultures, individuals are 
often represented as images on screens, and therefore Deleuze’s structure of affection-image 
is expanded on and discussed extensively in Chapters 4 and 5, where affection and power 
relations are key to my critical analysis of online gay dating apps through a number of digital 
artworks exploring the face as a fascistic digital structure.  
 
Identity and Essentialisation 
In the concluding segment of my dissertation, affect and affection will be discussed in light 
of Gilbert Simondon’s notion of “individuation” (Simondon, 1992) as it pertains to play 
through comparison to Miguel Sicart’s concept of playful “re-ontologising” or “Quixotean 
Play” (Sicart 2014a, para.21). In a discussion of subjects interacting with other bodies in 
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digital cultures, we need to consider how affection and the interplay of affects change or 
define ‘bodies’ as individual states through time; when is something ‘what it is’? When is 
someone ‘who they are’? Can we equate ‘identity’ to ‘body’? If so, on one hand we have 
identities (bodies), on the other we have affects, and as affects act upon bodies, identities 
change. This process is referred to as individuation.  
 
In The Cultural Politics of Emotion (2004) Sara Ahmed alludes to this process when 
she explores “how emotions work to shape the surfaces of individual and collective bodies” 
and that “bodies take the shape of the very contact they have with objects and others” 
(Ahmed, 2004, p.1) over time. Gilles Deleuze tells us additionally in Difference and 
Repetition (1994) that individuals are defined by their rate of change, through the interplay of 
affects and individual states, rather than by any solid identity. In this, Deleuze is heavily 
influenced by Simondon (Nash 2014, p.2), and it is an important concept in the final chapter 
when individuation is discussed as a core component of understanding artists’ critical play. I 
have come to understand that the playful re-ontologising of self, otherwise understood as the 
manipulation of the representation of stages of individuation is core to artists’ critical play 
and this is discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
Queerness 
This dissertation represents a queer perspective on art and play. Through my engagement 
with online dating spaces as a queer artist, it is important to consider how such spaces come 
to shape their users in terms of sexual identity. Ahmed is interested in the sexualisation of 
space generally and how spaces orient us. I generally mean ‘queerness’ or being ‘queer’ as a 
broad divergence from normative patterns of identity formation and relationships to digital 
culture and society in general.  For example, Chapter 4 specifically deals with a project I 
produced as a critique of the gay online dating applications Grindr and Hornet, which 
facilitate homosexual alternatives to physical and online dating. In Chapter 4, the face is 
discussed as a coded structure that may limit or render static otherwise queer orientations, 
and foregrounds this with a discussion of Deleuzian affection-image. Ahmed provides us 
with an identification of what makes something queer:  
 
 
 
 
 13 
Queer orientations are those that put within reach bodies that have been made unreachable by 
the lines of conventional genealogy. Queer orientations might be those that don’t line up, 
which by seeing the world ‘slantwise’ allow other objects to come into view. A queer 
orientation might be one that does not overcome what is ‘off line’ and hence acts out of line 
with others (Ahmed, 2006, p.107). 
 
Queerness has implications in any discussion of affect and identity because queerness 
engenders the potential for lines of flight away from conventional genealogy. These are less 
recognisable, perhaps less solid (and more changing), identifications produced in contrast to 
codified, normative ones. Judith Butler asserts in her writing on masculinity that behaviours 
“stick” through a “stylized repetition of acts through time” (Butler 1990, p.192) and become 
codes of behaviour if enough people perform them in a similar way.  
 
The nature of digital cultures, especially given the influence of algorithms and 
aggregates of digital data, as well as the swarming of like-minded users around similar 
identifications, means that many more perspectives and tendencies can become such 
‘repeated actions over time’ than ever before. If ‘play’ functions to repeatedly hook users into 
performing similar actions ‘over time’, creative or otherwise, then what room for queerness is 
there in notions of play? Play, it would seem, cannot always be seen as so freeform or fluid as 
queerness radically posits.  
 
Players and playfulness 
For the purposes of this dissertation, a player is not just someone who plays games, 
experiences play culture, or is a participant in play and games studies. The notion of play has 
been around for too great a period of time to be limited to this field. Artists have forever been 
using the concept of play to describe both internal and external relationships between their 
world and their practice. Indeed the word ‘play’ is used quite generally in the art world 
without being well accounted for. This dissertation works towards contributing to an 
expanded definition of a ‘player’ by considering how artists play critically. Miguel Sicart 
already makes a strong case for the expansion of the notion of play in Play Matters (2014):  
 
What we want is the attitude of play without the activity of play. We need to take the same 
stance toward things, the world, and others that we take during play. But we should not 
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play… We want play without play. We want playfulness – the capacity to use play outside the 
context of play (Sicart 2014b, p.21). 
 
This is perhaps what I am striving for when I discuss or use the term ‘play’ as an artist 
throughout my dissertation, as I have not designed digital games or experiences that might 
even be codified as play experiences, rather I am looking at an attitude or more elusive 
underpinning towards playful processes. I have not designed artworks that necessarily appear 
similar to art-game crossovers (‘art games’) like those of Pippin Barr or pervasive games; 
community games or games for socialisation and wellbeing, as Flanagan or others might. My 
artworks and their playful underpinnings tend to have much more ambiguous, personal and 
dark undertones. Sicart argues: 
 
Playfulness allows us to extend the importance of play outside the boundaries of formalized, 
autotelic events, away from designed playthings like toys, or spaces like the playground or the 
stadium. It effectively allows seeing how play is a general attitude to life. Playfulness expands 
the ecology of play and shows its actual importance not only in the making of culture but also 
in the very being of human, on how being playful and playing is what defines us. We are 
because we play, but also because we can be playful (2014b, p.34). 
 
This concept of play defining who we are becomes very important in later stages of the 
dissertation. Throughout my exploration of identities, faces, and bodies leading up to Chapter 
7, the concept of individuation gains prominence as something that underpins all play 
processes. In Chapters 3, 4 and 5, the concepts of caricature, subversion, microfascisms, and 
probe-heads will serve to illustrate playfulness as a dark, critical, radical, and even a 
curiously reductive strategy.  
 
Play 
Theories of play can be traced back from contemporary thinkers of games like Katie Salen 
and Eric Zimmerman, through Brian Sutton-Smith, Roger Caillois and Johan Huizinga, and 
finally into the early aesthetics of Friedrich Schiller and Immanuel Kant. My investigation 
follows what we could call the aesthetic tradition of play thinking (Sicart, 2016). Kant’s 
contribution to one of the first major theories of art, via the concept of beauty, primarily 
involves “A freeform play of the senses” which is “[…] conceived by Kant to be a product of 
the mind’s mental freedom and autonomy in assigning normative structures in the world, 
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such as harmony, perfection and function” (Sageng 2014, p.2). As such, Kant’s loose 
definition of play in relation to beauty involves at once a subjective, personal freedom and an 
appreciation of the objective world as it “ought to be” (Sageng 2014, p.3). The ongoing 
flavour permeating theories of play today echoes this paradoxical ‘freedom in structure’ or 
‘freedom versus structure’ or ‘at once free, yet also bound’ type of conception that informs 
the phrase ‘critical play’. Schiller’s response to Kant’s account of play and beauty in his 
letters On the Aesthetic Education of Man (1795) involves a play-based society where 
activities and identities within such a society evolve and change in a playful, freeform way: 
 
Schiller famously held that one must posit a ‘play drive’ which mediates between the timeless 
demands of subjective identity on the one hand, and the givenness and situatedness provided 
the sensuous drive (Sageng, 2014, p.3). 
 
Schiller’s definition of play thus involves mediation between subjectivity and external reality 
(or, in his words, the “sense” and “form” drives) in a similar manner to Kant’s, but Schiller 
extends the notion of freeform play ideologically into the concept of “aesthetic education” 
with the aim of helping society to achieve political freedom through the interplay of many 
binaries like passivity and activity, infinity and matter, sense and form. In these instances 
play comes to illustrate playfulness in culture rather than the concept of play as an organised 
practice centred on the experience of games. It is this fixation on gaming and perhaps even 
the development of games studies and cultures of gamers that can distract us from the 
universal nature of play, where games become the limiting of play to specific forms of late 
capitalist consumption. This gives play an exchange value both in terms of its consumption as 
an activity and as a form of knowledge. 
 
Play as commoditised consumption is a difficult proposition. Roger Caillois, in Man, 
Play and Games (1961), informs us that concepts of play require a broader plane from which 
to offer perspective, because “Huizinga seemed to ignore or minimise the diversified forms 
of play and the many needs served by play activity in various cultural contexts” (Caillois 
1961, p.ix) and Caillois affirms that similar types of binaries as present in Kant and Schiller 
are present in conceptions of play in the Twentieth Century:  
 
 16 
Summing up the formal characteristics of play we might call it a free activity standing quite 
consciously outside “ordinary” life as being “not serious”, but at the same time absorbing the 
player intensely and utterly (Caillois 1961, p.4). 
 
The “intense” and “utter absorption” of play should mean that it has a real-world impact, at 
least insofar as play affects our lives, our minds and our relationships to others, yet Caillois 
goes on to try and distance the outcome of play from the world, defining play as “free, 
separate, uncertain and…” importantly to our discussion “...unproductive”: 
 
It is an activity connected with no material interest, and no profit can be gained by it. It 
proceeds within its own proper boundaries of time and space according to fixed rules and in 
an orderly manner. It promotes the formation of social groupings that tend to surround 
themselves with secrecy and to stress their difference from the common world by disguise or 
other means (ibid.) 
 
I, however, strongly agree with Flanagan’s assertion that play can be thought of as entirely 
productive and very integrated with the so-called ‘real world’. Play has some real impact to 
bear on reality which, to Flanagan (2010, p.5) is “not an invariant external structure” and is 
therefore very much affected by what play produces. Creativity theorist Mikhail 
Csikszentmihalyi supports this notion by asking “How is it possible for play to be both 
divorced from reality and yet so rife with real-life consequences?” (Flanagan, 2010, p.1). 
 
This has implications for the widely debated notion of Huizinga’s “magic circle”. As 
theorist of synthetic worlds, Edward Castronova has pointed out, a synthetic world “cannot 
be sealed completely; people are crossing it all the time in both directions, carrying their 
behavioural assumptions and attitudes with them" (2005, p.147). When it comes to the 
boundary between synthetic play worlds and reality, for Castronova “the distinction is 
increasingly difficult to see” (ibid). In this sense, play worlds will always be assessed in 
terms of how we make sense of them given our existing reality. 
 
While we may think then of a play scenario as being born of an existing reality and 
existing on that reality’s terms, play scenarios can also render alternative realities on their 
own terms. Flanagan’s assertion that artists’ play is subversive is here relevant, as play not 
only reflects ‘reality’ but also produces something when it is critical of it. Important to 
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Flanagan’s argument is that artists (in her case, particularly visual artists, but I acknowledge 
that many types of artist can participate in this claim) have long known this, and through the 
study and deployment of representations artists play with realities by making copies of them 
which are slightly different (Flanagan uses Freud’s ‘uncanny’), tweaked through a subjective 
lens, or subverted entirely.  
 
By understanding a play construction in relation to the world, we become sensitive to 
subversion or critique by picking up on changes and manipulations that have been selectively 
made by a creator through translation. This subjective influence alters its logic (of 
representation and operation) through its status a simulation, which as we know is an 
“imitation of the operation of a real-world process or system over time” (Banks et al, 2001, 
p.3). The differences between the ‘real’ world and the ‘play’ world allow us, the player, to 
perceive of the ‘real’ world in a new light and perhaps it is these new versions of existing 
reality that play produces. We may find ourselves having control over systems we otherwise 
might not have (particularly concerning, in Flanagan’s writing, the agency of young women), 
or by having the space to discover new possibilities in simulations that we might not have 
had the chance to in the ‘real’ otherwise. 
 
Community of Practice 
So what does play look like according to this dissertation, given that artists participate 
in it? My own artworks, discussed later, were produced between 2013 and 2015, and I have 
since made work that is not discussed in this dissertation at any point. The context or 
theoretical backdrop for my artwork up until the time I had started my dissertation in 2013 
was post-internet-ism, which I have mentioned and critiqued earlier. Since exactly 2008 (the 
year the term ‘post-internet’ was coined) I have been making art responding to the internet, 
games and technology informed by net-art concepts such as telematics, and, I have been 
working with the real-time 3D game engine Unity3D since its first release.  
 
My work was featured in a show Tabularium at Slopes Gallery, Melbourne in 2014. 
This show exhibited works by other international and renowned post-internet artists. It was 
curated by Alana Kushnir and included Jon Rafman, Lawrence Lek, Heman Chong, Anthony 
Mercellini, Ry David Bradley, Katja Novitskova and Eloise Bonneviot. Problematically 
though, I never did and still do not, see my work as being post-internet. My contribution was 
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indeed overlooked by some reviewers who felt that I was not enthusiastic enough as a post-
internet artist to be mentioned alongside any of these people. This status may have had a 
silver-lining; as the film maker John Waters advises in his video interview with Amanda 
Marcotte, when making art “try to get on the coolest people one year ahead of you in school’s 
nerves” (Marcotte, 2017).  
 
The community of practice that I see my work being most contemporarily aligned 
with has risen or matured in the last four years, since I began writing this dissertation. This 
‘community’ that I talk through is more analogous than homologous – it isn’t centred on any 
particular social grouping or actual community, although some international Facebook groups 
like Casual 3D Potluck, Casual VR Potluck, or Unreality Journeys, as well as studying with 
game designers, has helped me to find artists and designers working in a similar zone to 
myself and some, particularly Robert Yang and Pippin Barr, do work together. Some would 
see themselves as game designers, some as artists. Some are inspired by games, others by 
social media. The game designers I mention here might be thought of as ‘art-game crossover’ 
or ‘art-play crossover’ artists under the terms ‘Alt Games’ or ‘Art Games’, while others are 
‘outsider artists’ or popular, humorous, queer artists with online followings working 
particularly in the realm of real-time 3D art, which is the medium I most closely identify with 
as an artist. There is no particular term that draws them all together, but I see elements of 
each in my own work and research contribution. I have followed the work of each 
individually and many of them follow me through social media, especially Instagram, 
YouTube and Facebook. Generally I connect with the following artists because they: 
 
• Exhibit an interest in the history of play and games, evidenced by the way they 
employ game-like tropes in formal as well as conceptual ways. 
• Portray 3D art in an anti-aesthetic, punk, glitch, broken, grotesque or 
subversive way and are not trying to create clean or utopian representations of 
technology. 
• Are not ‘too serious’ – they use humour, are playful and freely delight in a 
play with the vast possibilities of digital forms in 3D. 
• Don’t tend to centre the work on their own self, self-empowerment, 
entrepreneurship, or income (with the exception of Wendy Vainity who does 
this in a subversive way) as this is very common to post-internet-ism. This 
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means that the artists aren’t trying to rationalise their lack of empowerment in 
digital media systems by performing narratives of personal capital or 
‘disappearing into’ capitalism.  
• Are queer, punk-like, or portray issues pertaining to homosexual engagement 
with digital media. 
 
Robert Yang 
http://www.debacle.us  
Robert Yang is a celebrated alt-games designer and thinker whose work covers a similar 
critical conceptual territory to mine in terms of queer and psychosexual content. He is a 
major figure in the conception and dissemination of the term ‘alt-games’. Alt-games – a term 
that has been around since 2015 and includes games that are “too experimental or offbeat to 
be ‘indie’ or ‘AAA’" (Kareem, 2015, para.1) – still resist solid definition but basically refer 
to small-scale independently made games that are personal, have a specific or reduced focus, 
an artistic focus, and/or are not being made for profit (unlike indie games) (@Inurashii, 
2015). Yang’s notable works are many and include: Cobra Club (2015), a digital play 
experience where players can create and modify dick-pics (penis photographs) of an alterable 
3D avatar; and Stick Shift (2015), a “Short driving game about pleasuring a gay car and 
bringing it to climax” (Yang, 2017, para.6).  
 
In 2014 I exhibited a number of works that involved the play of 3D sexual bodies that 
were a critique of the gay dating app Grindr based on my personal engagement with the 
platform. These works are discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, but I see how Yang has developed 
these themes in his own work after mine to be an affirmation (in my own mind) of the 
relevance of my own digital experiments in this contemporary area. I don’t personally see my 
own work as being ‘alt-games’, but I see a likeness in my desire to caricature affective 
systems in a critical way, something that I discuss in Chapter 5. My critical caricature of 
affective systems particularly resonates with the alt-games tenet of having a reduced focus – 
being a critical portrayal of a specific experience – and heightening or exploding that 
experience by distending not only the visual or sonic tropes of it, but also the mechanics – 
through metaphor, anti-aesthetic, and humor. In my own work, for example, this involved the 
reductive portrayal of Grindr through a naked body that could be smeared around in a glitchy 
way ‘under’ the screen using touch input in Gay Under Glass (2014), or the reductive 
mapping of ego-gratification to the ‘like’ button in Fragile Ego (2013). This reflects a similar 
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spirit of caricature and humor that Yang exhibits when he maps homosexual arousal to a car 
gearstick in Stick Shift (2015) or the entire Grindr experience to that of taking the perfect 
dick-pic in Cobra Club (2015), although this pic would be deliberately glitched and distorted 
because of the nature of the 3D bodies used. 
 
Pippin Barr 
https://www.pippinbarr.com/ 
Pippin Barr could be thought of as an “Art-Games” practitioner, which is a term that has been 
around since the early 2000s, and much longer than “Alt-Games”,. The prototypical art-
games artist that people usually refer to is Cory Arcangel but Barr is a more relevant fit here, 
particularly because of his sense of humour, which is quite dark and witty. Humour is 
something important to play and to my practice, which I discuss in Chapter 3. Arcangel also 
has some humour in his work but, in general, I see his work as being more about form, and 
the tension between games and art as forms or objects. Art-games could refer to artworks 
produced inside games (machinima), about games (Arcangel), or games that are about art, 
which many of Barr’s are:  Barr calls his outcomes “games” (Barr, 2017). Obvious art-games 
in his oeuvre include “Art Game” (2013) and many of his games refer to celebrated 
performance artist Marina Abramovic including The Digital Marina Abramovic Insititute 
(2013), and Post-Apocalyptic Abramovic Method Game (2016). The caption for Barr’s game 
Let’s Play: Let’s Play: Ancient Greek Punishment: Art Edition Edition (2016) reads: 
 
It’s a game! In a painting! On a wall! In a gallery! In a game! Or something! Marvel as you 
once again confront that most boring question! Are games art?! Is art some kind of a damn 
game to you?! (Barr, 2015, para.1) 
 
Like Barr, I care, but like to pretend I am flippant about the question ‘Are games art?’ 
because to me art and games are linked by aesthetics and play. I tend to believe that the issue 
of classifying art and games are based on communities of practice (who is viewing or 
consuming the work) more than anything else, or, if they aren’t, it is at least more useful to 
see these distinctions as superfluous in order to make original content that occupies its own 
space. What I actually like about Barr’s art-games is, like alt-games, they present very 
specific and reduced mechanics for conceptual purposes – often they deliberately break or 
resist the player in order to make a particular point, and display dark and humorous outcomes 
as a result. Like play and critical play in general, Barr’s work explores frustrating paradoxes 
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and tensions through humour and subversion. Two examples are Let’s Play: Let’s Play: 
Ancient Greek Punishment: Art Edition Edition (2016), and Sisyphus: The Game (2010); both 
games that emphasise futility of interaction and punishment of the player or their avatar 
through banal or repetitive gestures (pressing the same button over and over again, for 
example). Other later works of his such as the recent V r 3 – a gallery of digital water (Meier, 
2017, para.1) also reflect my interest in the digital aesthetics of 3D art.  
 
Hunter Jonakin 
http://hunterjonakin.com/ 
Hunter Jonakin is another art-games type of artist though he refers to himself as a multimedia 
artist (Jonakin, 2017, para.1) and operates in a more traditional contemporary art sphere. We 
first connected over our interest in the influence and legacy of the big-business artist Jeff 
Koons whose work I’ve written about (Penney, 2010). Jonakin’s best-known work is a 
refitted arcade machine that houses a first-person-shooter called Jeff Koons Must Die!!! 
(2011) in which the player goes around a gallery that exhibits a Koons retrospective and can 
destroy the artwork with a rocket launcher until Koons’s army of lawyers shows up to attack 
them. Jonakin’s approach is reflected in some of my own work produced in an earlier period, 
such as my first ever fully realised Unity3D artwork Valhalla – Virtual William St (2010), 
also a first person shooter produced for two sculptural video-game machines depicted below. 
 
 
Figure 1, Tom Penney, Valhalla – Virtual William St (2010). Curtin University, interactive real-
time 3D environment in expandable foam, plaster, clay, wood and electronics.  
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There are important conceptual and formal connections between our practices. A lot of my 
work prior to starting this dissertation, between 2008 and 2011, responded to the 
philosophical problem that Koons had created for art through his smarmy, showman-like and 
egocentric conflation of art with capital, as well as conflating this business-like pursuit with 
forms of spirituality, such as his claim for his giant flower puppy that “Puppy communicates 
love, warmth and happiness to everyone. I created a contemporary Sacred Heart 
of Jesus” (Koons 1993, p.144). Koons has also stirred up theorists, especially Rosalind 
Krauss, through the way he elevates kitsch, appropriation, banality and pop cuteness to the 
status of high or fine art (Rothkopf 2014, p.25).  
 
We could easily trace Koons’s legacy through to many of the issues post-internet-ism 
exhibits. One such example is Ryder Ripps, who has been compared to Koons when 
exhibiting and appropriating a woman’s Instagram through a series of warped hyper-realistic 
paintings in his show Ho (Sokol, 2015) which was meant to be Ripps’ critique of a "constant 
reflexive feedback loop of ego" (Sokol, 2015, para.4). Ripps even hired some of Koons’s 
own assistants to make the work (Sokol, 2015, para.5). He has in turn been criticized for his 
own egocentrism (and misogyny) by objectifying an entire person for his own personal gain. 
He has done this in not only one project, but also in others such as Art Whore (2014) where 
he was “soliciting sensual masseuses from Craigslist (whom he consistently refers to as “sex 
workers”) to make drawings for him in order to demonstrate that he’s being exploited as an 
artist” (Kimball 2014, para.2), which is problematic and concerning given Ripps is born of 
both wealth and privilege.  
 
What I like about Jonakin’s work and its critique of Koons, is the attempt to simulate 
the destruction and disavowal of these problems of ego for art, positioning the player to 
sidestep these paradoxes for art thinking (the blurring of the self and the system), through a 
subversive caricature of Koons and his practice, using representation as well as mechanics to 
ham this up and ‘play’ it. The symbolic diminishing of an ego-gone-wild by reducing it, here 
through its simulation and rocket-launcher assault in a play experience, is important to me as 
an artist and important to the notion of a playful caricature. It participates in an oft-forgotten 
or overlooked legacy of humorous punk in art, a humour that allows us to simulate and step 
outside of a problem in order to see it objectively. I discuss this function of humour further in 
Chapter 3. 
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Wendy Vainity 
https://www.youtube.com/user/wendyvainity 
Wendy Vainity is a self-taught ‘outsider artist’ who lives in Adelaide, South Australia and 
has been referred to as “the Henry Darger of the Internet” (Chayka, 2012). I knew of Vainity 
before many of the artists in this community of practice selection: I fell in love with her work 
immediately. Vainity is a great example of an artist working with the portrayal of self or 
identity online, but she does it in a very free-form way that doesn’t pay any heed to the ego-
politics of contemporary art discussion. Vainity plays with the presentation of her own body 
in a completely bizarre, self-effacing way. It’s not self-conscious in that it attempts to hide 
any insecurity or boost her own profile, it really is as if she does not care at all about what 
anyone thinks and genuinely enjoys the material remixing of her own body and self (via an 
avatar) through tacky, surreal, and garish 3D video art.  
 
Vainity makes 3D representations of her body which are often rigid and awkward, lip 
synched badly to distorted audio, use motion capture dance moves, have erratic CG hair with 
settings maxed out to uncanny and disturbing proportions, wears CG cloth outfits that flap in 
similarly uncanny and bizarre ways, uses bright colours and lots of tacky generated effects 
and lots of distorted audio. This lack of care for what people think expresses itself in fantastic 
titles such as “bare-arsed Tedda bear does lunch in the park” or “just all other my crap” (sic) 
(Vainity, 2017). As I discuss in later chapters, particularly Chapters 2, 6 and 7, identity play 
and this ability to ‘play oneself’, be it through figurative representations of one’s own body, 
or through the manipulation of extensions of the body in other objects and symbols, is crucial 
to the notion of artist’s critical play because its consistency is that of a constant re-framing 
and testing of what the self might be over time. 
 
Theo Triantafyllidis (Trian) 
http://slimetech.org/ 
Theo Trian is a contemporary artist working with real-time 3D and the software Unity3D like 
myself. Trian’s employment of anti-aesthetic, abjection, and remixing of the body is quite 
akin to my own. Similar too, is the way he works with clay objects and 3D scans of these 
objects to produce deliberately crude, wet-looking digital sculptures using shiny digital 
shaders. This is how I produced many of my past 3D digital forms, and I continue to use 3D 
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photo scanning techniques to do the same. In “Self Portrait (Interior)” (2016) Trian reflects 
many of the concepts I discuss in Chapter 5, where a digital representation of his own body 
becomes a digital Surrealist “autotopography” (Bal, 2002). When cultural theorist Mieke Bal 
discusses celebrated post-surrealist artist Louise Bourgeois’ sculptural practice, she uses 
“autotopography” as term to describe the perverse and psychosexual reversal of the ‘interior’ 
of Bourgeois’ subjectivity to an ‘exterior’ environment; a topography that allows others to 
physically (or, in the case of Trian, digitally) explore a psychology and interiority of a body 
and its subjectivity. Much of Trian’s outcomes feature random and disparate objects, body 
parts, animals, foods, and erratic abstractions. Such a practice functions to fetishise and 
rapidly parse a perverse series of partial objects as digital forms. I discuss this type of 
perversity as artistic practice in Chapters 3 and 4. 
 
Cool 3D World 
https://www.facebook.com/cool3dworld/ 
Cool 3D World is a collaboration between Brian Tessler and Jon Baken and started as a Vine 
account. Like Wendy Vainity’s work, Cool 3D World is a series of videos rendered in a 3D 
software package that has become hugely popular online. The videos display grotesquely 
distorted, monstrous human forms participating in bizarre acts. ‘Human’ bodies lay eggs, 
grow trees from their face, eat other bodies, have whole universes inside them, make ugly 
baby sounds, sing horrible songs, or pop pimples that explode into new beings. Sometimes 
they defecate whole sandwiches or it rains gurgling, grimacing faces, or there are lakes filled 
with naked men rotating and making squeaky sounds. Bodies scream and repetitively enact 
the same unsettling movements and animations. There is something like a contemporary 
version of a 90s ‘gross-out’ cartoon like ‘Ren and Stimpy’ feel to these videos, although a 
sense of plot has been abandoned for Surrealistic segues into new transformations. In a 
similar way to Trian above, such work reflects a perverse fascination with the re-organisation 
of the body, a type of ‘probe-head-ism’ that I discuss in Chapter 5, as well as the subversion 
of bodies as objects that can be reorganised and transformed that I discuss in Chapters 4 and 
6. 
 
Geoffrey Lillemon 
http://www.geoffreylillemon.com/website/  
Geoffrey Lillemon is a queer artist working with a punk, camp, garish real-time 3D art, 
"outgrowing the stems of popitude culture, art fabrications, and digital dystopia, vowing for 
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retirement in a pixellated reinaissance of the Disney ghetto" (Lillemon, 2016). Much of his 
work like Hiss Missy (2016), Bitmap Banshees (2016), or the Nailpolish Inferno (2014-2016), 
portray queer representations of bodies and a fascination with surrealistic subversions and 
psychosexual arrangements of bodies. There is also an interest in witches and dark magic, 
something I discuss in Chapter 5. The Nailpolish Inferno (2014-16) is "[a] strip club filled 
with looks of the digital media world and all the extremes that pass through our field of 
vision: vain, semi-celebrities, grotesque figures, and techno glitter" (Lillemon, 2017, para.9). 
Rendered in real-time 3D with exaggerated digital materiality, these works mirror attitudes in 
my own, especially in regards to the playing down of ego. As in other examples, Lillemon’s 
work involves a pure joy expressed through the ability to play with, rearrange and remix 
bodies in a Frankensteinian manner and subvert good taste and the normative arrangements 
of bodies.  
 
Tender 
https://creators.vice.com/en_au/article/this-piece-of-meat-just-swiped-right 
Cors Brinkman, Jeroen van Oorschot, Marcello Maureira, and Matei Szabo produced an 
artwork in 2015 called Tender which was a subversion of the dating app Tinder (Veix, 2015). 
Tinder is a dating app where you can say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to people’s profiles who are in your 
area. The artwork was a machine that had a rotating arm and a slot for a phone that had the 
Tinder app open. A piece of meat was attached to the rotating arm that rotated forever, 
swiping ‘right’ on every Tinder profile that came up on the phone’s screen. When you ‘swipe 
right’ as opposed to ‘swipe left’ on Tinder, it means that you like the look of the person’s 
dating profile that is on your screen. Tender was essentially a machine that liked everyone’s 
dating profile. This work has participated in a similar playful critique to my own way of 
representing the body and the futility of dating apps in a mechanical, comical way, as 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
Other Artists 
There are many other artists that I could include as aesthetic or conceptual peers in this 
community of practice, such as Austin Lee, Jon Rafman, Ramesh Mario Nithiyendran, Philip 
Brophy, Sam Lyon (“Jellygummies”), Eva Papamargariti, Ryan Trecartin, Paul Yore, Mo 
Chamas, Georgie Roxby Smith, “Badly Re-Created Animation Film Frames” 
(https://9gag.com/gag/5570127/badly-recreated-animated-film-frames), all whom share an 
interest in the medium of digital 3D art, digital form, punkness, queerness, anti-aesthetic, 
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subversion, surrealism, and humour. All to varying degrees constitute perverse practices and 
all re-imagine bodies in subverted, transformed, and reconfigured ways. Many of the above 
utilise 3D scanning and printing techniques, transferring anti-aesthetic forms between 
physical sculptures and digital applications. Some are interested in magic, alchemy, and 
witchcraft (see Chapter 5). This reflects my interest in doing the same with my own plasticine 
sculptures and characters from The Sims, discussed throughout the following chapters of this 
dissertation. 
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2 Playing Critically 
 
In late 2015 I picked up a copy of Toys Redux: An Anthology on Play as Critical Action 
(Gygax and Welter, 2015) that had accompanied an exhibition at the Migros Museum für 
Gegenwartskunst. The anthology draws together artists for whom play is central, without 
looking at games, toys, or play experiences in any limiting way. The book, while promising 
an “anthology on play as critical action”, offers mostly political sentiments and accounts for 
the ways artists have been influenced by video games or toys. I hope to shed more light on 
what play actually does critically for this community of practice, or how it might operate in 
artistic practice, and subsequently incorporate this into an expanded definition of critical play 
by the end of the dissertation.  
 
In order to achieve this I investigate my own practice, which is characterised and 
informed by critical play that involves the creation of critical artworks. The artworks I have 
made in this research critique gay online dating applications and make use of a number of 
digital applications. In this mode of production, play becomes the method by which critical 
ideas are generated. The production of work and its surrounding thought processes, rather 
than necessarily the art-outcomes themselves, are the more important factor here in terms of 
the generation of new knowledge. This chapter is concerned with the articulation of this 
largely practice-led research method.  These methods especially concern the theme of identity 
and inform the conclusion of the dissertation in Chapter 7 which concerns the production of 
identities through play. 
 
Art-Based Research 
Art-based research is a form of practice-led research. In Art Practice as Research: Inquiry in 
Visual Arts, Graeme Sullivan argues that the “imaginative and intellectual work undertaken 
by artists is research” (2010, xix).  He continues: 
 
The critical and creative investigations that occur in studios, galleries, on the Internet, in 
community spaces, and other places where artists work, are forms of research based on studio 
art practice. Rather than adopting methods of inquiry from the social sciences, the research 
practices explored subscribe to the view that similar research goals can be achieved by 
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following different yet complementary paths. What is common is the attention to systematic 
inquiry, yet in a way that privileges the role imagination and intellect plays in constructing 
knowledge that is not only new but has the capacity to transform human understanding (ibid.) 
  
As this PhD seeks to use my own individual approaches to making art in order to approach 
the research question art-based research has been the logical methodology. This process 
involves exploring play techniques, as integral to cultural practice (Flanagan, 2009; Sutton-
Smith, 1997), within art practice. Focusing on the idea of play and affection in digital 
cultures, this research (both the artworks and dissertation) evolves around a series of iterative 
probes and inquiry. For art-based researcher Shaun McNiff: 
  
[…] a defining quality of art-based researchers is their willingness to start the work with 
questions and a willingness to design methods in response to the particular situation, as 
contrasted to the more general contemporary tendency within the human sciences to fit the 
question into a fixed research method. The art of the art-based researcher extends to the 
creation of a process of inquiry (2007, p.33). 
  
This “particular situation” for my research, as suggested by McNiff above, was discussed in 
Chapter 1 in relation to digital artists, play, and affective technology (which includes dating 
apps) within digital cultures. Throughout Chapter I discussed a number of approaches, 
forming a process of inquiry in response to this situation, or as McNiff has called it “the 
creation of a process of inquiry” (ibid.). This approach draws from an adapted version of 
Mary Flanagan’s “Critical Play”, and begins with the term “enquiry machine” (Jungnickel, 
2015). 
 
Enquiry Machines  
While McNiff states that art-based research need not adopt methods from the social sciences, 
art-based research projects such as this one can inevitably create insights into social problems 
given the contexts that such artists work in or reflect in the creation of practical work. Noortje 
Marres, contributing to Nina Wakeford and Celia Lury’s anthology Inventive Methods 
(2012), writes about the “living experiment” as a way of living through a problem practically:    
 
[...] the living experiment presents a notable device of social and cultural research: it provides 
a format or ‘protocol’ for exploring and testing forms of life, which is today widely applied 
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across social life. And because of this [...] can be used to explore collective practices of 
researching social and cultural change, as engaged in by actors who do not necessarily 
identify themselves as ‘social researchers’ (Marres, 2012, p.76). 
 
In my own circumstances, the environment in which I am a ‘living experiment’ involves my 
use of gay online dating applications (and to a degree other social media sites and video 
games). This will be discussed at length in Chapter 4 Fascism in Face-ism. To artists 
generally, their method of research is their own and very much reflects their own lives and 
habitual modes of enquiry. Artists form “living experiments” (Marres, 2012, p.76) as they are 
very much connected to and sensitive to their lived environment as the pool from which is 
inspiration is drawn. In this regard, outcomes, while not necessarily offering conclusions on 
social problems lived by the artist, offer insights that have been distilled through a subjective 
framing of a lived problem by them. Thinking through social issues occurs in and around the 
production and reflection upon such outcomes, and either the initial problems the work 
responded to, or new problems created by the work.  
 As such, the creation of artwork for this research can be thought of as the construction 
of an “enquiry machine” (Jungknickel, 2015, para.1) or “Dewey Organ”. An enquiry 
machine, given Kat Jungknickel’s research, is a way of visualising and creating problems and 
considers the different publics involved with such problems. To me, the production of a body 
of critical artwork work is the production of an enquiry machine; a symbolic representation 
of, or artifact produced in face of, a problem that provokes thinking about its subject matter. 
Chapter 4 discusses this in relation to gay online dating publics and the problems that concern 
them.  
 
Identity Play in Artists’ Methods  
Playing Many Selves 
 
For digital artist Mark Amerika, the Deleuzian fashion of wandering around in 
affective circuits testing the notion of a ‘self’ is key to contemporary arts practice. A term 
used here is “nomadism”, which refers to a decentred wandering. Within Amerika’s concept 
of “technomadism”, a practice of ‘testing’ via the body becomes a critical research approach; 
it is a tool for discovery through asking questions about where the self is located or 
constructed. Amerika claims “it’s the artist [as a self] that is the medium or instrument that is 
most capable of conducting radical experiments in subjective thought and experience” 
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(Amerika 2008, p.75). This is the discovery of new approaches through the performing 
artists’ experiences; by testing situations through becoming different “selves”. He largely 
refers to this approach as “technomadism”. 
      
 A technomadic research approach involves artists acting-out on “whatever playing 
field they happen to be on at any given time” (Amerika, 2008, p.76). This reflects the 
‘perpetual present-ness’ of Gilles Deleuze (1988) and Frederic Jameson’s (1991) notions of 
schizophrenic identity in postmodern culture. In this situation, this “playing field” becomes 
the digital cultures artists engage with, namely social media, online dating or video gaming. 
Amerika calls upon the image of Eleanor Antin’s “one person art-making machine” and uses 
the words of Vito Acconci to foreground the way in which a technomadic artist may engage 
with different media given different “playing fields”: 
 
 […] if I specialize in a medium, then I would be fixing a ground for myself, a ground I 
would have to be digging myself out of, constantly, as one medium was substituted for 
another – so, then instead of turning toward ‘ground’ I would shift my attention and turn to 
‘instrument’, I would focus on myself as the instrument that acted on whatever ground was 
available (Acconci in Amerika, 2008, p.75). 
  
The technomadic ‘one person art-making machine’, where the body or ‘self’ becomes 
an instrument through which all contexts are filtered and responded to given a relevant 
medium, could be considered a critical, or at least interrogative, approach. If we take the 
position that one can use whatever mediums are necessary in the moment to respond to a 
given context, then in an affective scenario, and given digital cultures are contexts, this 
involves the testing or play of the self against them; artists must “…step into the fold and 
‘play themselves’ – even if that means having to reinvent their artistic personas over and over 
again” (Amerika, 2008, p.82). This introduces the concept of ‘play’, or technomadic play, as 
testing the location of an affected ‘self’ in digital cultures, and raises the artistic medium 
chosen as reflecting any relevant explorations pertaining to this play.   
 
My own playing of ‘many selves’ is evident in a prior work of mine, The Tarot Self 
Portrait (2010) (Figure 3). In this work I had attempted to subvert the fractal narcissist, by 
assimilating the entire library of the Tarot into my own body. I had been reflecting on how 
my own Facebook images came to mirror a library of ‘possible selves’ back to me, but how 
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my reflection upon these images were plagued with what Amerika might refer to as notions 
of ‘not self’; none of the images are actually ‘me’.  
 
In this example, the sheer absurdity and tackiness of the poses and costumes break 
down any notions of immortality (of replication of these archetypes into infinity, or their 
application to any human being) through their clumsy materiality and personalised 
application. Facing my own self-portrait here, as a set of objects, I do not feel that any are 
flattering or self-promoting – there is a disconnection between me and the outcomes and 
representations of me that I feel are not are necessarily ‘me’. They resist my narcissism and 
instead I ask myself questions such as “oh dear… what am I?... what are these?... am I this?... 
is it possible to be immortalised through these things?” I therefore ask through this 
disconnected questioning; could this be a playful, sunnily ironic example of technomadic 
practice and ‘playing the self’? 
  
 
Figure 2. Tom Penney, The Tarot Self Portrait (2010), digital images 
 
As an art historic example in our discussion of artists’ identity play, the accessibility of 
vernacular tools (in this example, photography) lends a ‘disappearance’ to Cindy Sherman’s 
work: “I recall doubting Cindy Sherman’s Untitled Film Stills (1977-80): wasn’t she just a 
narcissist taking pictures of herself all day long?” (Allen, 2011, para.9), but we have to 
differentiate here between narcissism as behaviour of creative users, and as a feature of some 
artists’ work. I suggest that, although it is difficult to tell where narcissism as self-
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involvement starts and ends for artists, it could be confused with deliberate strategies that 
seek to blur boundaries and disrupt. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, for example, have 
discussed “schizophrenia” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983) as a model for resisting the co-option 
of identity in contemporary capitalism. While Jameson (1982) and Jean Baudrillard (1988) 
have both used “schizophrenia” to describe subjects critically in such a society, Deleuze and 
Guattari believe that the lack of consistent identity schizophrenics experience, and their 
difficulty participating in normative language systems, allows them to resist its effects but 
still be productive (Peretti, 1997). This is the difference between online participation as 
egotistical and self-affirming (narcissistic) and online participation as a rapid testing of what 
the self ‘might be’ where there is a lack of a consistent identity (schizophrenic). Both could 
produce a similar volume of output and engagement. I want to make it clear that I am aware 
that the use of ‘schizophrenia’ is not in-vogue, and using it to describe behaviours that have 
nothing to do with clinically diagnosed schizophrenia is problematic and even insulting to 
those who experience it. A better word to use than ‘schizophrenia’ is ‘nomadism’ but I have 
mentioned it here as it comes up once or twice as a concept in Deleuze’s analyses, which I 
refer to throughout this dissertation.  
 
Evoking Judith Butler, Cindy Sherman plays different roles, producing self-portraits 
with cameras, indeed ‘playing many selves’ in order to question what constructs an identity 
by confusing the boundary between self and other. In doing so Sherman subverts media 
representations of women; ‘testing’ the point where Sherman is herself, and what external 
representations are otherwise defining and constructing her. In her work The Untitled Film 
Stills (1977-80) the artist dressed up and photographed herself as different ‘types’ of women 
in popular film, television and printed media. Interestingly Sherman states ''I feel I'm 
anonymous in my work…. When I look at the pictures, I never see myself; they aren't self-
portraits. Sometimes I disappear” (Collins, 1990, para.1). Here Sherman’s work seems more 
nomadic than narcissistic; it is easy to confuse the two. Sherman doesn’t take these photos to 
affirm herself, perhaps she does it to find herself. Part of what we see in the work of artists 
that play many selves is that they ‘disappear’ into a multiplicity of performances through 
their mimicry of external ‘acts’ and media portrayals. While appearing narcissistic in form, 
the work operates differently to regular produsing narcissism; it can have a critical, resistant 
component. It therefore functions as a recalcitrant activism towards self-discovery and 
visibility.  
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Critical Play as Method 
Identity Play 
Therese Lichtenstein comments in her interview with Cindy Sherman that a “…sense of 
process and play comes through in your last show in that the poses and arrangements of the 
mannequins, accoutrements and settings did not seem preconceived. It reminds me of how 
children play with dolls” (Lichtenstein, n.d, para.1). The work of Sherman (or Post-Internet 
artists such as Ryan Trecartin and Ed Fornieles), can function as a kind of identity play; a 
testing of where an identity starts and finishes in media culture, and of what informs or 
constructs it. The vehicle for this has been through the manipulation of Sherman’s own body, 
and in later work, dolls that stand in for a body.  
 
As such, a playful approach in the digital becomes a kind of ‘technomadism’, where 
one turns their own fantasy worlds, nomadic wandering and boundary-testing into an 
interrogative practice. This reaches a parallel in doll play, which like the media stereotypes, 
possible selves and online systems Sherman ‘tests’ herself against, present dolls within which 
projected selves can be enacted. Here, play is a way of questioning our identities and is 
relevant to the current rapid authorship of profiles, which involve constant testing of the 
representation of an identity or what it could be and appear like to others. Artists play when 
they create artwork, and designers design for play experience in games and interactive works. 
  
In Plei Plei (2013), Jussi Holopainen offers a definition of identity play in their text 
“Exploring Play” based off Sherry Turkle’s analysis of digital identity in Life of the Screen: 
Identity in the Age of the Internet” (1995). In identity play: “the person is testing and 
exploring the limits of what he or she is like as a person, including moral standards, values 
and preferences, behavioural patterns, skills and knowledge” (Holopainen, 2013, para.17). 
This reflects Turkle when she discusses how “it is on the internet that our confrontations with 
technology as it collides with our sense of human identity are fresh, even raw […] we are 
dwellers on the threshold between the real and virtual, unsure of our footing, inventing 
ourselves as we go along” (Turkle, p.10). Indeed, everyday users undertake a form of identity 
play when they navigate their various constructed profiles on MySpace, Facebook and other 
social media systems, as well as in the play of video game characters. No matter which 
digital culture one is participating in, the concept of play appears to be involved on some 
level. 
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Critical Play and Subversion 
 
Play can […] function as a tool to understand the self. Many anthropologists like Sutton-
Smith have argued that play is the way children work out social and cultural norms. 
—Flanagan 2009, p.5. 
  
Mary Flanagan has undertaken research into to framing the relationship between art and play 
culture. As a feminist game design approach, Flanagan’s Critical Play (2009) explores 
specifically how players of games (especially girls) have used doll play, domestic play 
(“playing house”), dress-ups, and “re-skinning” to critique and examine their identities in 
relation to broader human systems. Flanagan discusses “play as method” for artists, an 
element of which I interpret here to be identity play as Holopainen or Turkle describe, 
however Flanagan goes further. To Flanagan, Sutton-Smith provides grounds on which to 
situate notions of play as a critical activity through subversion, which is “the turning [of a 
thing] upside down or uprooting it from its position; overturning, upsetting; overthrow of a 
law, rule, system, condition…” (OED 1989, p.88).  
 
For Sutton-Smith the dark side of play emerges from the transgression of a game’s 
structure or rules, inciting subversion. Whereas for Flanagan this means subversion operates 
“from within” and possibly ignites cultural change; play “keeps a species flexible in 
evolution [with the] potential to help define social norms and identity” these are through the 
“use of play forms as forms of bonding, including the exhibition and validation or parody of 
membership and traditions in a community” and Flanagan goes on to say this is “essential to 
cultural formation” (Flanagan, 2009, p.5).  
 
In The Ambiguity of Play (1997) Sutton-Smith organises play into four major 
categories; play as learning, play as power, play as fantasy and play as self. As “power play” 
play involves the symbolic “practice of real-life functions” such as “bonding and belonging” 
(Flanagan, 2009, p.4) the play space becomes a symbolic “world” where rules can be 
changed and tested to imagine them differently. In a “play as self” this can mean that 
different bodies come to represent these worlds and associated changes, as seen in the work 
of Sherman. An artist’s subversion might involve taking a cultural situation, rather than the 
rules set up by the symbolic play space, as the space for play, as many have done through 
political intervention, performance and disruption. The work of Fluxus, The Critical Art 
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Ensemble or Barbara Kruger, would be some examples, and in these scenarios the blurring of 
art and life suggests the transgression of a ‘magic circle’ in order to involve ‘the world’ as the 
space of play. In Chapter 1 of this research, the ‘play space’ as intersection with ‘the world’ 
was outlined as a situation I engage in. Now I move to look at how identities, specifically, 
might be tested in digital art through Flanagan’s notions of critical doll play. 
  
Art and Doll Play 
Flanagan opens much of her discussion through the art historical subversiveness of Dadaism 
and Surrealism. Out of these movements Flanagan draws the use of artists’ dolls or “the 
peculiar emergence of dolls in twentieth-century art” (Flanagan, 2009, p.37). The man-sized 
“marionettes” in Alfred Jarry’s Play Ubu Roi, and Hannah Höch’s “Dada Dolls” are some 
examples. Emphasis however is placed on Hans Bellmer’s dolls, for their violating depiction 
of the female form, which “objectified, fetishised and ultimately degraded the female body” 
(Flanagan, 2009, p.42). These dolls however functioned critically in the Surrealists’ time to 
highlight issues of desire, fetishism and political unrest. Flanagan’s reasoning for the use of 
dolls in art are Deleuzian and Freudian; the presentation of other possible worlds in dolls link 
reality, (artistic) fantasy worlds and subversion: 
 
A frightening countenance is the expression of a frightening possible world, or of something 
frightening in the world – something I do not yet see. Let it be understood that the possible is 
not here an abstract category designating something which does not exist: the expressed 
possible world certainly exists, but it does not exist (actually) outside of that which expresses 
it (Deleuze in Flanagan 2009, p.41). 
  
The notion of Freud’s uncanny is deployed also, which “helps us ground an 
investigation into the human fascination with automata and life-like figurines” (Flanagan, 
2009, p.41) because the uncanny is linked “to desires repressed from infancy, and [...] this 
return to repressed desire is based on a desire for control, a viewer’s or player’s reaction to 
uncanny situations can create dread, fear, or fascination out of what on the surface appears to 
be an everyday circumstance” (ibid.). The tradition of subverting or re-framing the body in 
this way is continued in the work of postmodern artists such as Jake and Dinos Chapman, 
who similarly violate the presentation of bodies through life-size dolls, and thus the 
expectations we have over ordinarily perceiving a desirable body and the contexts that 
construct such desire. 
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Video Game “Dolls” 
Flanagan further links doll play to video games, like that of The Sims series (Maxis, The Sims 
Studio, 2000-present); “[t]here is a desire to produce meaningful interaction that motivates 
the creation of new worlds” through play (Flanagan, 2009, p.57), and these worlds are 
accessed through digital game play. Flanagan emphasises the subversive possibility inherent 
within these doll-play worlds; a way for individuals to play with and subvert the normative 
and banal structures of domesticity and consumer capitalism through objects (dolls and 
dollhouses) that represent key features of those systems. “The fun of the virtual house is 
inextricably related to mastery of the household objects and the human-like dolls that are so 
very familiar” (Flanagan, 2009, p. 56).  
 
This feeling can function as a critical but enjoyable process. “A great deal of 
pleasure… is derived from subverting these set norms and exploring the boundaries of what 
is, and is not permissible” (ibid.). When playing The Sims, the player is “put into a 
controlling position” (ibid.) over personal anxieties, through the objectification of bodies 
situated in symbolic worlds. Flanagan uses a Freudian perspective here, that it is enjoyable 
for players to enact their gaze over objectified bodies; satiating a “desire for mastery over the 
object” (ibid.). Doll play can here become transformative, symbolically representing an 
altered version of the player’s reality. This is not unlike contemporary art, which at many 
points constructs an altered vision of reality for others to participate in, as a separate and 
manageable, symbolic representation in the ‘other’ space of the gallery. The work of Cao Fei 
is invoked (discussed further in Chapter 6 Queering the Sims) where her RMB City (2007-11) 
becomes both a video game and gallery space that her avatar, her ‘doll’, inhabits. Doll play 
also has implications for narcissism, in that human beings as objects, become part of the 
‘world building’ activity of the narcissist. 
  
Re-Skinning, Unplaying 
Flanagan goes more specifically into the subversive strategies of doll play, two of which are 
“re-skinning” and “un-playing”. “Re-skinning” is a user-made intervention in games, a form 
of modding, where graphics are replaced by users to change the games’ meaning. A notable 
example of this is for the purposes of “sadomasochism and sexual experimentation” 
(Flanagan, 2009, p.109). My own experience with the mods of websites like “Pandora Sims” 
suggest this is the case; offering subversions of the game incorporating nude anatomical 
features and incorporating sexual and homosexual animations and interactions, thus breaking 
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the game’s normative boundaries, and changing its nature to incorporate minority or 
underground perspectives. “Un-playing” is slightly different, in that players might exploit 
existing mechanics to work against the encouraged goals. In The Sims this might mean 
trapping a character in a room without doors and setting them on fire, or making them wet 
themselves by not incorporating a toilet into the house’s design.     
 
     Flanagan’s strategies help us to think about the ‘play’ between the artist, screen, and 
exploration of identity. Her reflection on doll play, and the objectification of represented 
human bodies in critical doll play, suggests how artists as ‘players’ might treat bodies and 
virtual bodies subversively in contemporary digital culture. Of course, many feminist artists 
like Maria Abramovic have performed in ways that suggest the manipulation of an objectified 
female body, as in Rhythm 0 (1974), but Flanagan’s work applies this to the realm of the 
digital, which is highly manipulative in that bodies are easily objectified, altered, and 
changed in the windows of our screens. Games offer us manipulable worlds, intensified at a 
point by the individual screen, and displayed for the amusement of a player. As such, 
narcissism or nomadism are invoked; such representations become objects, as extensions of 
the narcissist’s body, or wanderings of the nomad’s fantasy world.  
 
In terms of ‘play as method’ for artists, Flanagan uses the words of Johan Huizinga; 
“All art derives from play” (Huizinga in Flanagan, 2009, p.8). Play as a process of making art 
can be further demonstrated by Flanagan’s use of Macleod (1999) "If I had to say that I had a 
methodology then I have a method of play which is bringing things in without a pre-
established notion of their use". One of the inconsistencies with Flanagan’s consideration of 
‘play as method’ is that she does not focus on the experience of creating art as a play activity, 
rather she focuses on making art to design critical playful experiences. Issues of what 
constitutes ‘experimentation’ rather than ‘play’ is not something that Flanagan covers; for 
artists, a lack of ‘pre-establishment’ is a common theme when discussing the emergence of 
outcomes through play.  
 
For Amerika, play in this form takes on a certain unconscious quality, the aim of 
‘playing a self’ is to reveal things previously unknown, and here Amerika’s referral to 
playing many selves actually complicates the notion of critical play: “Where [is the artist-
researcher] to go and play, the way any great athelete would play when they say [...] ‘I am 
not conscious when I am playing …how can we encourage more research methodologies that 
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essentially support the artist not being conscious while playing? Is that even possible… ?” 
(Amerika, 2008, p.79). This complicates the searching for a ‘critical play’ as the nature of 
being ‘critical’ implies a degree of consciousness; an awareness of one’s situation and of the 
correct questions to ask in order to ‘be critical’. 
 
Design Method 
Flanagan has articulated in Critical Play (2009) the notion of ‘play as method’ for artists 
which sits well within an emergent art-based method and complements Amerika’s approach 
to “playing oneself” (2008) or seeking play in the consistent present-ness of digital cultures. I 
have considered her method as it applies to the term ‘critical’, as well as how such a method 
might apply to artists. Although Flanagan could go into the idea of ‘play as method’ in 
greater detail, we can expand on the idea of the body as instrument to consider the playing 
with bodies (as with Flanagan’s discussion of dolls) as complementary to Amerika’s 
approach. This is a way artists can make discoveries through transformation, reconfiguration, 
subversion, and intervention with their own body and others’ bodies; their subjectivity, and 
the subjectivity of others in digital systems. In particular, the image of Deleuze’s nomad (or 
schizoid) is invoked as a ‘player-as-tester’, in contrast to the image of a narcissist as a 
‘player-as-participant’. This became play as testing the location of a ‘self’ or of identity, as in 
Holopainen and Turkle’s notions of identity play. To re-iterate some major strategies of 
critical play discussed thus far include subversive play in the form of: 
  
● Constructing Artists’ Dolls 
● Re-Skinning 
● Unplaying 
● Re-writing 
  
With these elements in mind, as the artist I have become the ‘critical player’; the one who 
tests selves, the limits of my body (and other bodies) and reflects to some degree, Deleuze’s 
conception of nomadism. The situation I respond to in digital culture becomes the emergent 
zone; the milieu for critical play. The situation (digital cultures) and its actors (subjects 
within digital cultures) are what becomes ‘played’, through various tools and approaches that 
I call upon in individual projects as an “art-making machine” (Amerika, 2008). My method 
involves becoming the technomadic, critical playing, one-person art making machine, who 
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tests “alteration” (Bishop, 2012) or affect through the critical play of bodies including 
perceptions of my own.   
  
The Materiality of the Method 
In keeping with art-based research, and its emergent approach, any number of materials and 
tools may need to be deployed to engage in the above approaches. For the most part, and 
given the nature of my own practice, my materials and tools involve: 
● Using game engine software such as Unity3D 
● Using photo-editing software such as Adobe Photoshop 
● ‘scraping’ images from offline to distort and change (see Chapter 6) 
● Constructing mannequins, dolls and bodies from traditional art materials (clay, 
plastic, plasticine etc.) 
● 3D scanning forms and bodies to use in virtual spaces 
● Bringing forms, such as avatars, out of the computer via 3D printing 
● Using code, and expanding on existing knowledge of Javascript 
● Drawing digitally and traditionally 
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3 Queerness, Humour and Perversity 
 
  
Figure 4 Tom Penney, 2014, screenshot of profiles displayed on the gay dating app Grindr. 
 
Where Flanagan’s Critical Play (2009) is a feminist approach to thinking about game design, 
I am using critical play to think about artists’ processes, specifically my own. While I am a 
feminist, my research additionally involves creating representations specific to gay men from 
a queer perspective. The world of gay men’s experience is often hidden to non-participants. 
Gay men in online dating environments differ from women and non-gay men in specific 
ways that require a critical attention that may not be entirely readable through a lens of house 
and doll play. Also, my work does not have an immediately constructive or social element; 
much of Flanagan’s writing is complementary to Claire Bishop’s in they both have a keen 
research interest in art as activism.  
 
In fact, much of Flanagan’s artistic output can be seen as emerging from movements 
such as Relational Aesthetics, and have the compassionate social concern that has been 
discussed between Nicholas Bourriaud and Bishop over the years. We might generalise that 
this is a positive and constructive approach that characterises much Anglo-American feminist 
art discourse, whereas my own work throughout this project has been characterised by 
concepts of isolation with screens and the consumption and manipulation of representations 
of male bodies. It is problematic and comes to constitute its own form of enquiry machine.  
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My own work perhaps deals with more sinister territory and is more ‘male’ in the 
critical, binary sense; technocracy, manipulation, control, affective distance, and obsession 
with partial bodies are all involved in my artistic outcomes. This may resonate with the 
representation of bodies by early male surrealists such as those by Hans Belmer that Flanagan 
finds uncomfortable as discussed in Chapter 2, Playing Critically. These speak to many of the 
complex and intense power relations experienced daily on gay online dating apps, as well as 
my affinity with screens and code. As I was encouragingly raised with technology but also 
went to one of the first ‘laptop high schools’, I had far too many opportunities to begin 
prematurely in the world of gay pornography and meeting strangers from gay online websites 
such as Mogenic.com (which no longer exists) and Gaydar.net. As a result, while my 
interaction with men in screens online is comfortable and eerily routine, it is also altogether 
unfulfilling.   
 
Given this sinister element, the work is also is presented through shifting levels of 
irony and humour, and has a fairly camp aesthetic of ‘loud’ colours and a ‘digitally trashy’ 
atmosphere. Generally it also has a very dark, black and distinct humour that comes from 
being raised in a family with British-Irish heritage that worshipped Monty-Python-esque 
comedy. This section is not only about sexuality but also about how queer humour, when 
coupled with perversity, functions in terms of critical distance. As a queer weapon, humour is 
a classic tool for subversion. At the centre of this is a way of critically ‘playing’ issues of 
affection in online encounters.   
 
Queer Humour and Subversion 
At the heart of queer approaches are relations to normativity and visibility. Queer people and 
artists have often used humour as a tool of political subversion and to render the invisible, 
visible (such as through camp aesthetics). As mentioned in the definition of ‘queerness’ in  
Chapter 1, queer orientations function as lines of flight from normative constructions that 
may or may not overtly represent fascisms limiting the boundaries of an identity. In his 
discussion of the “camp” aesthetic as “a product of the gay sensibility” (Babuscio 1978, p.7) 
Jack Babuscio describes a central paradox, that:  
 
Society says to gays (and to all stigmatised groups) that we are members of the wider 
community; we are subject to the same laws as 'normals'; we must pay our taxes, etc.; we are, 
in short, 'just like everybody else'. On the other hand, we are not received into society on 
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equal terms; indeed, we are told that we are unacceptably 'different' in ways that are 
absolutely fundamental to our sense of self and social identity. In other words, the message 
conveyed to us by society is highly contradictory: we are just like everyone else, and yet, we 
are not. It is this basic contradiction, this joke, that has traditionally been our destiny 
(Babuscio, 1978, p.127). 
 
What Babuscio identifies in this paradox is the construction of identification plagued by the 
logic of a joke. In Freud’s analysis jokes function with a paradoxical structure and are related 
to play. To him, jokes are judgements first and foremost; “a joke is a judgement which 
produces a comic contrast” (Freud 1905, p.25). Freud refers to German philosopher Kuno 
Fischer’s similar definition that draws from Kantian perspectives on play, in that a “joke is a 
playful judgement” (Freud 1905, p.26) analogous to aesthetic freedom. The “joke” identified 
by Babuscio above concerns the binding of dissimilar things into such a comic judgement 
(Freud 1905, p.27) that is, the binding of queer ways of being different into the judgement of 
the normative; the terror of being judged, reduced, essentialised. Perhaps it is through the 
frustration and exasperation of the joke-like structure of the societal position of queer and gay 
people that phenomena like the critical humour and camp of queer people are born; “a joke 
comes about through bewilderment being succeeded by illumination” (Heymans 1896). The 
second illumination of a joke, according to Heymans (1896) is its “resolution of the problem 
into nothing”, that is, the impotence of the judgement, which inevitably produces such 
frustration and exasperation.   
 
Through Judith Butler, subversion has become key to the political project of queer 
theory and queer performativity. If a joke is here a judgement against the freedoms of queer 
people, then jokes can just as much be weaponised as judgements; propositions against 
normativity. Subversion is here the seizing of middle-class pretentiousness (Sontag 1964) and 
the exposure of its artifice through camp aesthetics — a method which my work employs: 
loud, colourful, ugly, predisposed to highlighting artifice, and upsetting pretention through 
the inversion of taste. Generally this is in keeping with the logic of the joke:       
  
Humour constitutes the strategy of camp: a means of dealing with a hostile environment and, 
in the process, of defining a positive identity. This humour takes several forms. Chief of these 
is bitter-wit, which expresses an underlying hostility and fear (Babuscio 1978, p.127). 
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Wit comes to expose a bringing-to-the-surface, the ironies and paradoxes of the world in the 
service of critique in the face of a frustration or bitterness, which in this dissertation, Critical 
Affection, concerns gay online dating apps: 
 
Camp can thus be a means of undercutting rage by its derision of concentrated bitterness. Its 
vision of the world is comic. Laughter, rather than tears, is its chosen means of dealing with 
the painfully incongruous situation of gays in society (Babuscio 1978, p.128). 
 
Humour and Critical Distance 
Laughter in the place of tears functions as a way to remove the emotional impact of such 
judgements. According to Henri Bergson in his theorisation of the meaning of the comic, 
humour tends to reflect a certain numbing of affection in the exchange of affects. Laughter, 
especially, allows us to stand apart from an object of humour, yet still appreciate it. Laughter 
is perhaps a coping mechanism, a release from the intensity of charged subject matter and 
environments. It is here that we come across the notion of distance in humour; which 
operates both playfully and as a critical tool. For Bergson, laughter renders things with 
intelligibility rather than emotion as there is an:    
  
[...] ABSENCE OF FEELING [sic.] which usually accompanies laughter. It seems as though 
the comic could not produce its disturbing affect unless it fell, so to say, on the surface of a 
soul that is thoroughly calm and unruffled. Indifference is its natural environment, for 
laughter has no greater foe than emotion (Bergson 2002, para.5). 
 
We could say therefore that laughter and humour have perversely technical properties and 
come from a privileged position. This is the position of being distant enough of mind to 
calculate the logic of a joke’s connection, and be shaken by the affects of laughter after-the-
fact. To be the appreciator rather than the object of the joke one has to be separated enough 
from the comic judgement so as to make the connections between the joke’s elements in a 
relaxed rather than violating sense. It would appear that the comic, here as artist, is perverse 
and manipulative rather than always necessarily emotional. The comic artist ‘crafts’ through 
playful and subversive connection making, in order to produce a comic affect, which in turn 
implies a critical or affective distance; a distance that withholds pity for the sake of a comic 
judgement, for we must:    
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[...] put our affection out of court and impose silence upon our pity [...]. In a society 
composed of pure intelligences there would probably be no more tears, though perhaps there 
would still be laughter (Bergson 2002, para.5). 
 
Perversity 
Humour and the crafting of jokes features a distanced connection-making; the ability to hop 
along the surfaces of ideas and draw them together; manipulate them to create comic 
judgements without falling deeply into them. This is perversity. I equate artistic production to 
perversity. To Deleuze, a pervert is someone who can constantly shift their libidinal energy 
into different territories by creating new desires, rather than fixating on certain fetishes in 
particular. “Nothing is more fragile than the surface” (Deleuze 1990, p.95) writes Deleuze in 
The Logic of Sense (1969) during his series on “The Schizophrenic and the Little Girl” where 
he describes the difference between two forms of nonsense.  
 
The first form of nonsense Deleuze sees in Lewis Carroll (Alice in Wonderland), is an 
account for nonsense constructed from existing language (a nonsense of surface at the level 
of language, such as word games), whereas in Antonin Artaud (Theatre of Cruelty) Deleuze 
perceives a nonsense of depths, of the body (1990, p.96). In Deleuze’s writing, the former 
kind of nonsense is the result of Carroll’s privileged perversion “[...] a little pervert, who 
holds onto the establishment of a surface language, and who has not felt the real problem of a 
language in depth – namely, the schizophrenic problem of suffering” (1990, p.97). In 
contrast, for Artaud “there is not, there is no longer, any surface” (1990, p.99) for the 
schizophrenic, whose nonsense is a product of everything being “body and corporeal” (ibid.) 
[...] and who struggles in a world where “the inside and the outside, the container and the 
contained, no longer have a precise limit” (1990, p.100).  
 
         For the most part, I cannot claim to be all that different to Carroll, “an affected little 
girl” (1990, p.99) who enjoys the surface play of language perversely when it comes to 
objectifying the depths (of any bodies). Many of my outcomes are an example of this; puns 
through which I fetishise and play with skin and body parts, and partial objects in a digital 
environment. Yet, the production of this and other works has always relied on this perversity 
or a desire to fetishise subject matter in order for it to exist. Perversity is very important in 
production, especially for artists who have a playfully subversive practice. As professor of 
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philosophy Philip Goodchild (1996, p.81) writes, this perversity is indeed productive to 
Deleuze: 
 
The sexuality of surfaces operates through perversion: one surface is always substituted for 
another - the search for the phantasm yields something else of a different nature as its result, 
but this result can be made into a new object of desire, producing new phantasms, 
maintaining the plateau of intensity. 
  
“Phantasm” here refers to Freudian psychoanalyst Melanie Klein’s account for a child’s 
construction of a surface (language) from the depths (a world of schizophrenic part-objects). 
Phantasms function as an “ideational surface” (Deleuze 1990, p.242) for objects and relations 
without prior sense; they are psychic objects that function as models for sense. In this respect 
a phantasm forms “an obsessional image” (Smith 2012, p.330); the place where the ego 
merges with a phantasm (this is in fact Deleuze’s notion of narcissism). We could say that an 
artistic practice relies on the maintenance of a “plateau of intensity” – the maintenance of a 
series of phantasms – in order to keep it running as an anti-cliché or subversion (enquiry) 
machine. As in my own and other artists’ practices (such as Cindy Sherman), these subverted 
phantasms come in the form of a series of obscure self-portraits and portraits of others. To 
Deleuze the pervert is a person who has achieved “mastery of surfaces” (1990, p.104); a 
productive archetype able to constantly produce new desires for themselves through fixation 
on new objects, as partial objects or phantasms. Each artwork is an intensity or intense-
surface in a psychosexual series of fetishes, something that holds up and honours the object 
as perverse.  
 
Online Dating Apps 
A sexually exciting fetish may be an inanimate object, a living object, part of a human, an 
attribute of a human, or a whole human seen as an abstraction. — McDiarmid 1978, para.1. 
 
Perversity, jokes, and a discussion of the surface are apt when taking into account the 
language of gay online dating apps. “Men as a Class are the Fetish” is the title of an artwork 
created by David McDiarmid in 1978 and the text quoted above is embedded into this 
collage. In this artwork, McDiarmid cut up an assortment of images relating to homoerotic 
masculinity. A leather boot, a collar, a torso, a penis, a face with a moustache, all within 
separate square and rectangular borders come to form an image of men themselves as a 
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fetish, or as a class (as the title proposes) through these partial objects. Rather uncannily this 
effect is achieved in gay online dating apps such as Grindr today, which effectively cut up 
the male body, and collage it into squares based on desire and attraction.  
 
In her 1990s artworks, British artist Jenny Saville presented a defiant exploration of 
the glassy surfaces that objectify bodies, particularly concerning the representation of women 
in media, shop windows, television screens and shiny magazine pages. In her large-scale 
photographic series Closed Contact (1995-6), Saville presses her body directly against a glass 
surface as if challenging it to contain her (Saville and Luchford, 1995-6). Today, any person 
who chooses to have a profile on an internet site has the privilege of being presented beneath 
the shiny glass surfaces of mobile smartphones and computer screens. We all contribute to 
how we see our bodies, a role previously reserved for celebrities, supermodels and the stylists 
and editors who dictate their image. Where better to see these bodies-under-glass in 
proliferation than on dating websites?  
 
The discussion now turns to bodies-under-glass via the lens of smartphone dating 
apps for gay men. These include Grindr, Jack’d, Hornet, Scruff, Recon and many more. 
While a great deal of research around these apps has focused on health, especially how such 
apps affect the distribution of HIV, or in cultural studies research into ideas of community, 
individual performativity or race, my engagement with these apps as a heavy user informed 
my production of a series of playful artworks testing the relationship between bodies, users 
and glass interfaces through finger-based swipe gestures (see Chapters 4 and 6). 
 
Brett Victor (2011, para.16) calls the current state of interaction design “Pictures 
under glass”. Victor laments that interaction design, indeed “the future of interaction design” 
(Victor 2011, para.1) is limited to the gestures made by hands on glass surfaces, and that the 
two major functions of hands (feeling and manipulating) are completely underutilized in 
current state-of-the-art. I would propose that the effect of this has been to “numb” interaction 
with elements under glass surfaces, which to our discussion involves the human body, or the 
human-body-as-face. Bodies as (re)presented under glass surfaces become manipulable, non-
visceral, gaze-oriented visual bodies, for consumption as objects by narcissists through the 
personal screen. The commanding fingers of these users rub numb, as if calloused, upon the 
surface of visual bodies. 
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The consumption of bodies here is, however, two-way and works off a mutually 
shared narcissism (as discussed in Chapter 1) that most users will probably take for granted. 
Users are set up by the very interface to operate narcissistically and to think about themselves 
and what “they want”. It is the very setup of the experience and affordance of the interface, 
delivered through a personal screen as if ‘for’ the user, that produces narcissistic and 
defensive behaviour. One must remember that at every moment one is browsing through 
images of other people, that we are also one other image in the screen of some other person 
who is also skimming over us, checking out our face or perhaps even blocking us before we 
have had a chance to engage in a chat. Baudrillard talks of the “vitrified exacerbation of the 
body, of vitrified exacerbation of genitalia, of an empty space where nothing takes place and 
which nonetheless fills our vision” (Baudrillard 1987, p.34) as a result of media spectacle. In 
the case of the app Grindr (and others) we are faced with a constantly updating, user-
produced media spectacle involving both bodies and genitalia. The presentations of gay 
maleness proliferating within Grindr are not the products of Grindr necessarily, but the 
products of gay males using the app. Claims of essentialisation have been made in literature 
surrounding gay online dating, such as in the work of Ben Light who claims of the system 
“Gaydar.co.uk” that: 
 
Individuals write a version of themselves and of this gay community into being. However, 
because of the desire to commodify ‘the difference’ that is gay, predominantly white men, 
online and offline, such inscriptions become monolithic caricatures that are obdurate and 
enrol even those who do not participate in such arrangements at all or only by proxy” (Light, 
Fletcher & Adam 2009, p.304). 
  
The standard on Grindr is to participate in such arrangements by taking a selfie of oneself 
and posting it to the profile space. Lacan asserts that an identity is formed when a child 
recognises its own reflection in the mirror; the mirror's representation of the body turns it into 
an object to be compared against other objects of language (Lacan 1949, p.503). If “media 
images act as Lacanian mirrors that cause identity formations to be ideologically laden” 
(Peretti 1997, para.28), then the app Grindr allows the user to participate as an objectified 
media image. One's own image on the screen, or selfie-as-mirror, is displayed alongside 
others in the Grindr interface as a square in the top left corner, comparable to others around 
it. Baudrillard’s echo bounces again: “While here everything is of equal visibility, everything 
shares the same shallow space” (Baudrillard 1987, p.33).  
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Peretti (1997) further asserts that, in Lacanian terms, consumer capitalism needs 
subjects who continually re-enact the infantile drama of mirror stage identifications in order 
to maintain productivity. The speed of the app, its constant update of profiles and their 
immediate proximity to each other, leads subjects to constantly question their participating 
image. This is not a seasonal change of fashions but a minute-by-minute update of images. 
As soon as a single picture consolidates the external self, it is immediately threatened again 
when compared to a context of other profile images. Is one displaying the right image, 
encoding the correct type of person, that in turn attracts the right types of people? By 
participating this way, through the portrayal of many selves, one feeds Grindr the images that 
construct its types through a positive feedback loop; a mirror, and each individual becomes 
an object to be consumed. 
 
We often live in gay worlds which are quite efficient sex delivery systems but men then have 
to focus a great many of their emotional needs into this one avenue and that itself creates new 
risk situations which are again often inadvertent but that we are called upon to manage one 
way or another (Adam 2011). 
  
Kane Race here references an interview with Barry Adam concerning his analysis of “sex 
delivery systems”. Race describes Grindr as providing an appropriate service insofar as it 
deals in the market of producing sexual encounters or “hook ups” (Race 2014), but in terms 
of providing solutions to problems of intimacy, loneliness, or even more innocently seeking 
‘like-minded’ others in the local area (as is the claimed original intention of the app), Grindr 
and other apps may not suffice. One might rather look to OkCupid or a more ‘serious’ dating 
website for the complicated question-based matching algorithms provided, as those are in the 
business of ‘producing relationships’. Grindr was developed by Joel Simkhai, who in a 
similar vein to other digital software legacies originating in California, started little (with 
$5000 of his savings) and ‘got big’ (Hall 2013, para.7). Grindr does not manage its users in 
the same way as Google, Facebook, or other less demographically targeted social media 
systems. It has no investors and is funded entirely by advertising on its free version (Grindr) 
and subscription fees on its paid version (Grindr Xtra) (Hall 2013). Here it operates as a 
closed power structure, which we know historically might tend towards oppression, and like 
any libertarian capitalist product, applies itself to the greatest number of users by packaging 
their modes of engagement into symbolic, simulated choices (Nash 2014). 
 
 49 
Affection-Images in Gay Online Dating 
I would like to propose here that the smartphone is a kind of surrogate object of affection, 
being the physical device through which affect is sent and received. Smartphones are on our 
bodies, we touch them all the time, and we might even bring them to bed with us. Through 
the prevalence of apps like Grindr, gay people have come to expect that the app and their 
smartphone will bring them affection and sexual gratification at a steady pace. One is ever-
presently checking for a buzz in the pocket that indicates a new message has been received. 
 
The way we must, however, read this affection is numbed by the interface and its 
reductive tropes. Affection and intimacy cannot be perfectly translated, or modulated, into the 
comparatively discrete packages of representation provided by the app. In Cinema 1: The 
Movement Image (1986) Deleuze discusses “affection image” as a kind of image used in 
filmic shots. This refers to close-ups of the face that aim to reveal the interiority of a 
connected body (its emotions), either projected onto, or read from within, the workings of a 
face. “There is no close-up of the face, the face is in itself close-up, the close-up is by itself 
face and both are affect, affection-image” (Deleuze 1986, p.98). My interest in the idea of an 
affection image stems from my own frustration as a user in reading affection in images of 
other men online within a system that purports to provide it.  
 
To Deleuze, although affection-images are always ‘faces’ (or ‘facified’) they do not 
have to actually be faces. A close-up on a clock-face is for example an attempt at revealing 
the interiority of the clock, or of the clock’s reflective state, or response to the environment 
around it. This idea is important when thinking about online dating apps, in particular Grindr, 
because we are faced with a wide variety of images from which to glean affection, many of 
which are not faces, or are still and unrevealing. To Deleuze, a facial system implies the 
body; a face is ‘read’ in such a way that it describes the functions of the body it facialises. On 
gay apps, users are for the most part represented as bodies or faces. Users can use other 
images (landscapes, for example) but such users will mostly be ignored; they are not at all 
‘readable’ and do not communicate affect. A face is a body; we must imagine the body that 
supports it. What is the face that is imagined? One we can go on a date with? What is the 
body that is imagined? One that we want to have sex with?  
 
The face is the organ carrying plate of nerves which has sacrificed most of its global mobility 
and which gathers or expresses in a free way all kinds of tiny local movements which the rest 
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of the body usually keeps hidden. Each time we discover these two poles in something - 
reflecting suface and intensive micro-movements we can say that this thing has been treated 
as a face – it has been facified, and in turn it stares at us and looks at us […]” (Deleuze 1986, 
p.98) 
 
 Yet on dating apps we cannot read these micro-movements and are instead presented with 
‘poker-faces’; still faces that mask their interiority. We cannot read any real emotions in the 
body; we must interpret each face as a ‘type’. Deleuze continues: 
 
There are two sorts of questions that we can put to the face, depending on the circumstances: 
what are you thinking about? Or, what is bothering you, what is the matter, what do you sense 
or feel?” (Deleuze 1986, p.99). 
 
If we are to ask any of these questions of any face online, what we must conjure in our minds 
is a concept of the inner workings of the person and their possible affection towards us as 
read through a single image, or series of images, and a discrete set of phrases and data on a 
profile. The profile is the face of the person, and instead of reading muscular micro-
movements in a user’s facial features we read data and static imagery. Imagery is not here 
like Baroque painting; it does not express or externalise maximal folds of emotion or 
meaning, it is a close-up, generally cold, and designed to mask anything but the ‘objective’ 
appearance of the person; this is the ‘any-person-whatever’ of the person, that is, the person 
designed to catch the most number of affective responses. 
  
The face that attracts the most number of other faces is generally not a revealing face, 
but one that allows others to project their own desires onto it (a reflective face). This is not a 
specific person but a person functioning as a type. What we find here is the Deleuzian 
distinction between “quality” and “power” in the affection-image, the difference between 
reading a face as having qualities “common to several different things” (the still, whole, face 
as a “type”), and the expression of “power which passes from one quality to another” (the 
ability to read movements in individual features in the face) (Deleuze 1986, p.101). We must 
read other human beings in terms of their “quality” as we do not have enough expressive 
information. We must fit these self-representations to what we already expect similar images 
to behave as. As such we find in many, a person who has self-aggregated so as not to offend, 
but defend, against any suggestion that they’re a non-sexual person; a person that otherwise 
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cannot capitalise in the facial market. What is ultimately consumed in this market varies 
(affection, intimacy, hook-ups), but all begin with the image, and an image must initially 
represent all opportunities. Even if a user chooses to have no image, they will be represented 
by a blank automatically generated silhouette of a face in most cases; the ultimate “poker 
face”. 
 
The body as affection-image 
To Deleuze, faces represent bodies (their inner workings, the operation of their 
organs) and faces are close-ups. But, as I have shown, in a body-under-glass world when we 
are faced with a body image as a profile image we must read close-up bodies as faces. A 
torso online, as an avatar, is to be met as face. It is the first point of contact for an identity 
and we must guess the identity of its owner. If it is a healthy looking torso, then it describes a 
sexually-abled body that can achieve the purposes of a sexual exchange. When we read still 
bodies or torsos for affection, as faces, we do not get all that much from them. Like faces, 
torsos present a flat plate with a few features upon themselves; two nipples like eyes and 
perhaps a crease in the belly denotes a mouth. Different levels of muscularity, ribs or fat tell 
us limited information about the lifestyle or personality of the subject. I am not claiming to 
read the torso as a literal face of course, but in the Deleuzian sense discussed above, and 
consequently in some respects it is an even more “reflective” face than an expressionless 
selfie – it is more stern and more poker-faced – intending to reveal even less than a cool 
expression or a semi-sexual pout on an actual face. 
 
The penis as affection-image 
The penis-as-closeup is a tradable affection-object in a body-under-glass world. Each, like 
torsos, can stand in for identities. A penis-as-input is on display. On some apps (Jack’d, 
Manhunt) these can be the profile image. On others (Hornet, Gaydar) they must be private 
images that users reveal to each other if they want to ‘display what they are working with’. 
Sometimes, the penis image will be the first image the user sends to you to initiate 
communication if their profile is completely blank. The penis-as-close-up represents the 
Deleuzian pole of “power” more often than not. Movement is more easily imagined here; the 
rise and fall of arousal. Veins suggest power or the flow of blood – and there is the urethra (a 
singular eye) – the growth of the erection or the folds of the testicles. It is ‘happy to see you’. 
A flaccid penis is relaxed and confident perhaps, where an erection is ready-to-go. A penis 
perhaps reveals more than a torso or a bottom, but it is still an affection-image that avoids the 
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presentation of a totally revealing face, and as a type of image indicates a masculine 
readiness to take sexual action over other affections. 
 
The bottom as affection-image 
The bottom as a face presents itself as a willing receptacle in any sexual exchange. Its 
represented body is ready and available. Like the penis image it can be sent as a private photo 
and communicates submissiveness (sometimes aggressive submissiveness) and the intent to 
be penetrated. Two flat cheeks, and the anus, somewhat like the urethra, but as a mouth of 
sorts. As a whole, solid type of form, the bottom is the ultimate reflective face, because, 
unlike the penis it is illustrative of quality rather than power and desire can be projected onto 
it. As submissive, more often than not, it reflects the desires of the dominant male in the 
sexual exchange. It yields very little in terms of movement unless where the anus is opening 
or closing, pushing out or winking, almost always to indicate a desire to be penetrated. The 
bottom, having less individual qualities than the penis, stereotypically acts to reveal little 
more than the quality of a willingness to receive. 
 
The finger fingering affection-images 
The other body part that plays a significant role in our discussion of the body-under-glass, of 
course, the finger. The finger to me is the extension of the will of the user, for whom bodies 
and their parts are displayed. The finger is external to the glass and the affection-images 
beneath it; it is what numbingly browses and swipes through displayed bodies. It is what 
punches out the opening lines of conversation, and presses the ‘block’, ‘send’ and ‘chat’ 
buttons. It pokes at glass but feels very little in terms of sensation. The finger as a narcissistic 
control mechanism, a scepter of command, is the physical manifestation of the user’s internal 
judgment; the point of decisive action. It decides what external objects are to be included or 
excluded from the users’ world, that is, which objects “make the cut”. I have known users 
who have blocked thousands of profiles before ever initiating contact, just so that this world 
is constructed according to the benefit of the user through the personal screen, so that only 
those best matching the user’s desires appear. The finger chooses what complements the 
narcissist, but as mentioned earlier, is a numb unfeeling finger. The user, like a god over their 
iPhone world, is a closed circuit. 
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Partial Objects and Affection-Images 
Through the above readings of body parts as affection-images, the term ‘partial object’ is apt 
as a post-Freudian term present in Deleuze that describes the breaking down of an object 
(here the body) into its component parts. Partial objects are those perceived and desired in 
isolation from the whole. The classic example from Melanie Klein is of an infant desiring 
interaction with the mother’s breast (Klein, 1946, p.1). Often partial objects refer to sex 
organs. On Grindr isolated images of male body parts become objects of desire in isolation 
from the whole. Because partial objects are symbolic, they are essentially consumed for what 
they represent in a system of desire and do not actually fulfil desires. This exacerbates an 
unending process of desire and consumption as such images are produced in abundance. As 
users log in and out, the user browses, the geo-location changes, and the illusion of an 
abundance of symbolic desires in the form of affection-images and partial objects is 
produced. Divorced from a unified whole, affection-images as partial objects cannot be read 
or actually confronted, as a person faces another person, but will always reflect desires that 
are projected on or into them.  
 
This process becomes a repetitive and perverse browsing-over-time, as the gaze skips 
over face after face or consumes dick-pic after dick-pic, one becomes accustomed to, or even 
oriented-towards, a mastery of a perverse surface, a play of bodies, and a system of unending 
desire without fulfilment. The purity of the partial object – the promise it offers – eclipses the 
messy reality of situated bodily experiences. Even after such experiences, the phone will 
buzz, the list, re-opened, and partial objects represented. Each object is readily suggesting 
more idyllic scenarios that seduce users away from pursuing others. These others may be 
more situated affectionate realities that are frightening and confronting.    
 
Orientations Toward Affection-Images as Partial Objects 
A queer phenomenology might offer an approach to sexual orientation by rethinking how the 
bodily direction “toward” objects shapes the surfaces of bodily and social space. — Sarah 
Ahmed 2006, p.68. 
 
I have discussed my definition of affection-image and how I wish to use the term in relation 
to a facial language in gay online dating apps. I have also briefly mentioned that the 
processing of these images at the level of the individual constitutes the time-based production 
of a standard of participation online. Ahmed in Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, 
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Objects, Others (2006), introduced here in Chapter 1, sheds light on how situatedness with 
objects-over-time (sexually) orients us. We know through Judith Butler (1990, p.192) that 
identifications such as masculinity rely on the “stylized repetition of acts through time” and 
that identification is a time-based language. We can here think about how such behaviours 
become normative in online settings, where the online setting is an everyday ‘domestic’ 
space for gay men. The repetitive consumption of images, the behaviours of pressing, 
swiping, blocking, typing and looking, surely orient, and have a lasting effect on, users of 
Grindr and similar apps.   
 
Ahmed (2006, p.57) discusses repetition, saying that if “the work of repetition is not 
neutral work; it orients the body in some ways rather than others”. Just as typing this 
dissertation produces tension in my arm over time, inscribes itself, physically on my identity 
as an academic, just so does such situatedness with affection-images, and the repetitive 
treatment of their associated users on smartphones, produce lasting qualities, inscribing 
behaviours and orientations in gay male users. Ahmed’s approach is phenomenological and 
concerned with relations to objects in the world. Ahmed invokes a primal narcissism via 
Schutz and Luckmann (1974, p.4) to say “in such a world, everything is orientated around 
me, as being available and familiar to me” (Ahmed 2006, p.33). This is the nature of the 
smartphone app, which presents other users ‘in terms of’ the individual through the personal 
handset. These other users are presented as ‘within reach’; their faces always face our body. 
We are familiar with them. It is through the turning-towards, the facing of ‘the face’ of 
objects we can think of narcissism differently here; affection-images and profiles constitute 
objects ‘within reach’ for a subject, as such objects have faces that ‘turn towards’ subjects 
consistently over time.  
 
Putting aside any suggestion that orientation necessarily starts with objects, we can ask what 
kinds of objects bodies ‘tend toward’ in their tendencies, as well as how such tendencies 
shape what bodies tend toward (Ahmed 2006, p.57).  
 
As one sits comfortably in a private setting, skimming through affection-images, one faces 
many faces. Through reading Ahmed we might consider that in the comfort of the home (the 
union of the domestic and Grindr as a privately networked space ‘within reach’ of or ‘on’ the 
body), one becomes oriented-towards the partial object, the affection-image, the close-up, as 
a default mode of engagement. “The repetition of the work is what makes the work 
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disappear” writes Ahmed (2006, p.56); the practice of swiping, gazing, blocking and chatting 
become invisible forms of labour that shape our tendencies towards consuming affection-
images and partial objects as ‘comfortable’ inscriptions on our behaviour. “Orientations 
shape what bodies do, while bodies are shaped by orientations they already have, as effects of 
the work that must take place for a body to arrive where it does” (Ahmed 2006, p.58). The 
body must therefore arrive at an orientation that faces the symbolic in affection-images, the 
symbolic desires of partial objects, and not of their reality.  
 
The normative can be considered an effect of the repetition of bodily actions over time, which 
produces what we can call the bodily horizon, a space for action, which puts some objects and 
not others in reach” (Ahmed 2006, p.66). 
 
To Ahmed, this normativity also constitutes a straightening or a ‘lining-up’ of things, so that 
if something is out of line, it is immediately noticeable or queer. Grindr constantly presents 
‘within reach’ a certain kind of face (discussed next in Chapter 4). In the Grindr interface, 
which relies on the arrangement of bodies in a grid, it is easy to spot bodies that attempt to 
participate ‘out of line’ with the usual standards of participation. Queer, which is originally 
“a spatial term” (Ahmed 2006, p.67) “does not follow a ‘straight line’, a sexuality that is bent 
or crooked” (Cleto 2002, p.13). In the Grindr grid, bodies are co-located as affection-images. 
“For Merleau-Ponty, the sexual body is one that shows the orientation of the body as an 
‘object that is sensitive to all the rest’, a body that feels the nearness of the objects with which 
it coexists” (Ahmed, 2006, p.67), although Ahmed adds that this sensitivity itself can already 
be a queer one.  
 
A Human Algorithm in Face-ism? 
We might relate these actions over time to the ‘algorithmic’ treatment of identity in 
contemporary digital cultures mentioned in Chapter 1. Here, through mass usage, people have 
done exactly what they criticise digital algorithms in ‘Google culture’ of doing: forming 
aggregate models and standards for human beings from processing massive amounts of user 
data. Users rapidly processing and judging the masses of Grindr images they view, aided by, 
but not entirely because of, machines. This is the inscription of a ‘straightening up’, a ‘falling 
into line’, and a normativity that is occurring over time, through repetition. Gay men are then 
applying these averaged images to their own standards of self-representation. We can easily 
today refer to machines that also recognise faces this way, through arrangements of 
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contrasting pixels in a camera image, or facial recognition. Machines learn to interpret faces 
by parsing as many images of faces as they can. If human users repeatedly affectively process 
similar faces then that composite ‘face’ must inform desirable standards in their mind. This 
‘straightening’ of gay online dating apps and idea of an algorithm is what I discuss in the 
following chapter.  
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4 Fascism in Face-ism 
 
Hardness is not the absence of emotion, but a different emotional orientation towards others. 
The hard white [male] body is shaped by its reactions: the rage against others surfaces as a 
body that stands apart or keeps its distance from others. We shouldn’t look for emotions ‘in’ 
soft bodies. Emotions shape the very surfaces of bodies, which take shape through the 
repetition of actions over time, as well as through orientations towards and away from others. 
— Sarah Ahmed, 2004, p.4 
 
Critiques of Grindr are not only phenomenological or psychoanalytical. They are deeply 
political. In particular, the critique of Grindr as a space that promotes normativity (or 
‘homonormativity’) amongst homosexuals is common and topical. Usually this normativity is 
characterised in terms of white-maleness and its racism towards and exclusion of bodies that 
deviate from a ‘gym-fit’ white male standard. Racism classically manifests on Grindr 
through requests like ‘no Asians’. This normativity extends to the pervasive privileging of 
masculinity; the demand for ‘masc only, no fems’ is very common on Grindr profiles.  
We must recognise that while Grindr is a homosexual space, it isn’t necessarily a 
queer one. The white male body structures a ‘norm’ against which judgements are made. This 
becomes a kind of vortex or ‘black hole’. Fit, white, masculine male bodies are privileged as 
something the majority ‘tend toward’. Users reject (mostly by ignoring the advances of) 
bodies that deviate from this model. Users attempt, by averaging themselves out, to remove 
or hide the qualities that render them specific racially, sexually or emotionally (see poker-
facing in Chapter 3). Alternatively they stop participating altogether. The result is a mono-
cultural grid of bodies that highlights not only what “bodies ‘tend toward’ in their 
tendencies” (Ahmed 2006, p.57) but also “how such tendencies shape what bodies tend 
toward”(ibid).  
 
Microfascisms 
Ahmed implicitly claims that the white body is ‘hard’ and emotionally challenged. This is not 
because it lacks emotions, but because it distances itself from, or turns away from others; a 
different kind of emotional orientation. The way the white body deals with complex emotions 
is to disconnect, to not participate in affective exchanges, to face elsewhere. On Grindr, 
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ignoring the advances of another, blocking others, or even pre-emptively saying ‘no fems’ on 
one’s profile constitutes this ‘turning away from’.  
 
The consequences are intense and heavy silences; tense and emotionally charged 
spaces of time where affection is not being reciprocated. Such waiting games can only be 
tempered by attempting to contact more and more people, ‘trying one’s luck’, and further 
inscribing repetitive engagement with still faces into the orientation of the user ‘playing’ the 
game of Grindr. However, what causes any of us to ‘turn away from’ others? Here I take into 
account Deleuze and Guattari’s extended concept of ‘micropolitics’, and then ‘faciality’ from 
A Thousand Plateaus (1988) in order to discuss the maintenance of, and submission to, 
powerful and implicit codes accompanying faciality in gay online dating apps. I am not 
generally discussing repression at the hands of forces external to homosexuality, but forces of 
male homosexuality acting upon itself. 
 
Only microfascism provides an answer to the global question: Why does desire desire its own 
repression? […] Desire is never separable from […] micro-formations already shaping 
postures, attitudes, perceptions, expectations […] etc (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988, p.251). 
 
When Deleuze and Guattari talk about “micropolitics”, they are talking about the propensity 
for everyone to want others, the external world, to conform to their own rules. This is an 
internalised politics functioning on the level of the individual. “Microfascism” is an 
internalised algorithm of judgement. We could say that the forming of a micropolitics is part 
of being oriented over time – it constitutes what we will ‘accept’ or ‘reject’ when we face 
towards things, but is also structured by the things we face towards over time. The personal 
nature of Grindr on smartphones constructs a thriving environment for microfascism. This is 
in part because the structure of judgement is very much based on an algorithm – a 
microfascism of the face. If affection-images represent desire as partial objects do, then a 
more perverse form of desire is repressed if our consumption of others as desire objects is 
limited by internalised microfascisms informed by the orientated privileging of white bodies. 
The face, at least in terms of affection-images, is the structure of this politics.  
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Faciality as overcoding of the face 
Hand, breast, penis, stomach, penis, vagina, thigh, leg and foot, all come to be facialized… an 
overcoding of all the decoded parts. —Deleuze 1988, p.199. 
 
Face-ism is the structure of microfascism in terms of affection-images on Grindr.  In A 
Thousand Plateaus, the plateau called “Year Zero: Faciality”, Deleuze and Guattari extend 
their discussion of the face, to “a machine specific to faciality” (1988, p.200) especially in 
regards to how the structure of the face organises our response to other human beings. 
“Certain assemblages of power require the production of a face, others do not” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1988, p.205). Grindr requires the production of a face. In this scenario, the face is 
discussed as divorced from the body; a sign rather than a physical object. This is the 
discussion of the face not as a head (where it is part of a body), but as a system of 
overcoding. “Overcoding” (Deleuze and Guattari 1988, p.71) refers to the use of language to 
dominate through translation, and refers to the overriding of heterogeneous things existing on 
their own terms, unifying them in a new way, under a new code. When something is 
“overcoded”, it ceases to be ‘messy’. In terms of capitalism money is an example of a 
numeric code that generifies labour and value through translation. Our example here is the 
face, which, when overcoded, becomes a language and a measure of difference, a standard, 
rather than a ‘head’:  
 
The face is produced only when the head ceases to be part of the body, when it ceases to be 
coded by the body, when it ceases to have a multidimensional, polyvocal corporeal code - 
when the body, head included, has been decoded and has to be overcoded by something we 
shall call the Face… to be facialized” (Deleuze and Guattari 1988, p.198). 
 
In Anti-Oedipus (1983) Deleuze and Guattari refer to McLuhan in the discussion of 
overcoding, which is important to capitalism. Capitalism uses the “electric flow” (which we 
might interpret to mean the digital today) as a “technical means of expression that 
correspond[s] to the generalised decoding of flows […] instead of still referring, in a direct or 
indirect form, to despotic overcoding” (1983, p.240). We might think of Grindr or the 
proliferation of many other face-based applications, along with facial recognition, to be a 
digital deterritorialisation of the head, that allows it to be re-territorialised or ‘overcoded’ 
when it is divorced from the context of a real body. On Grindr this is the head’s status as a 
partial object. This both allows it to be treated as an object, as previously discussed, but also 
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allows it to be manipulated and played with, as we see in many other playful face-swapping 
and editing apps like Snapchat for example. I will discuss the expressive qualities of this in 
my own practice in later chapters.   
 
Microfascisms and black holes 
In Chapter 3 I discussed contrasts of light and dark as they apply to a facial grid. In terms of 
faciality microfascisms are represented as the black holes of the facial grid – the point at 
which an individual is defined not by its reflectivity but by its subjective openings, the place 
where an individual sucks the external world into itself (its eyes, its mouth, its nostrils) – the 
places where the agency of the face and connected body are most powerful. ‘Black hole’ is 
synonymous to subjectivity, a ‘sucking-inward’. To Deleuze and Guattari black holes are 
intertwined with whiteness, the placement of the black holes in the reflective surface of the 
white face mirror the dominator influence of White Man, who manipulates the world through 
overcoding, subjecting other languages to their own. ‘The face’ for Deleuze and Guattari is a 
white male political structure, overcoded so as to reflect the idea of white men themselves: 
 
The face is not a universal. It is not even that of the white man; it is White Man himself, with 
his broad white cheeks and the black hole of the eyes. The face is Christ. The face is the 
typical European […] The face is by nature an entirely specific idea (Deleuze and Guattari 
1988, p.206-7). 
  
This ‘specific idea’ for Deleuze and Guattari is white-maleness and deviation or proximity to 
it. In this culture, the face has become fixed. It is over-coded and has ceased to be 
polymorphous. A face is always judged in relation to the white face. Deleuze and Guattari 
claim that ours is a culture of submission to the white-male facial system. In such a system, 
“It is not the individuality of the face that counts but the efficacy of the ciphering it makes 
possible” (1988, p.205) therefore faciality allows for a code to be applied to all faces and 
subjects them to the same judgment. “This is an affair not of ideology but of economy and 
the organization of power” (1988, p.205), and therefore speaks to the territory that the white 
body has gained, and continues to maintain, on Grindr. On Grindr, a user with their own 
subjectivity, their own status as a black hole, surveys a grid of reflective faces. They are a 
singularity that other faces exist ‘in terms of’, forgetting that, in fact, each other face is a 
black hole perceiving them to be a reflective surface that they project their own desires onto. 
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Faciality in Grindr 
A smartphone full of faces is a place for microfascisms to operate and collide. Each face 
perceived by a microfascist as reflective masks another microfascist. Each body replaced by a 
partial-object creates a temporal and aesthetic delusion between the two. Every microfascist 
will assume that others exist in terms of proximity to their own body, ‘within reach’ of the 
microfascist. I am here, with myself, and my phone. These subjects are for me, they present 
themselves to me. I can delete, block, sort, filter, chat, ignore, turn off, engage or not — as I 
see fit. I am not buffeted by complex faces; faces that respond, faces that I am challenged to 
assess myself against, to have a discussion with. The faces have already been “slid” into. 
They have been “slid” into my pre-digested facial units. They are static, unresponsive. 
Responses before-the-fact are imagined and based on typification; what is seen, projected 
upon the reflective surface of an affection-image.  
 
The logo of Grindr is a mask; a dark, skeletal face, but “[e]ven masks ensure the head 
is belonging to the body, rather than making it a face” (Deleuze and Guattari 1988, p.206). 
Grindr might be seen as an entity, a body (such a mask is hard to read), but using Grindr, we 
can definitely say, as has previously been discussed, that the human face becomes 
‘overcoded’ with potential readings. Why is a face needed? As the locus of an identity a face 
is a point of contact with another. The face comes to constitute largely a language of the 
interface, of the surface. When one opens an online dating app, one is presented with 
surfaces. Surfaces (faces) within a surface (the interface) representing another kind of surface 
(geo-location). These are all 2-dimensional coordinate images with only x and y coordinates 
operating within a grid, or grids within grids. As discussed in the previous chapter, ‘the face’ 
itself uses a grid structure. Then, the app interface itself is a grid of profiles, and these are 
arranged according to their coordinates on a global positioning grid. The interface of gay 
dating apps itself is generally a fractal sort of face; we see a face composed of faces. Grindr 
may use a mask as its icon, its identity, its face, but its real ‘face’ is the ‘grid of gays’. 
 
[…] moments of switching dimensions can be disorientating[…]. Bodies that experience 
disorientation can be defensive, as they reach out for support or as they search for a place to 
reground and re-orientate their relation to the world. So, too, the forms of politics that proceed 
from disorientation can be conservative, depending on the “aims” of their gestures, depending 
on how they seek to (re)ground themselves. And, for sure, bodies that experience being out of 
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place might need to be orientated, to find a place where they feel comfortable and safe in the 
world (Ahmed 2006, p.158). 
 
The Face as an Algorithm 
There is something absolutely inhuman about the face. It would be an error to proceed as 
though the face became inhuman only beyond a certain threshold: closeup, extreme 
magnification, recondite expression, etc. The inhuman in human beings: that is what the face 
is from the start. —Deleuze and Guattari 1988, p.198. 
 
One of the features of our algorithmic society, as hinted previously, is that it is a society 
where swarms of people produce, without much guidance, their own norms and trends 
without policing or curation by experts or intellectuals. We cannot claim there is a despot, nor 
celebrity conspiracy, at the helm of Grindr enforcing a white male regime upon its users. 
These users construct this reality for themselves based on whatever “despot” exists within 
them, and whatever politics the app encourages, through the presence of faciality and 
microfascism. As mentioned earlier being with the app and its language of affection-images 
can consist an orientation-towards certain types of images over time, and this in turns 
inscribes itself on the politics of users.  
 
Just as digital facial algorithm systems work by recognising light/dark contrasts in the 
face, according to Deleuze and Guattari  human beings do the same when it comes to reading 
faces. This is why they refer to faces with a binary logic of black hole/white wall; a grid of 
contrasts that constitute facial identities on a grid. To put it simply, imagine the “white wall” 
is the (reflective) surfaces of the face/grid, and “black holes” are shadows formed by the inset 
of eyes, mouths or nostrils upon this plane. This is relevant in our discussion of Grindr, 
which features a proliferation of faces that must be read and accepted/rejected en masse and 
at great consumptive speed, as a form of language or overcoding, rather than as something 
immediately affective or corporeal. Affection is ‘read’ rather than always ‘experienced’. 
 
faciality assumes a role of selective response, or choice: given a concrete face, [it] judges 
whether it passes or not, whether it goes or not, on the basis of the elementary facial units. 
This time, the binary relation is of the “yes-no” type. The empty eye or black hole absorbs or 
rejects, like a half-doddering despot who can still give a signal of acquiescence or refusal 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1988, p.207). 
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Facialisation operates on a logic of ‘yes’ or ‘no’ — one either conforms to an accepted 
degree of deviation from the norm or does not — and if not, facialisation proceeds to evaluate 
one’s degree of deviation from the norm. This, Deleuze and Guattari propose, is how 
prejudice operates; by measuring their degree of deviation from European norms in the white 
face model. As such, the face structures normativity online. Faces are grids that operate as 
maps, telling us, for the most part, about the normativity of a person’s representation. The 
face essentially becomes the inhuman in humans. A human-generated algorithm that sorts, 
accepts, rejects and defines normativity based on traits.  
 
“Wanna Play?” 
Dries Verhoeven is projecting other people's private Grindr texts in the middle of Kreuzberg, 
Berlin – and many aren't too happy about it. —Tsjeng 2014a, para.1. 
 
In late 2014, Dries Verhoeven caused public outcry with a new artwork produced through his 
interaction with Grindr. Verhoeven aimed to "expose the opportunities and tragedies of a 
phenomenon in gay culture: the sex date app" (Tseng 2014a, para.7) by installing himself 
publicly in a glass shipping container in the streets of Kreuzberg, Berlin. Verhoeven would 
open a conversation with another man online using the app, under the guise of looking for a 
sexual exchange or ‘hookup’. He would print out and post large blown up screenshots of 
these (very private) conversations into the windows of the shipping container in Kreuzberg.  
 
Meanwhile, the man he was communicating with would be under the impression that 
he was arriving somewhere to have sex with Verhoeven, but the address Verhoeven gave the 
man would be that of the glass shipping container, and so he would arrive to see his own 
(often lewd) conversation blown up for the world to see. Many were outraged when they 
appeared, even aggressive; “somebody had tried to hurl a brick through the glass-walled 
trailer that Verhoeven was living in” (Tseng 2014b, para.8). Verhoeven has since been 
banned from Grindr, and had his exhibition shut down within five days. There was massive 
public outcry on social media, particularly Facebook. 
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Verhoeven’s artwork exposes issues surrounding the ethics and affective 
consequences of digital systems like Grindr have on their users: this is the fragility of Grindr 
and its clandestine community; at once both a site of empowerment (to find gay men 
anywhere, invisible to the rest of the population) and extreme insecurity (the threat of 
exposure, particularly via public exposure). As Tseng (2014a, para.13) reflects: 
 
Gays require safe spaces to exist in… Granted, Grindr is not exactly a 'safe space', but it is a 
space for us to communicate our desires and needs. In this digital world, it's one of the few 
safe spaces we have. [Verhoeven] is violating that.  
  
Verhoeven’s artwork operates through a kind of “Dark Play” where “Dark play is used as a 
playful approach to play situations, in which the disruptive nature of play can be used to 
break the conventions of gentrified play contexts” (Sicart 2014, p.23). In this scenario, online 
dating becomes the play context, where users are often manipulating and producing self-
images in order to maximize an affective/affectionate response from the application(s). 
  
I realised that on many occasions it wasn't sex that I was looking for, but more the affirmation 
that I got from the sex. The sounds of the various apps had the effect of a slap on the back, an 
incoming message meant interest. I felt like a teenager who needs the approval of his 
classmates and so conforms to their rules and their jargon. In less than half a year my texts 
had been reduced to simple one liners like “Hey there” and “What’s up?” my photos did not 
show the man that I was, but rather a bad imitation of the typical torso photos (Verhoeven 
2014, p.2). 
 
Verhoeven’s reflection demonstrates how he as a user felt condemned to performing the 
codes that Grindr inscribes within him and many of its users. In the following discussion I 
demonstrate how I came to enact my own ‘dark play’ on the topic of Grindr and other online 
dating applications.  
 
Works at the Radicalism Exhibition 2014 
Artwork of mine at The Substation, Melbourne, 2014, curated by Drew Pettifer, played with 
and depicted facialised partial-objects in order to critique faciality and masculinity in online 
dating. Faciality was discussed in terms of how a focus on images depicting faces or body 
parts can be read as affectionate. Partial objects refer to objects of desire perceived separately 
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to the whole body. Simply playing with facialisation and partial objects however is not 
enough.  
 
How does playing with faciality and partial-objects constitute a critique or original 
knowledge in terms of a dissertation on critical play? A user keeps their distance from any 
physical encounter for a time and skips around on a digital surface of faces, relying on only 
affection-images, profile statistics, and chats for approximations of intimate immediacy. Such 
a process is reflected in my own work, which, like the logic of comic judgments and 
perversity, reflects a consistent skipping or skimming of facial languages. The difference is 
that such comic judgments are made for critique in the place of essentialisation, and they use 
essentialisation in the form of caricature. This process of caricature is discussed in Chapter 5. 
  
For the Radicalism show I presented four artworks; a large digital print (“Selfie”), a 
video (“Tough Guy / Big Red X”), and two works on iPad (Gay Under Glass and 
“TinderFlick”), all centred on the theme of online dating applications, particularly Grindr, 
but “TinderFlick” concerned the pansexual Tinder app. Radicalism was presented during 
Melbourne’s “Midsumma” queer festival (January/February 2014) that sought to explore 
“...radicalism, resistance and defiance around questions of gender and sexuality in the 
contemporary moment” (The Substation 2014, para.1). My four works were presented in a 
dark dungeon-like space suited to screen works but also reflecting the somewhat seedy or 
‘out of sight’ nature of Grindr and its related subject matter. All of these works were 
formalized versions of experiments produced earlier in the research period, which went on to 
inform the more involved G-Net work at Tabularium (2014) which will be discussed later in 
this Chapter. The first work I made was a video called Tough Guy / Big Red X here is a quote 
of the blurb that Drew Pettifer and I wrote for the artwork’s wall panel: 
          
[...] Tough Guy / Big Red X looks at how users perceive and treat representations of other 
people in contemporary dating apps. The artist swipes unceremoniously through dozens of 
Grindr profiles, rhythmically blocking each user as their profile loads. The finger, insensitive 
towards these bodies-under-glass, becomes an extension of the artist’s ambivalence towards 
the app’s ability to provide meaningful affection. Each subject becomes a discarded body 
preceding an endless series of options as the artist challenges the standardisation of queer 
identity encouraged by the app’s design (Penney and Pettifer, 2014). 
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Tough Guy / Big Red X made a normally private process of judgment public, in a similar but 
less affronting way to Verhoeven. It aimed to make viewers highly conscious of the number 
of users, faces, or bodies they themselves discard or swipe through daily on their own device. 
It turns a private screen into a public display, exacerbated by stock videos of crowds playing 
in the background behind the phone. The screen itself becomes an intensive or reflective face: 
intensive because the artwork displays a series of repetitive movements, although these reveal 
nothing except a mechanical body – that of the screen or Grindr itself. The participating 
finger is merely an extension of this process. It responds to its environment rather than 
revealing any interiority that is of the phone itself or the artist who is off-camera.  
 
The user must ask ‘am I the same as this phone or this finger when reading the 
artwork?’ The faces or affection-images of each discarded user are equally unimportant. They 
are not read individually because all are treated the same. All stats and individual 
characteristics are rendered meaningless when subject to a single, repeated action that seems 
not to care for any such criteria. The video becomes expressive of a machine, the facial 
algorithm, and the inhuman-in-humans that exist to impersonally and perpetually discard 
images of Grindr users. 
 
Gay Under the Glass 
Playing with meshes of bodies in the software Unity3D resulted in early versions of Gay 
Under Glass (2013-14), an artwork made for iPad that presented viewers with a body loosely 
and flaccidly hanging within a faux Grindr frame. When the user touches their finger to 
Joel’s body, Joel’s face connects to the player’s finger and his body can be dragged around, 
via his under-the-screen face. Using the iPad viewers can directly touch the interactive body 
with their finger rather than use a mouse. As they drag the body a smudging-glass sound is 
heard which makes the user more conscious of their dragging the body with their finger. 
 
 I discuss the use of bodily meshes as an artistic play process in more detail in 
following chapters. In chapter 6 I discuss specifically how this relates to critical doll play. I 
generated this work while thinking about how dating apps present ‘bodies under glass’ and 
had in mind Jenny Saville’s feminist photography, where she had pressed her own flesh and 
skin against glass for a series of photographs in defiance of screen-based culture and female 
body standards. In my work I used the mesh of a male body sourced from The Sims (see 
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chapter 6). I turned it into a ‘cloth object’ (also chapter 6) and used a transparent cube object 
to squash it and approximate the fleshy quality of a body pressed against glass.  
 
Earlier iterations of the work involved a 2D cut out finger that replaced the mouse 
cursor, so that the body could be dragged around under the simulated glass. This cut out 
finger approximated a real finger before I moved it to iPad. The subsequent poor 
approximation of a finger, in place of a cursor, was later removed so that viewers could 
directly feel the numbness of pressing, dragging and glitching out the body on the screen, 
rather than exacerbating this by adding another representation of a finger between them and 
the content. This clumsy 2D finger does however have some merit on the web version of the 
work, where viewers have to use a mouse rather than use their own finger to drag the body 
around. It was important that this work be on iPad rather than just on a computer screen, 
because I wanted players to be able to connect this experience haptically to their everyday 
experience of app usage on phones and other touchscreens. I wanted the gestures to relate as 
closely as possible to how fingers use touchscreens daily. Users needed to touch the body 
with their finger to drag it around to make connections between the gaze, the finger and the 
screen. 
          
   
Figures 4 and 5: Tom Penney, Gay Under Glass (2013-14). Differences between the original 
desktop version of with cut-out finger image replacing computer arrow, and touch-input version 
installed in the Radicalism exhibition. 
 
The final version for exhibition used a more realistic skin colour on the body mesh rather 
than a flat colour, giving it more of a simulated flesh quality. I also added a face. I felt it was 
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important to add this because otherwise you feel like you are just dragging around a 
mannequin. I wanted to suggest that this body might not simply be a ‘toy’ and had some 
reality as a body being subjected to your gaze and under the screen manipulation. Now with a 
personality (a face), the body of the man, Joel, appears squashed up against the screen and 
glitches slightly, particularly where the face and penis are. These are the two most affective 
or affectionate parts of a Grindr based body, and they protrude the most, becoming the most 
affected by the squashing of the simulated glass. I see this as an affront to the affection-
image; distorting it beyond its capacity to function as a partial object or to be ‘read’ 
effectively. It is a way of breaking or subverting this language.   
 
 
Figure 6: Tom Penney, from left ‘Gay Under Glass’ (2013-14), ‘A Handsome Man’, Radicalism 
exhibition (2014). Photo by Hoda Afshar 
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Figure 7. Tom Penney, Gay Under Glass (2013-14), screenshot of iPad installation. 
 
There are two oddly crisp and isolated virtual fingerprint marks on the screen 
deliberately made to approximate real fingerprints. This plays alongside the uncanny 
approximation of a body, or the shoddily cut out finger from earlier iterations. It is intended 
to be a deliberately poor simulation of ‘touch’ speaking to the affective numbness of touching 
bodies within screens. When viewers do touch the screen and drag the body around, another 
poor simulation takes place – the sound. The audio heard in the work is an edited series of 
open-source sound files of rubbing glass played one after the other, randomly, so long as 
body is being dragged around. They are quite abrupt, they don’t fade in or out, and it’s quite 
easy to hear the same sound bites repeat because the list of possible sounds is not long. It’s 
like a video game where you hear the same sound effects, such as slashing, firing a gun, or 
gaining a point repeated over and over. It is humorous because clearly the sound — like the 
image — is an approximation, a simulation, and not smooth or realistic.  
 
The notion of affection or affection-image as discussed here and in chapter 3 as it 
applies to this work is problematized. The work sends-up or makes farcical the problems I 
have identified earlier in this dissertation. Dragging the loose, saggy body around via its 
glitched-up face is rather satisfying, even sadistic. The body is pressed against the screen 
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with some clumsy semblance of non-virtual physicality. The viewer gets a strong sense of 
their own sadistic manipulation of the body as they use their finger to smear it around. The 
intention is to invoke a self-awareness of the kind of ‘god complex’ through the 
objectification of a virtual body beneath a commanding finger. I write further about 
objectification and commanding finger in relation to the video game Black and White in 
Chapter 6. 
  
The glitching of the face, and this glitching as a point of contact with the finger, 
creates a physical relationship to the distortion of facial imagery; the distortion of the 
affection-image. This distortion also extends to the manipulation of the body and penis. The 
body is the most expressive component here, it distorts and twists when it collides with itself, 
the finger, and its profile-prison. The penis and face, both affective close-ups, are glitched 
and provide us with no information. The unnatural smudging sound emanating from the 
finger’s interaction only makes it more obvious that there is no real physicality at play either; 
these are strange simulations of any visceral experience. The whole work becomes a slapstick 
irreverent downplaying of these elements; of the body, its relationship to a personal glass 
screen, and to a user who sees that body as an object, and intends to make this absurdity clear 
to any user of Grindr through this uncannily-portrayed ‘version’ of a simplified Grindr 
encounter. 
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Figure 8. Tom Penney, Gay Under Glass (2013-2014), Unity3D web app version, screenshot of the 
web version. 
  
TinderFlick 
‘TinderFlick’ (2014) was a work developed specifically for the Radicalism show. I had 
always wanted to make a work about Tinder, another dating app, because the method of 
browsing through possible dates is unique. On Tinder one is presented with profile image 
after profile image, at which point the user makes a quick decision to ‘swipe left’ or ‘swipe 
right’. One ‘swipes left’ to discard a human being; these people you are not attracted to. If 
however you ‘swipe right’ this indicates you might like to chat to the person, and, if they also 
happen to ‘swipe right’ on you then you get a match and can chat to each other. ‘TinderFlick’ 
relates to the video ‘Tough Guy / Big Red X’; viewers perform dismissive swipe or flick 
gestures on ‘TinderFlick’s’ virtual bodies. These gestures dismiss bodies and imply users’ 
judgment although here they can do it themselves rather than watch my finger do so. In this 
scenario, I have played with the idea of Tinder being a fire, both positive and negative. Here, 
no matter which direction you swipe the constant onslaught of bodies, they land in the fire.  
 
In this work, there are only four bodies that rotate through, although each time they 
are presented with a randomly generated name. These are white, generic bodies, two male 
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and two female. I used open-source meshes and turned them into floppy ragdolls whose 
heads always face the user, as if silently begging the user to ‘pick me!’ or, seem to offer them 
some affection. The user places their finger into the profile space to flick the body left or 
right, the person’s head snaps to the finger, often extending their neck in an absurd fashion 
and leaving their body flailing about behind them. The bizarre disconnect of the head from 
the body creates a strange relationship between each person’s face and their connected body. 
When the head is “flicked” either side, the body often snaps back as if on an elastic band (via 
the neck). After a user has discarded a few bodies on either side the ‘bodycount’ starts to rise, 
and the cadavers become uncontained by the space either side of the ‘profile’ area. They loll 
about, toppling throughout the whole scene. This artwork is an expression of complete 
ambivalence towards the ‘Tinder treatment’. 
 
 
Figure 9. Tom Penney, TinderFlick (2014), screenshot of web version 
 
The concerns elaborated in these works, notably regarding the relationship between bodies, 
screens, faces and fingers, have been explored through a number of works during my practice 
particularly those shown in the Radicalism exhibition in Melbourne. I began with a 
discussion of an unusual tension; between the notion of an app providing meaningful 
affection to users, and this affection as undermined by the strange narcissistic and numbed 
affective circuitry that such apps engender. Throughout my work I have drawn conceptual 
parallels between elements of gaming and dating apps in order to draw attention to the 
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simulations of the body present in app-dating environments. My work has seized the concept 
of critical ‘world building’ (see Chapter 6) to create uncanny parodies and symbolic 
reductions of online dating environments. These reductions have involved a focus on using 
the finger or swipe-gestures to select, discard, or distort virtual human beings. The work 
draws viewers’ attention to their own gestures and judgements by taking them out of context 
and rendering them absurd. This enables viewers to translate the parody back to their own use 
of dating apps and reflect upon how they objectify other users and themselves.  
 
Tabularium (2014) 
Later in 2014 I built upon the works presented at the Radicalism exhibition to create an 
artistic ‘probe-head’ (see chapter 5) that examined the reconfiguration of facial politics of 
using Grindr and other gay online dating apps. This project was exhibited at Slopes Gallery, 
part of Melbourne’s Utopian Slumps, in the exhibition Tabularium curated by Alana Kushnir.  
Tabularium at large had a post-internet art focus, and included works by Jon Raffman, Ry 
David Bradley, Eloïse Bonneviot, Heman Chong, Anthony Marcellini, Rachel De Joode, 
Lawrence Lek and Katja Novitskova. My works however sought to do something different to 
this general trend and I think they sat awkwardly amongst the other standard post-internet 
pieces. I had never conceptualised myself as a ‘post-internet artist’.  
 
Museum  
I presented my online components of the exhibition in a form that I called “Museum” in 
keeping with the exhibition’s theme of Tabularium, a closed archive “which was constructed 
in around 78 BCE to house official legal documents of the ancient Roman State.” (Kushnir 
and Lek, 2014, para.1). It was important to me that I reference the history of Greco-Roman 
sculptures at some point to infuse the works with a frame of classical white-maleness. The 
background for “Museum” which is a container for many of the works previously discussed 
and presented online, is a museum scene built in The Sims 3 that I have taken a screenshot of, 
blurred and Photoshopped (more details in Chapter 6). The phone browser hovers on a layer 
above the background as if you were looking at these works on a smartphone or iPad in a 
virtual gallery. The background of the phone browser is one of the images that I didn’t end up 
producing as a print or finished piece when developing “Selfie” (see Chapter 6).  “Museum” 
became a web-based interface through which you could access the works previously 
discussed in this chapter, as well as an additional work G-Net.  
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Figure 10. Tom Penney, Museum (2014), screenshot of the website. 
 
G-Net 
The primary new work I produced for Tabularium, and accessible through “Museum” was 
‘G-Net’, a parody app deriving its title from the gay dating app Hornet, which is very similar 
in nature to Grindr, adopting the same grid location based-interface, orange colour scheme 
and profile structure. The main screen of G-Net first introduced the user with a logo 
displaying a stylised star-shaped anus between two butt cheeks and the words “Finding others 
nearby” (web version) or “touch to find others” (iPad version) before loading a grid of square 
rooms that one monster inhabited each. At the bottom of the interface was a ‘trough’ that 
collected any monsters you didn’t like and blocked. Blocked monsters slid down the screen 
and landed in the trough. The design of each room was to be somewhat like a padded cell, 
subtly alluding to the self-entrapping feedback loops that users might get themselves into, 
addictively, in using such apps. 
 
Doll Play for ‘G-Net’ 
 ‘G-Net’ evolved from extensive play with both physical and digital materials. This for the 
most part involved the creation of bodies resembling partial objects. I sculpted a number of 
forms from plasticine to get an immediate sense of physical creation over my characters, 
these were later 3D scanned and rendered as digital meshes. Much of this process I can 
describe as semi-erotic. I rather liken the experience of moulding my preliminary sculptures 
out of plasticine to that of forming a body, or moulding flesh. It is very queer, this process of 
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sculpting reductive phalluses, as one is both creating a perverse object (eluding to one’s own 
sexual interests) and interacting with it in order to later objectify it as a critical object.  
 
In a sense, each monster is an ideal-object: a subverted, dark object rather than a 
‘good’ object. These objects only become individuals when when they are in the app,  
characterized by other profile stats, and text that has been programmed to randomly generate, 
alongside different skin colours. As general designs, each monster-style functions as a 
generic, reductive ‘type’, pulling the pantheon of homosexual ‘tribes’ into a pantheon of 
reductive body-type-styled monstrosities. In G-Net these were objectified in the same way 
users might be within the interface of the actual Hornet or Grindr apps; the fetish of their 
presentation as generic (anti)ideal objects was extended to their physical creation. 
Importantly these bodies were not represented as ‘whole’. They were ‘whole’ in the sense 
that they were objects, but as bodies they were merely detached parts, or resembling parts, 
but with an added singular eye. 
   
 
Figure 11. Tom Penny, G-Net (2014). Initial sketch designs for the monsters. 
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Figures 12 and 13. Tom Penny, G-Net (2014). From left, original plasticine sculptures, and rendered 
as digital meshes made from 3D photo-scans. 
  
I had actually got some of my inspiration for the way each monster would ‘inhabit’ the main 
profile browsing space by reading about dolls houses in Mary Flanagan’s writing as 
discussed in Chapter 2. Many traditional dolls houses are ‘cut-away’, revealing a series of 
rooms often of equal size that the dolls can inhabit. I combined this idea with the grid of 
squares from Grindr of Hornet, and although the reference is not at all obvious in the final 
outcome, it is where the idea came from in part. The second influence here, ‘dungeons’, is 
discussed in Chapter 5. The ‘grid’ of rooms in a dolls’ house might structure a domestic 
space, granting each room its symbolic and contained purpose, but here the square boundary 
of each profile space offers a different kind of ‘domestic’ prison; the everydayness for gay 
men is the Grindr or Hornet interface and each face is a denizen of its own frame. As 
mentioned earlier, every monster’s profile is decorated with randomly generated statistics to 
give it a personality. These are age, distance (from the user), height and weight. Additionally, 
a profile title was generated from a long list based of profile titles I had witnessed on real 
profiles such as “Masc 4 Musc”, “Total Top”, “Horny Bottom”, “Twink for u” and “Wrd 
Looking”.   
 
 This work took a lot more planning and time than other works in my dissertation. It 
was my most ambitious work, and I sought assistance from a programmer, Stevie Griffiths, to 
make it. Mostly, planning involved how we would arrange a series of rooms that could 
automatically load in random features from a library of ‘pieces’. These included which 
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monster mesh would be used, which skin colour, what profile name, whether it would or 
wouldn’t like you, and other statistics. We set up a grid of co-ordinates that would spawn 
‘rooms’. Each ‘room’ had a controller (written in UnityScript code) that would determine the 
features that would be loaded into it. Additionally there was an external controller that could 
determine if a room needed to be replaced (because you had ‘blocked’ that character), as well 
as determining the room you were looking at, and therefore which cloth-based mesh to 
animate and light up. UnityScript code also controlled things like the chat feature.  
 
 
Figure 14, Tom Penney, G-Net (2014), view of a monster inhabiting its room with 
randomly generated profile statistics. 
  
G-Net was programmed so that users could actually chat to the monsters. For each randomly 
generated monster, there was a 3/10 chance that it would be “into you”. If a monster was 
“into you” it would gradually spam you with introductory messages such as “hi”, “hi”, “hi”, 
“I’m horny”, “hi”, “wanna fuck?”. These messages (and this may come as a surprise to non-
users) are very common in real-world Grindr encounters. It is very common for a guy to 
continually spam you with “hi”, failing to catch on that you are not interested. If you typed 
anything into the response area, the app would search through your response for sexual 
keywords and reply using them if it liked you. For example, if you offered, “I’m horny”, it 
might reply “Hot, yes I love horny”. The effect is deliberately clunky and robotic, alluding to 
realistic code-based interaction of the app experience. Essentially you could have a very 
crude, sexual, pseudo-conversation with each monster.  
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Additionally, if the monster liked you, with every reply you gave it the monster would 
inflate. It would puff up with comic inflation sounds like it was becoming erect, excited and 
engorged with blood. Alternatively, if the monster was not “into you” and you attempted to 
converse with it, it would take a lot longer to reply or not reply at all. It would deflate and 
become wilted from disinterest, until it decided to block you, in which case the screen would 
say, “You have been blocked”. You could also block each monster yourself using a block 
button, at which point they would be ejected from their room and slide into the “trough” at 
the bottom of the interface and be replaced with a different randomly generated monster. 
Responses from disinterested monsters were short and rude, examples include: “fuck off”; 
“I’m not interested in <sexual keyword from your message>”; “I’m not into you kinda guys”; 
“Ur not my type hey”; “Yeah whatever”. This combined with the depiction of monsters 
whose ‘faces’ have been reduced to singular, unblinking eyes, is designed to render the 
dating app experience as an altogether unsatisfying and alienating one.  
 
Figure 15, Tom Penney, G-Net (2014), chat view of monster in the web version.  
 
G-Net used profile text based off the type of text seen in real Grindr and Hornet 
profiles particularly profiles that expressed a crude, reductive image of what it means to use 
the app. Many of the pieces of text chosen reflected the defensive, hyper-masculinity of the 
environment. Examples include “Message me all u like.., Just don’t expect a response unless 
you look like a current ELITE athlete. Footballer 5yrs ago = no!”, “no Indians”, “hit me up 
NSA cant host anon. Descreet”, “Don’t msg me if ur ugly coz I don’t wanna reply but ill feel 
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bad bcoz I ignore basically everyone who messages me and basically everyone I message 
ignores me”, and “Show me your face if you wanna get anywhere (seriously though I’m 
probably not going to talk to you if you don’t have a face picture”. It was important to me 
that these profiles reflected real life, because, it was in fact harder to come up with them 
myself than use what was seen in reality, the situation being “reality is stranger than fiction” 
when it comes to what you can find in these unexposed, semi-anonymous environments, 
especially where men are hiding their identity and using the app for an ideational fix rather 
than intending for anything face to face or personal.   
 
 
Figure 16, Tom Penney, G-Net (2014) image of a monster’s profile with profile text inspired 
by real life (spelling mistakes included). 
  
Exhibition and Reception 
Playful designs are by definition ambiguous, self-effacing, and in need of a user who will 
complete them… rather than imposing a context, playful designs open themselves to 
interpretation; they suggest their behaviours to their users, who are in charge of making them 
meaningful. Playful designs require a willing user, a comrade in play. This approach to design 
downplays system authority. —Sicart, 2014, p.31. 
  
When Sicart discusses the iPhone’s Siri as a playful design, he notes “Siri has a personality, 
she is quirky, ironic, even a bit dry” (Sicart 2014, 32). With my own work G-Net the app 
becomes a dry and condemning playful reduction of existing apps, and requires that anyone 
interacting have a sense of humour. In G-Net ‘personality’, or represented personalities, are 
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cutting. The app is not designed as a tool for people insecure about the depicted digital 
culture to start worrying about non-users looking down upon their activities; I doubt they 
would understand the joke. It is designed for savvy users who wish to recognise the 
“problem” that Grindr or Hornet represent to a specific culture. The ideal normal response 
would be something like ‘hey, yes, haha, I see this everyday, this is a good distillation of that 
experience’. Therefore, there is a certain solidarity hoped for here, that anyone coming to 
experience the work will become a “comrade in play”. In the web-viewer version of the 
artwork, the application is housed in a fake iPhone border, which along with the application, 
floats above a blurred background of a public crowd. 
 
 
Figure 17, Tom Penney, image of the full interface of G-Net (2014) as seen on the web version, with 
blurred ‘public’ background. 
  
  
Figures 18 and 19, Tom Penney, from left: G-Net (2014) as it appears on a web browser, and iPad 
installation view at the Tabularium exhibition.  
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Perversity and Critical Play 
Through the production of G-Net I encountered a problem with the concept of Critical Play as 
it applies to critical reduction and objectification. G-Net not only comments on the perversity 
of users of Grindr and Hornet, but also functions to focus perversity on behalf of me: the 
artist who produces perverse caricatures of perverse behaviour. Thus my examination of 
artistic practice becomes a subversive exercise in facial logic. To Deleuze and Guattari this is 
a practice of becoming-clandestine, producing a probe-head (see Chapter 5), and is to become 
a kind of Frankenstein: 
 
[a] demented experimenter who flays, slices, and anatomizes everything in sight, and then 
proceeds to sew things randomly back together again. You can make a list of any part-objects 
you want: hand, breast, mouth, eyes […] it’s still Frankenstein”  (Deleuze 1988, p.201). 
 
The works function as caricatures of dating apps, and each profile also operates as a reductive 
caricature of its users that objectifies their content in the same way that the original does. It is 
this conflict that I address in the following chapter on caricature and the digital.  
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5 Caricature and the Digital 
 
 The comic is concerned with the ugly in one of its manifestations: ‘If it [what is ugly] is 
concealed, it must be uncovered in the light of the comic way of looking at things; if it is 
noticed only a little or scarcely at all, it must be brought forward and made obvious, so that it 
lies clear and open to the light of day […]. In this way caricature comes about. —Fischer 
1889, p.45.  
 
In this chapter I articulate how a number of works have informed the notion of caricature as a 
way of seeing for the playful artist, particularly in terms of re-arranging organizations of the 
face in spite of a kind of oppression of the face. In particular, this is about how the line 
between critique and essentialisation become blurred, or share the same logic, when it comes 
to critical play. These ideas originate in my reading of Mike Kelley in “Foul Perfection” 
(1989). Particularly, this chapter relates to the Chapter 7 and its discussion of the production 
of identities, through the notion of arresting, freezing or capturing aesthetic representations of 
identity in the form of caricatures and comic judgements. Freud’s analysis of jokes relies on 
German philosopher Kuno Fischer’s illumination of caricature above; that caricature comes 
to represent a comic judgment.  
 
In a sense, a caricature as an artwork is also a playful judgment. If we consider that 
play scenarios function as subjective representations, as simulations of existing ones, we 
might come to think of a caricature as behaving similarly to simulation in the form of ‘critical 
inversion’ as discussed in Chapter 1. Caricature’s critical distance is constructed through this 
paradoxical status. ‘Probe-Heads’ are a Deleuzian term referring to the method of breaking-
up, re-arranging or modifying the organization of face, to change orientations towards 
faciality. I talk about caricature’s relation to probe-heads here.  
 
Caricature 
An artist has the opportunity to subjectively represent faults for the purposes of critique 
through caricature. As a strategy this serves to distance the artist critically from the critiqued 
by subjecting subjects and systems to their own play. For example, in the traditional visual 
arts hierarchy, caricature is often treated as a low form. It is something we expect to see in 
popular newspapers and children’s books. Historically caricature has been used most 
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effectively by the middle and working classes to critique aristocracy, government, and power 
structures in general by rendering key figures within such structures as grotesque or ugly. For 
example in the famous case of William Dobell, his 1943 Archibald Prize winning portrait of 
Johnny Russell was contested in the Supreme Court of Australia on the basis that it was a 
‘caricature’ and not a “proper” portrait (Eagle 1996, para.10).  
 
In a practical sense caricature is about exaggeration or reduction. I’m referring here to 
Mike Kelley’s definition of caricature as “a portrait that deliberately transforms the features 
of its victims so as to expose and exaggerate their faults and weaknesses…” (Kelley 1989, 
p.21). Kelley goes on to expand this definition by discussing it in terms of essentialisation, 
pointing out that “although they may appear to be very different, caricature, which uses 
deformation in the service of ridicule, and the idealised, heroic, classical portrait, are founded 
in similar essentialist assumptions” (Kelley 1989 p.22). The key here is that the purpose of 
caricature is to critique, not to immortalise or to affirm the essential qualities that the 
caricature attempts to draw-out. It does this by highlighting certain features of the critiqued; a 
slight bump in the nose becomes a great big lump. 
 
In low comedy and political cartoons, reductive and distortional practices exist side by side. 
Here, both approaches are set up to attack false or hated authority, for in the context of 
caricature’s distortions, the refined heroic figure becomes a comic butt (Kelley 1989, p.27). 
 
As a subversive tool caricature is associated with scatology and low humour with the aim to 
destabilise its subjects. In a way, a caricature could be seen as a threat to a represented 
individual, although this is a different kind of threat to abjection which presents us with 
elements divorced from the unity of the body such as urine, blood, or severed limbs. With 
caricature elements are retained within the unity of the body however they are exaggerated. 
No information is really ‘added’ it is only highlighted or exaggerated. The threat of caricature 
lies not in any threat to unity, but in emphasising what is already there; the ‘truth’, albeit a 
totally subjective one. In such a scenario caricature is threatening if the subject is insecure 
about certain observations of their own body or identity. Kelley articulates further; 
“Caricature is at root based on the idea of essence, the inner truth […and that…] caricature 
has a kind of ‘good’ twin in less discordant attempts to essentialise the human form” (Kelley 
1989, p.21), however this truth is presented as an ugly truth, rather than one that is beautiful.  
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Essentialisation in Portraiture 
“The face, according to Deleuze and Guattari, has become a frozen structure in Western 
history and culture, perpetuating a cult of “personality” and setting up exclusionary zones 
between surface “features” and the depth of “mind” that lies behind these. The human has 
subsequently been evaluated and determined according to this dominant facial system” 
(Munster 2006, p.21). 
  
Affect theorist Anna Munster here reflects on Deleuze, Guattari, and the face as a prominent 
structure in contemporary digital media. Through the algorithms that digital media uses to 
interpret us and our faces unintended caricatures may be produced. Social media synthesizes 
information based on data about individuals in order to optimise an understanding of a person 
and streamline their networked experience; it essentialises them for these purposes. Avatars 
and profile pictures as faces often stand in for bodies in digital cultures. Portraits, like dolls, 
‘stand in’ for individuals. In Joanna Woodall’s text Facing the Subject (1997) she discusses 
the portrait as a “conscious depiction of particular individuals” that “bring[s] out hidden 
information”, “reaches an understanding of its sitter” and has a “central role as an arbiter of 
identity and presentation” (Woodall 1997, p.5-7). Thus the notion of a portrait stands as a 
medium, between the individual subject and its representation to others. Woodall also 
suggests that on the topic of constructing a portrait “…a principal medium is thus precisely 
the individual’s body-features” (Woodall 1997, p.260). It may be that portraiture is a relevant 
way to present an individual, its subjectivity, (or as a reflexive process) its narcissism.  
 
Algorithmic Caricature 
The research of Alesandro Ludovico and Bronac Ferran help us to situate the notion of 
portraiture in the context of the digital, where ‘portraits’ are everywhere and can be made by 
anyone. But I would also like to frame their investigation as one of caricature. “The 
appearance of our individual faces in other peoples’ screens is now in quotidian” (sic.) 
suggest Ferran and Ludovico (2013a, p.1) in their analysis of artistic responses to 
“representations and misrepresentations of the face” (Ferran and Ludovico 2013a, p.1) in 
contemporary digital culture. Ferran and Ludovico mirror the definition of ‘portrait’ that 
Joanna Woodall alludes to in 1997; that “the portrait’s function has been to represent an 
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identity through its somatic traits” (ibid) but they now emphasize the machine’s role in the 
interpretation of such traits. 
 
It would be safe to say that the idea of ‘portrait’ and the degree to which it represents 
‘truth’ about a subject is now even more tested given the digital. Surveillance systems, face-
tracking software, and apps designed to distort or re-touch the face all surround the reception 
of individual faces today. “Personal profiles lie within bureaucratic archives, are held in 
passport and ID records and captured, often trivially, in the documentation of everyday 
movements by surveillance cameras” (ibid). Ferran and Ludovico’s intent is to draw attention 
to the way faces and identities are mediated by ‘machines’, and to strategies that disrupt or 
subvert the machine’s ability to recognise individuals, or have an influence over one’s 
representation, indeed, to ‘play’ this system. 
 
Ferran and Ludovico describe a number of artworks that shed light on strategies 
disrupting the relationship between a human identity and a machine’s treatment of its image. 
“…artworks are elaborating on machinic perception of faces, and ‘construction’ of a 
biometric identity” (Ferran and Ludovico, 2013a, p.1). They highlight and seek to subvert 
concepts of individuality that are measured, reduced, or quantified by mechanical 
perceptions. The most important strategy I notice in the works discussed by Ferran and 
Ludovico, is the symbolic use of algorithms that judge facial information about users 
wrongly, or present them negatively, thus placing the role of the ‘judgemental machine’ in a 
negative light.  
 
This focus on algorithms is present in the popular blog “Nick Clegg Looking 
Algorithmically Sad” (2013), in which photos of (then) British Deputy Prime Minister Nick 
Clegg are analysed and show “scientifically, how his profile can be analysed as sad most of 
the time” (ibid). This work is humorous; it shows how the software used to analyse his facial 
emotions, and then how it gets it wrong; even if Clegg is smiling, the analysis comes out as 
“sad”. In this sense the work highlights that computer algorithms can get it wrong, ignoring 
individual nuances and forming a blanket judgement of the subject. Whether the authors have 
tweaked the algorithm to provide a bias is not certain, but the message remains the same; the 
work forms a contemporary political caricature of Nick Clegg through the algorithms it uses, 
emphasizing his character as purely ‘sad’.  
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The idea of a portrait altered by algorithms is expanded in Ludovico’s own artwork. 
With artistic partner Paulo Cirio, Ludovico is responsible for the Hacking Monopolism 
Trilogy (2009-11), which includes their most famous project, Face to Facebook (2011). 
Operating within the critical new media traditions of hacktivism and artistic intervention, 
Face to Facebook saw Ludovico and Cirio ‘scrape’ profile data from one million Facebook 
users. This data included the profile image, name, some personal data, and some relationship 
data of each user. Ludovico and Cirio then customized a facial recognition algorithm to sort 
photos of smiling Facebook users into six simple categories (Ludovico and Cirio, 2013b). 
The six categories were ‘climber’, ‘easy going’, ‘funny’, ‘mild’, ‘sly’ and ‘smug’ and were 
chosen to reflect the type of words we use to judge people from a distance (ibid.). These 
words represented comic judgments. Their system effectively sorted 250,000 profiles before 
the artists uploaded them all to their fake dating website; “www.Lovely-Faces.com”. 
“Lovely-Faces.com” was soon taken down due to the great controversy and threats of legal 
action it inspired, but before it was removed, visitors to the website were presented with a 
dating-site-style interface that enabled them to choose a suitor by browsing through the sorted 
faces from within the six artist-designed categories.  
 
The work of Ludovico and Cirio does an excellent job of highlighting questions about 
the use of our personal data, given our complacency within pervasive social networking 
systems. By using algorithms to reduce human faces to category judgements (‘climber’, ‘easy 
going’, ‘funny’, ‘mild’, ‘sly’, ‘smug’), and filtering potentially any individual through the 
algorithm, Ludovico and Cirio show us that anyone could be a ‘victim’ of identity sorting by 
digital algorithms. The “Face to Facebook” project helps us to consider in greater depth the 
concept of an algorithmic image of an individual, in a humorous way, even producing 
caricatures not only of individuals but of the way an entire social media system treats its 
individuals. 
  
Autoscopia  
    Adam Nash, Justin Clemens and Christopher Dodds’ Autoscopia (2009) was “an attempt to 
explore the affective cycle established between the material and the networked self” (Nash 
2012, p.18). Autoscopia produces “search-based composite portraits” (ibid) using the 
affordances of Google, Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn, as well as more “insidiously 
invasive” but publicly available “search engines specializing in background checks and 
public record searches” (ibid). The work allows a visitor to enter a name that will be used in 
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conjunction with search engines to produce a composite portrait using images returned under 
that name, as well as a written profile constructed in much the same way using text. Until 
2010 Autoscopia also produced Second Life characters for each name search who “tweeted” 
their existences on Twitter.  
 
Through these searches, and tweets, the Autoscopia portraits were “recursively 
feeding themselves back into the results of future searches” (ibid) to the point that the profiles 
have been “continuously running online long enough now that Google will actually return the 
Autoscopia page for certain names as the top ranking result” (ibid). As Anna Munster puts it 
clearly: “the autoscopic portrait that the site generates of Barack Obama will become a future 
element composing his incrementally heterogeneous data self, both in Autoscopia and in 
future search engine results for his name” (Munster 2013, p.49), as a result “…the trace left 
by the digital entity may have more power, in the virtual world, than the trace of its 
associated material entity” (ibid). As such, Autoscopia uses digital algorithms to generate and 
project perpetual caricature-composites of the individuals searched within its system and 
reflects the ever-compounding, personally produced caricatures of our own selves we 
produce in tandem with the digital media systems that interpret and construct us. 
 
Caricature as Critical Play 
For my purposes caricature is a Critical Play strategy that places control of subjects and their 
representation in the hands of the artist, somewhat like doll play. I will discuss my own doll 
play in relation to Critical Play in The Sims in Chapter 6. Artists can subjectively manipulate 
and re-imagine their subjects through reduction, distortion, and exaggeration. For me, playing 
with caricature, as in my Grindr works, is a way of taking back control over something that is 
perceived to be all-powerful.  
 
Artist Carla Adams and I have both treated our subjects as dolls subjected to a process 
of caricature. Adams was a peer of mine in earlier stages of the Grindr project, though our 
practices are separate. ‘Caricature’ has allowed us to take control over various subjects' 
representation in a virtual environment. We draw over subjects and emphasise different 
qualities in order to portray their weaknesses in a digital culture. This system, for both of us, 
has largely involved online dating. Our transformations are caricatures that imagine 
structures as broken and forlorn rather than functioning. Much of Adam’s recent works have 
involved her encounters with men through video webcam chat Omegle: she takes images of 
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the people she interacts with via webcam, and paints over them so as to mask their identity 
but emphasise their perceived-as-flawed nature.  
 
In Very Sad Men (2012) the subjects she has chosen are anonymous but the nature of 
the colour and shape in each image is blob-like, crude, and unflattering. The colours are 
sickly or pale. These caricatures emphasise sadness in each subject from the subjective point 
of view of the artist, being the singular feature that is brought-forward in the representation. 
Adams has also recently constructed her caricatures in sculptural form, using papier maché to 
create lumpy, sagging versions of her online encounters. The effect of these caricatures is to 
render them powerless as objects on the other side of a screen; reversing a relationship that 
would normally position the female as the object of a male gaze. In this scenario, the men 
become objects as artworks that can be positioned or played with like dolls in order to 
subvert the new domesticity of social media. By imagining this environment differently 
through caricature, the sadness of anonymous webcam interaction is emphasised and 
critiqued by the artist. These are similar to a number of early digital experiments I did early 
on during my project by painting over profile images of Grindr users in Photoshop called 
Profile Pics (2013). 
 
     
Figure 20 and 21, Carla Adams, Very Sad Men (2012), acrylic on board 
 
Caricature and the Queer 
The caricaturist’s secret lies in the use he [sic] makes of controlled regression. Just as his [sic] 
scribbling style and his blending of shapes evokes childhood pleasures, so the use of magic 
beliefs in the potency of his [sic] transformations constitutes a regression from rationality. 
[…] The hostile action is confined to an alteration of the person’s ‘likeness’[…]. Only this 
interpretation contains criticism. Aggression has remained in the aesthetic sphere and thus we 
react not with hostility but with laughter. —Kelley 1989, p.25. 
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To the caricaturist there is indeed some belief in the power of reduction. To reduce something 
to an expression, a gesture, is to capture an essential part of it. In this capturing is a certain 
objectification; to ‘own’ the expression on paper (or on the screen), to see the subject, 
rendered and trapped within a negative depiction, is to control it. The subject has been 
subverted, re-skinned, un-played. As an object though, is the caricatured subject one of 
desire? Desire here is perhaps desire for subversion. To Kelley, caricature is additionally 
made sense of through the Freudian Oedipal complex, in which caricature comes to represent 
a subversion of the “falling in-line” of the symbolic father, or family’s direction. The concept 
of familial subversion as it pertains to my own practice will be discussed further in Chapter 6. 
 
The Oedipal complex constitutes the beginnings of the forms of political and social authority, 
the regulation and control through the superego or conscience. On the other hand, the political 
caricature permits the displaced manifestation of the repressed aggressive desire to oust the 
father. The political enemy, or the subject of distortion, becomes the projection of the hated 
parent and through caricature can be struck down” (Kelley 1989, p.26). 
 
Caricature as Black Magic 
My interest in caricature-as-magic is not new. In one of my older works, The One Minute 
Soul Capture (2009) I exhibited an interest in the “use of magic beliefs in the potency of [my] 
transformations” as described by Kelley (1989, p.25) above. The One Minute Soul Capture 
refers to the computer’s reductive role in processing individuals as a kind of ‘caricaturist’. 
This project was framed through my performance as a witch who, having lost her magic 
powers had to use computers to perform dark magic (I called this The Dark Arts of Art). She, 
the witch, seized the profile images of my Facebook friends and digitally transformed them, 
each in the space of one minute, using quick and over-used filters on Photoshop. This process 
was filmed comedically as an instructional crafts show, where the witch showed you how to 
do it at home using your own Photoshop software. Each subject was reduced to an 
unflattering digital caricature. Its outcomes were essentialisations of individuals realised in 
digital artefacts, however they were negative depictions rather than celebratory.  
 
This concept of The Dark Arts of Art was also inspired by J.K Rowling’s “horcruxes”, 
a fictional dark magic artefact from her Harry Potter (1997 – present) series. “Horcruxes” are 
objects that a dark wizard can use to store fragments of their soul. By splitting their soul this 
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way, a dark wizard will be immortal until all such objects are found and destroyed. I had 
imagined that each ‘soul capture’ was a dark artefact in this way, and put them on a website, 
encouraging users to download the images. The rationale was that each time the images were 
downloaded, the soul would split into even smaller fragments within each copy on different 
users’ computers, further immortalising the caricatured egos. The comment here was that 
digital spaces allow for ever-fragmented digital objects that disseminate our egos online, 
echoing Baudrillard’s notion of a “fractal subject”, a concept that I explore further in a recent 
work titled The Garden of Horcruxes (2016) that I discuss towards the end of this Chapter. 
 
[…] one can speak of the fractal subject […] diffracted into a multitude of identical 
miniaturized egos […] completely saturating its environment […] the fractal subject dreams 
only of resembling himself [sic] in each one of his fractions. That is to say, his [sic] dream 
involutes below all representation towards the smallest molecular fraction of himself [sic]; a 
strange Narcissus, no longer dreaming of his ideal image, but of a formula to genetically 
reproduce himself [sic] into infinity (Baudrillard 1988, p.40). 
 
While such a process could be interpreted as a critique of the narcissism of each 
subject’s self-representation on Facebook, I had masked their identities entirely through each 
image and as a collection the work became more about the overall process of reduction. The 
gesture of ‘the filter’ became a metaphor for the subjective essentialisation a computer 
perceives on its end of the screen-as-mirror. The framing of this reduction as ‘dark magic’ 
placed it in a critical light by rendering it an ‘evil’ act. With a screeching Monty Python-
esque voice, shoddy makeup, and, wearing a torn sheet and Crocs shoes, the character of the 
witch who performed the dark magic became a meta-caricature: a witch who conflated digital 
processes and dark magic, who ‘became one with the filter’, and a caricature of systems 
producing caricatures of subjects. The witch subjected others to her own system; the captured 
souls became agents of her expression, and the individuals in them had no agency in their 
own.  
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Figures 22, 23, Tom Penney, The One Minute Soul Capture (2009), digital images 
 
Probe-Heads 
Deleuze and Guattari ask how it is possible to dismantle the face if it is such a dominant 
mode of subjectification; “How do you get out of the black hole? How do you break through 
the wall? How do you dismantle the face?” (Deleuze and Guattari 1988, p.218) and they use 
the term “probe-head machine”. Simon O’Sullivan suggests in “On the Production of 
Subjectivity: Time For Probe-Heads” (2012) that these ‘probe-heads’ are alternative ways of 
organising the face; cutting lines through the fear that is generally present when a human sees 
a face that is too deviant from the white-face model as discussed in Chapter 4, and is deemed 
abhorrent or monstrous (O’Sullivan 2012, p.190). “A probe-head might in fact be any form of 
practice – any regime – that ruptures the dominant [faciality]” (O’Sullivan 2012, p.191).  
 
For an artist like me, the concept of a “probe-head” elicits an artistic interrogation of 
faciality and attempts to poke at or unravel the face; putting it back together or rearranging its 
features to produce something that is beyond the normal representation of human as defined 
by faciality. This ‘probe-heading’ constitutes a kind of perverse facial play, a subversive, 
dark or critical play. This type of play is often found in art history: 
 
Artworks might likewise operate as probe-heads (Francis Bacon’s portraits for example (at 
least as Deleuze writes about them), but we might also add the more ‘expanded’ practices 
from the 1960s to today that often offer even stranger – non-facialised – diagrams for 
subjectivity, for example with performance art, installation, happenings and the like) 
(O’Sullivan 2012, p191). 
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My own works, such as G-Net discussed in Chapter 4, participate in this tradition by 
presenting digital monsters that re-compose affection images through caricatured partial 
objects. We can connect the practice of probe-head-ism to playful caricature in this sense, 
because “[f]rom this formalist point of view, the whole low-art pictorial tradition of the 
monster can be viewed as an expression of the pleasure of shuffling the components of a 
form” (Kelley 1989, p.28), the ‘form’ here referring to facial organs. 
 
Probe-head-ism as critical or dark play 
I attempted to employ a probe-head machine in the production of work, that is, create work 
that responded to the faciality of Grindr but that was ‘beyond’ portraiture or a standard 
representation of the personalities or faces one might find within, and operate in an altogether 
more reductive and Frankensteinian manner. This was the employment of a playful ‘Mr 
Potato-Head-ism’ (a toy which features a blank potato that you can plug different facial 
organs into as you please) as probe-head. G-Net became saturated with ‘caricature’ – a 
feature of which included phallic monsters based on the affective partial-objects I listed as 
affection-images earlier in Chapter 4. These include monsters based on a bottom, a hand, 
biceps, torso, penises, legs, testicles and a mouth, and all had only one eye. The singular eye 
was intended as the ‘black hole’ of each of these facialised partial objects; the transformation 
of each body part into a micro-fascistic, anti-affective and (alienating) face. The experience 
was one illustrated with poker-faced monsters daring you to interact with them, and judging 
you just as much as you were judging them.  
 
Death Masks and “Unskinning”  
During the development of all the works throughout my project, particularly G-Net, I 
have produced 2-Dimensional ‘skins’ of 3D objects. These are the basis for what I call my 
many “Death Masks”. These are outcomes that came from a playful and experiential 
engagement with digital materials during the process of preparing 3D models for interactive 
work. This kind of ‘skinning’ (as Flanagan might refer to it) is not however applied to a pre-
prepared virtual doll character like a Sims character or playable game character, it is applied 
to a virtual body created by myself firstly from modelling clay and then as a 3D scanned 
form. When a model is textured (given a colour and surface detail) in 3D, its x,y,z 
coordinates are flattened to a 2D grid of u,v coordinates. When a 3D model is constructed 
from photo-scanning software, it produces a messy set of coordinates that are unlike the 
symmetrical and optimised 3D mesh coordinates produced by 3D artists and animators when 
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a mesh is sculpted from scratch. These function as additional caricatures or ‘probe-heads’ of 
the already caricatured ‘affection-images’ as monsters.  
  
  
Figures 24 and 25, Tom Penney, from left, development screenshots of monster from G-Net 
(2014), post and pre u-v unwrapping. 
 
 
Figure 26, Tom Penney, 2014, a ‘skin’ of one of the 
scanned sculptures, unfolded into digital 2D space. 
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Figures 27 and 28, Tom Penney, a series of Death Masks (2014), digital images made from 
colourising and unwrapping the skins of various monsters. 
 
Fragile Ego 
 
Figure 29, Tom Penney, Fragile Ego (2013), screenshot. 
 
The use of caricature to represent whole interactive environments can set artists apart 
from media systems rather than see them operate from within. By this I mean that artists can 
attempt to distance themselves from systems like social media by attempting to produce their 
own critical, standalone representation of such systems. This kind of caricature – system-as-
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caricature – has implications not only for artists but for designers of games and interactive 
media as well, such as ‘Alt Games’ designers or ‘Art Games’ designers discussed in Chapter 
1. One method of constructing a caricature of a system is to use basic gestures of interaction, 
such as the swiping of the finger in my work Gay Under Glass (2014) (see Chapter 4), as  
symbolic of ‘interaction’. For example, in Fragile Ego (2013), a recent work made for this 
dissertation in Unity3D, I exaggerated the feature of the ‘like’ button on Facebook and used it 
as a central, critical motif. By reducing the Facebook environment to two symbolic actions 
(clicking a ‘like’ or ‘dislike’ button) viewers are able to inflate or deflate phallic monster 
characters contained within a box reminiscent of a Facebook page, until they explode. This 
gesture acts to form a critical representation of Facebook by emphasising the relationship 
between ‘input’ and ‘ego’ (more clicking = bigger ego, less clicking = deflated ego), 
highlighting this functionality by rendering it simplified and absurd. An entire system is 
criticised through two buttons. This simple system acts as a caricature of Facebook through 
the emphasis of a single reductive mode of interaction. 
 
Dungeons Bosses and Caricature 
In Fragile Ego I drew a lot of the imagery from my past playing of video games. In 
particular, my intention was to bind the notion of a ‘dungeon boss’ into a comic 
representation by connecting it to the idea of a Facebook profile. To Jacques Lacan the 
phallus is an expansion-retraction object signifying desire for power (Hill 1999 p.103-5). My 
claim is that on Instagram and Facebook, the ‘like’ button is a kind of phallus linked to social 
status. It is the expanding-contracting provider of an immaterial desire-object (the number of 
‘likes’ boosting a fragile ego). I chose very phallic, inflatable, balloon-like forms for this 
reason. Interaction with the inflatable monsters needed to be sexual and highlight this 
caricatured judgment of Facebook, of the desire for social connection and affection. Kelley 
discusses the sexual in reference to the monstrous body: 
 
The grotesque displacement of the order of the body is a mainstay of popular art. Cartoons 
and horror films provide numerous examples of it, and in many of these the move towards 
abstraction is consciously erotic […] the parts that most often come to the foreground are the 
genitals. The monstrous figure truly becomes an erotic ornament (Kelley 1989, p.27-29). 
 
As such my reductive representations aim to be both joke-like reductions and comically 
sexual. In the same way cartoon characters can extend and bend their bodies, or can be 
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polymorphous and violently sexual, as in the work of Tex Avery or Basil Wolverton (Kelley 
1989, p.29), my work tries to invoke a perverse and detached fascination born from tensions 
between attraction and repulsion. This surely is not too different from the attraction and 
repulsion between our desire for social affection (in faces-as-bodies) and our disdain towards 
the endless feed of banal updates on Facebook.    
 
 As part of my dungeon-boss-profile metaphor, I gain pleasure from imagining that 
Facebook profiles are like the video game dungeons that ‘dungeon bosses’ inhabit. They are 
kind of psycho-geographical spaces with a creator-god at their centre. The depths of the 
dungeon are in stark contrast to the overworld, which is the place for towns and villages, 
normal people, civilisation and regular goings-on. In contrast, Dungeon spaces offer monsters 
and abominations that wander around, as well as traps, puzzles and strange obstacles that 
have no apparent justification for existing other than to make players’ journey into the 
dungeon’s depths a challenge.  
 
At the core of many dungeons (archetypically those in The Legend of Zelda (1986-present 
series)) are a final obstacle that, curiously, take the form of a monstrous body; a monster of 
epic proportions that reflects the very essence of all previous challenges within the dungeon, 
and is usually the dungeon’s raison d’être. By slaying the monster, the corrupted 
environment is restored or healed. Such dungeons are a mine of psychoanalytical 
perspectives, particularly those which concern the Oedipal myth; the symbolic journey to find 
‘sense’ beyond schizophrenic depths (discussed in Chapter 3), by slaying a phallus and 
healing the land (‘mother’). In a ‘dungeon complex’ we have three main elements; the 
environmental structure, the evil ‘presence’ (or ‘boss’), and the player themselves. 
 
Boss fights are like something right out of Jungian psychoanalysis and dream 
interpretation. In Aspects of the Masculine Ark (1961) Carl Jung discusses the image of the 
phallus and his childhood preoccupation with representations of God (which in Freudian 
psychoanalysis would constitute an Oedipal father-image), or rather, dark inversions of this 
representation in the form of a subterranean phallus. “At all events, the phallus of this dream 
seems to be a subterranean God ‘not to be named’ [...] ” 
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“Above the head, however, was an aura of brightness. The thing did not move, yet I had the 
feeling that it might at any moment crawl off the throne like a worm and creep toward me. I 
was paralyzed with terror” (Jung and Beebe, 1984, p.xi). 
 
The description of Jung’s dream phallus as a worm, with a single eye, a mound of flesh, is 
fitting to this depiction of the dungeon boss. A boss ‘sees all’ in the confines of its own 
dungeon and thus is often sporting a single eye, or many disjointed eyes. The Legend of Zelda 
features boss-upon-boss where eyes are a theme or are cyclops-esque (“Vitreous”, “Ghoma”, 
“Bongo Bongo”, “Kholdstare”, “Arrghus”, “Mothula”, “Eyesore”, “Blind”). They can also be 
heavily facialized, usually with a disembodied floating head and sometimes with giant 
floating hands (“Ghodan”, “Ramrock”, “Façade”, “Stallord”, “Onox Dragon”) or worm and 
snake-like (“Volvagia”, “Lanmolas”, “Moldorm”, “Twinmold”, “Slime Eel”, “Morpha”, 
“Molgera”). In any of these three cases the ‘weak spot’ of the boss, that is the place for the 
player to strike it, is the same as its affective trope. Shoot it in the eye. Smash it in the face. 
Cripple its hands. Chop its tail off. Hear it howl in electronic sub-human pain. A boss fight is 
the Artaudian theatre of cruelty (see chapter 3). From the (symbolically) schizophrenic depths 
they face us. They do not speak, they have no language, and they must be destroyed.  
 
Bosses of Australia 
 
Figure 30 Tom Penney, Bosses of Australia (2015), screenshot  
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A dungeon boss appears as a caricature; an homunculus. It is condemned to eternally 
represent its nature through its exaggerated and intense organs. It is howling in pain and 
uttering non-human noises. I am not referring to the kind of homunculus summoned by a 
wizard, nor the kind that ancient scientists believed semen to be. I am referring to the medical 
drawings known as homunculi, which depict parts of the body in proportion to the number of 
sensory nerves they contain.  
 
A medical homunculus is an ugly looking representation of a naked person with giant 
hands, giant lips and a giant tongue (these are the locations of the body with the most number 
of sensory nerves). A boss monster is a body that gives and receives affect but only in the 
form of punishment or pain and is subordinate to the environment it generates and which 
generates it. The locus of affect, of its pain, is its exaggerated parts; its large singular eye, its 
massive disembodied hands, its snake-like tail. These are its weapons, and also the only 
places it (or the player) ‘feels’; a place for only one kind of symbolic feeling (a sexual, 
affective, and violent form of pain).  
When its organs have been destroyed, it moves from being an intense and perverse 
object to an inert nothing; obliterated, sanctified with no remains. The player has deactivated 
its extended and perverse body (its dungeon and its organs), temporarily fixated on this 
sexual being by fighting it (the dungeon’s mature, sexual organ) and healed, cured or passed 
it. Any affront to the boss creature is an affront to its extended body. Oedipus has prevailed.  
 
For the caricature of then-Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott in Bosses of 
Australia (2015), I drew this analysis into such a caricature as a joke; a comic judgment, 
where Abbott’s boss-ego was imagined as such a creature, and Australia became the psycho-
geographical dungeon-reflection of his psychology. It wasn’t hard to imagine Abbott’s ‘weak 
points’; his large lips and big ears served perfectly as engorged, sexual, affective organs to 
affront, endlessly. 
 
The Garden of Horcruxes 
 The most recent work I have produced for this dissertation combines my interests in 
dark magic, dungeon-bosses, caricature, fractal subjectivity and ego into one real-time 3D 
environment. Titled The Garden of Horcruxes (2016) it is available on the Apple App Store 
for iPhone, as well as for desktop via my website. It can also be viewed with a Google 
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Cardboard viewer on an iPhone for a virtual reality experience. In this artwork I drew from 
all of the concepts I have mentioned above, to produce a single ‘art-dungeon’ that has 
additionally been informed by my discussion of Koons and Jonakin in chapter 1. I used my 
caricatured partial-object-monster sculptures from the development of G-Net as my 
‘horcruxes’ influenced by playing The Legend of Zelda. At the ‘core’ of The Garden of 
Horcruxes in an underground cavern there is a cyclopean, Jungian phallus-monster. Players 
can hurl colourful paint blobs at the sculptures and hit them in the eye, to which they react 
with boss-monster sounds. 
 
In The Garden of Horcruxes players can walk around a sculpture garden of my one-
eyed ‘horcruxes’, which I imagine, in a Surrealist fashion, to be a space that reflects the 
perverse psychology that has produced all of the imagery that I have explored and justified 
throughout this dissertation. In this sense it is an ‘autotopography’ – a constructed 
environment that functions like a self-portrait (Bal, 2002). In 2010 I had attempted something 
similar called The Horcrux Dungeon (2010) where I decorated a single digital 3D room with 
images of artworks of mine signed with my signature in a Duchampian fashion.  
 
 
Figure 31 Tom Penney, The Garden of Horcruxes (2016), development screenshot. 
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Figure 32 Tom Penney, The Garden of Horcruxes (2016), screenshot. 
 
 
Figure 33 Tom Penney, The Garden of Horcruxes (2016), underground cavern opening, screenshot.  
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The Politics of Caricature 
If the face is a politics… dismantling the face is also a politics involving real becomings, an 
entire becoming-clandestine. —Holland, 2013, p.88. 
 
Often when Deleuze is invoked, we get the sense of a political call-to-action, although my 
invocation of probe-heads here in terms of caricature is not so necessarily radical given the 
conflict that I raised at the end of Chapter 4 where reduction is here used to create critical 
representations of systems and their users, but such systems are being critiqued because they 
already reduce people. Caricature as critical play can use reduction and essentialisation in the 
service of critique, but it itself produces problematic and simplified representations. 
Caricature has no political alliance; it is problematic for both the right and the left just as 
microfascisms are. The politics of the caricaturist is certainly grey. I don’t think that 
caricature ever fully dismantles the head or the face as the concept of probe-heads might call 
for. It is rather another form of arrangement of a face particular to a critical aim. Even critical 
versions produce new versions. As in Deleuze’s critique of Lewis Carroll in my discussion of 
perversity in chapter 3, the caricaturist, like the pervert of the surface who stays with 
language rather then destroying it, remains within the identification of faces. A caricaturist 
relies on maintaining some semblance of the structure of the face; it merely shifts its 
organization by extension and reduction.  
 
Caricature is not such a revolutionary act, although caricature often accompanies the 
dissent of power that leads to call-forth change. Revolution (as change) is not an aim 
necessary to caricature because caricature does not present a totally new world. Caricature 
presents an uncanny version of an existing one in the same way Flanagan discusses the 
representation of play worlds. Caricature, although used politically, often does not have any 
particular allies. Seeing the world in caricature is the world of the stand-up comedian. 
Nothing is sacred. It has no particular desire for revolution because it requires the 
maintenance of a world worth critiquing to continue to plateau in a perverse manner. Because 
caricature is also about pleasure, such perverse or polymorphous pleasure lies in the plasticity 
and manipulation of the face and the desire to be critical for its own sake. 
 
Finally here I would like to add that a feature of play worlds is that play worlds 
functioning as simulations need not offer a single moral path for the player to follow. 
Simulations, if they are to represent choices and respect the autonomy of players, offer both 
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‘good’ and ‘bad’ choices for players to take in various scenarios. Traditional artworks might 
offer ambiguous messages, but they tend to represent the politics of their respective artists in 
one way or another. If an artwork is ‘ambiguous’ it represents an ‘ambiguous’ politics – it 
can’t really transform itself into anything more extreme on either side. Play experiences, 
however, can transform themselves through the options that are designed into them by play 
designers (designers of games for example) because players decide how they will use the 
tools at their disposal to alter the functioning of the represented system. If caricature 
functions to caricature systems as well as the identities that structure them, then the politics 
of caricature may apply here to the design of games, both which I see as (critical) playful 
experiences. 
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6 Queering The Sims 
 
In this chapter I discuss the role that the playing of The Sims has had in the production of my 
artworks. I use Ahmed and Flanagan to help make sense of orientations or tendencies-
towards play and the queer, as they pertain to a game based on domesticity and family life. In 
Women and Gaming: The Sims and 21st Century Learning (2010), James Paul Gee and 
Elisabeth R. Hayes note that The Sims is a game “where the majority of players are girls and 
women [...and…] it is odd, perhaps, that when males play a military game […] we do not say 
they are playing with toy soldiers. But when women play The Sims, we say they are playing 
with a dollhouse” (Gee and Hayes 2010, p.2). What does it mean for men, extending 
themselves in mobile devices, to play various encounters online, and what is subverted if 
doll-play is used as a metaphor for such encounters? What do the parallels between family, 
doll play, video gaming and queerness hold as implications in terms of this project? This 
penultimate chapter looks at how artworks produced during this dissertation have formed 
aesthetic judgments by binding ideas like domesticity and online dating together through 
metaphor. This informs the final Chapter where it is considered how such judgements, in 
turn, shape identity representation through the fixation on roles or representations in play 
contexts. 
 
Personal History Playing the Sims 
I have been playing The Sims since it was released; I was 12 years old at the time. I used to 
play The Sims in a female friend’s bedroom. We would each be on our own laptops, playing 
independently, yet still sharing our creations. We would play like this, co-located, for hours 
on end. My friend would build functional, one room houses for her Sims which contained 
mismatched furniture and made more sense in terms of efficient game mechanics than real-
life aesthetics (having a toilet next to the bed to speed up getting ready for work, for 
example). Mine were architectural endeavors where I would hardly actually play the families 
I made and focused on building nice houses. We bought all of the expansion packs and had 
many user-created items and mods, plenty of which were sexually explicit, such as various 
‘nude patches’ that removed pixilation on nude Sims and other features that we found on 
independent sites. I continue to do this to this day. 
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Later on when I had moved away from home, I started to use The Sims to create queer 
characters and scenarios. I would write bizarre stories and use the character creator in The 
Sims to design their bodies and clothes. Often I would make families of elderly women who I 
would give deranged and obscure psychological traits. They would take jobs in criminal 
career tracks and have magic powers. The resulting life-stories were very much like 
something from films by John Waters or Pedro Almodóvar. In “Critical Affection”, I returned 
to playing The Sims again but this time for the purposes of rendering my experience within 
my own work, external to The Sims game world itself.  
 
Playing with Objectified Bodies 
On the topic of the finger-swiping and narcissism of online dating, video gamers may 
remember the famous title by Peter Molyneux’s Lionhead Studios, Black and White (2001). 
This was an archetypal ‘God Game’ where players were represented by a floating virtual 
hand, with index finger outstretched, on screen. This hand could do ‘good’ or could do ‘evil’ 
with relative ease; it could pick up individual villagers and throw them, set them on fire, heal 
them, make them breed or physically beat up other creatures. This hand would morph in 
appearance depending on its alignment on a scale from ‘good’ to ‘evil’. Gamers could get 
satisfaction from becoming either and they could see their actions shaping the world through 
visual feedback of the game; the hand would change in appearance (to look gnarled and ‘evil’ 
for example), and the landscape would alter (become barren, or abundant with flowers 
depending on alignment).  
 
When using dating apps, however, our hands do not change to represent our influence 
over the environment (other people) as we manipulate interactive content. Instead we browse 
through other human beings using our fingers on a touch-screen, not casting fire and 
brimstone upon them, but nonetheless employing some level of tactility and gesture that 
implies judgment; a block button, a chat button, typing the words ‘hello’, all imply some 
action that confirms or denies another human being access to our own personal individual 
milieu.   
 
As such, video games are an important format for me to utilise when critiquing or 
parodying online dating worlds; especially through this notion of a ‘God complex’; a 
surveyor who is in charge of and has power over a world that is perceived by them and no 
other. Video games, just as dating apps, rely on simulation. When we create a character in a 
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role-playing video game, for example, we adjust a series of sliders representing height and 
weight (or moral alignment), as well as tick check boxes for gender, archetype, or facial hair. 
We do precisely the same thing when we set up our profiles to be used on dating websites, 
but instead of selecting an archetype such as ‘the mage’, ‘the warrior’, or ‘the rogue’, apps 
like Grindr now allow us to select from gay ‘tribes’ such as ‘bear’, ‘twink’ or ‘clean-cut’. 
Profiles composed of just as much information as anybody’s video gaming avatar, sets up a 
curated participant in this multiplayer ‘game’.  
 
The term Grindr seems appropriate; in video games the term ‘grinding’ refers to 
mindlessly slaying enemy monsters for hours in order to ‘level up’, and it seems as users of 
Grindr we tend to do the same; we addictively consume images of bodies in order to ‘get up’. 
A great, much earlier parody of this kind of body-defined-by-sliders scenario appears in John 
Tonkin’s 1990s work Elastic Masculinities which can be accessed on Tonkin’s website 
(Tonkin, 1996). This is a really simple work where viewers can adjust sliders to create 
awkwardly distorted male human bodies beyond the boundaries of any acceptable standard 
that we might find in a videogame, or as acceptable standards on a dating site, however here 
it is done through images rather than using 3D meshes as is common in video games today 
and in my work. 
 
Virtual Worlds as Doll Houses 
In Chapter 1, I outlined Flanagan’s position on how virtual worlds relate to doll-play, 
particularly through play in The Sims series. As a general summary, play with virtual scenes 
of domesticity and the everyday allow us to work through issues in the real world that are 
concerned with the represented, but we can additionally subvert those representations or 
change the rules of the simulated environment by ‘unplaying’, ‘reskinning’ or ‘rewriting’ 
their respective scenarios. We don’t only build new worlds; we can construct critical versions 
of existing ones.  
 
Also important here is the notion of a ‘world builder’ who has some agency or 
omniscience over the represented play world; in a sense, a kind of narcissist for whom such a 
world is presented in terms of. As I am looking at how this operates for art rather than games 
specifically, I need to think about how artists have used games or ‘doll play’ as platforms for 
artistic production. The work of Cao Fei is relevant here, as her RMB City (2007-11) becomes 
both a video game and gallery space that her avatar (her ‘doll’) inhabits. Doll play also has 
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implications for my invocation of a narcissistic god-like complex, in that human beings as 
objects, become part of the ‘world building’ activity of the narcissist. 
 
 
 
No matter how much a player in a paper house or in an online world works to maintain his or 
her dolls, the desire to return to the place before desire – that is, the paradise that drives the 
fantasy play in its first impulse – always lingers (Flanagan 2009, p.57). 
  
I see the work of Cao Fei as a form of playbour (see Chapter 1) because her work is made by 
playing inside another’s designed system, specifically, Second Life. Cao Fei is also a 
“machinimist” (Hjorth 2013b, p.137) since any narratives come from those practiced inside 
the game world. Fei also demonstrates a degree of identity play through social practices like 
cosplay. Greeves (2013, para.3) emphasises that “In promoting cosplay as tactical, Cao Fei 
celebrates a generation disenfranchised by real life who cocoon themselves in fantasies just 
as schizoids might retreat to internal fantasies to avoid facing a world of realities”.  
 
Cao Fei is possibly the best-known artist operating in Second Life and with it 
problematizes the public intimacy that typifies the online interaction and play of selves. The 
intimate-made-public interactions of Fei speak of a “paradoxical culture of extreme 
narcissism coupled with an intense desire for external connection” (Fateman and Greene 
2004, p.86), which problematises the notion of online intimacy as being one of “extimacy” 
(Clemens, 2001, p.1), which in the Lacanian sense means that the ‘inside is on the outside’, 
or they are one and the same, implying a certain lack of the critical distance. Her work is 
characterised by a romantic utopianism offsetting the political and economic scenario of 
contemporary China and its relation to global capitalism. “Utopia needs to be constructed by 
us working together” (Fei cited in Fang, 2008, para.37) says Fei. Anna Munster identifies a 
general problem in the new media research in which Fei’s work participates: “Posthumanism 
gives us some new possibilities for human-computer engagement, but it often continues to 
subordinate the sensate body to the transcendent technological world that is offered via the 
interface” (Munster 2006, pp.21); an interface that allows one to access these fantasy worlds 
and remain complacent within them. 
 
Differentiation from Machinima type works 
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The methods that I use in my play of The Sims as a medium for creating artworks are very 
different to the play in virtual worlds that come to typify artists working in online 
environments such as Cao Fei in Second Life. We might more loosely refer to this kind of art 
here as ‘Machinima’. Although I consider the play of some artists in game spaces, and their 
documentation, to constitute artworks, I do not consider my own ‘play’ in such spaces to be 
my primary artwork. Instead, I try to break the condition of playbour, or using the creative 
tools designed within others’ systems, by taking that content outside of the original world and 
re-working it in a more generic game-engine package: specifically, Unity3D.  
 
Although I concede that of course, such software has limitations and tends to lend 
itself toward game or game-like outcomes (arguments about whether creative software 
packages limit expression are somewhat beyond the scope of my project), it can be seen as 
more of a blank-slate scenario than using limited in-game tools such as character-creation or 
terrain sculpting systems that are presented to players within games. While mods might allow 
users to create any 3D content and incorporate that back into a game, I have rather found 
ways to take content out of existing games for the purposes of subversion, where the 
possibilities for manipulation in terms of parody, or producing critical ‘versions’ of such 
environments become enhanced. Essentially, parody requires an original from which to build 
a critical inversion. By taking this out of the game, such an original can be distended, 
distorted, and ‘caricatured’ by editing the original content in more powerful 3D sculpting and 
interactive packages like Autodesk Maya or Unity3D.   
 
In terms of ‘world-building’ Unity3D presents a 3-dimensional plane where objects 
can be arranged, built, scaled, reduced, and skinned. Unlike games which each have their pre-
set conditions and conventions of size, colour, and general design, setting up parameters for 
users to design within, a package like Unity3D is a game-creation system, which means all of 
these features are completely left up to the artist or designer. By dropping objects into the 3-
dimensional interface I can imagine whole environments where objects interrelate in a virtual 
space and produce relationships that construct meaning, perhaps not unlike the visual 
arrangement of elements in a painting. In this sense the difference between narcissist-as-user 
or narcissist-as-artist becomes blurred. At least when I manipulate bodies and other content in 
such a space I transfer some of my behaviour from being a God-gamer to being an artist, 
though maybe these have similar origins.  
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When I play around with my 3D images I feel like I am controlling a kind of video 
game world; I am used to playing simulation games where one controls different characters, 
populations and environments. My Unity3D worlds become symbolic dollhouses; here 
dollhouses that are caricatures of the systems that subjects might operate within, rather than 
artworks produced from within the parameters of those systems themselves. For this project, I 
had created a series of male ‘dolls’ in The Sims 3 each with their own personalities, looks, 
and character traits. I then used these as the origin for models that I placed in a Unity3D 
world.  
 
Scraping Sims Meshes 
Originally throughout Critical Affection my production of characters in The Sims was for the 
purpose of efficiency. I had originally intended to use characters based on Sims I had created 
in G-Net. Rather than having to model my own characters, I was working with various 
methods of exporting the Sims bodies, after using the in-game character creation system to 
design them. I refer to this as ‘scraping’ in the same way that Ludovico and Cirio (2011) refer 
to their ‘scraping’ of profile data from Facebook profiles; data that is available but just not 
immediately accessible through the regular interface. I had installed a number of mods to 
assist in the design of my characters, including nude mods (adding penises to men, and 
vulvas and breasts to women) as well as ‘slider’ mods, which allow me to extend bodily 
proportions to distended and extreme sizes in the character creation system:  
 
    
 Figures 34 and 35 Tom Penney, 2014, The Sims 3. Screenshots of applied body slider extending 
mods. 
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I used a number of methods to scrape meshes that I had designed in the Sims. The first main 
method I attempted was to capture 3D ‘snapshots’ of the game world from the memory of my 
computer’s graphics card itself using a Direct-X based tool called “3D Reaper DX”. By 
running The Sims through 3D Reaper DX, I could press a key on my computer (F12) to save 
a copy of whatever meshes were running through my graphics card at that moment in time, 
including texture files and materials. The software often produced erratic and bizarre results, 
and never matched up the textures correctly.  
 
Sometimes all of the objects captured were placed directly on top of each other, 
making it hard to extract the right data. My focus was on capturing characters’ bodies, and 
these often came in multiple pieces. Despite this, I did manage to capture a small number of 
bodies that I used in some experiments. I had to work on the meshes in Autodesk Maya to 
reconnect detached mesh body segments, particularly the hair, for them to work in the 
Unity3D environment. Some of these meshes I used to attempt to create physical 3D 
sculptures, although the results were too complex and produced broken results due to the low 
resolution of the printer: 
 
   
Figures 36 and 37 Tom Penney, 2014, screenshot of The Sims 3. A gay sex scene in with nude mods 
applied, and on the right the same scene printed as a plastic 3D print. 
 
I had used one of these meshes to create my first interactive piece Gay Under Glass (2013-
14) which I have discussed previously in chapter 4. Scraping a Sim’s body was useful as it 
was a very generic male body, and it came with a penis because of my nude mod. Rather than 
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use the mesh in its original state, I turned it into a ‘cloth object’ in Unity 3D. When ‘cloth 
objects’ are closed objects in Unity3D they function much like balloons; they become soft 
and blobby, they can deflate and inflate, so that’s what I did to my Sim, who I nicknamed 
“Joel” after the founder of Grindr. While playing with this soft body in Unity, posing it and 
arranging it, I was creating a transparent cube object that acted like a screen that could press 
against the Joel character and squash him. I took many screenshots of this process, because 
the blobby body had so many variations of how it would react with the ‘glass’, often 
producing amusing poses.  
At one stage the hair was behaving so strangely that it slid down the wall like a snail-
trail behind Joel as he slumped under and popped up the other side of the invisible glass, 
pushing the ‘air’ from his body into his penis. This moment was captured in a screenshot that 
I used to create a large poster-sized work that accompanied Gay Under Glass at the 
Radicalism exhibition in 2014. I skinned the wall behind him with one of my own 
screenshots of a Grindr conversation (“what’s shakin handsome?”) and added a ‘block button 
X’ for interest and composition. A further set of three images was produced of earlier stages 
in the experiment that were from poses of Joel reacting to the virtual glass. These were called 
the “Bodies Under Glass” (2013). 
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 Figure 38 Tom Penney, A Handsome Man (2014), digital image 
 
 
   
Figure 39 Tom Penney, Bodies Under Glass (2014), triptych of digital images. 
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In terms of ‘play’ as an artistic methodology, such play happened less in the game than in the 
manipulation of the content in the Unity3D world. Play was important in the game for 
producing a kind of relation to the characters as artistic ‘prey’; making representations of 
‘alive’ bodies that I could exploit, that I could see, in their wholeness as objects to be pulled 
out, manipulated and changed. Originally, I had proposed that I might do something similar 
with real profiles (I did to an extent, as discussed in chapter 5), but the ethical implications of 
using recognisable-as-real profiles are not acceptable, given my critique of post-internet-ism.  
 
Instead, I was finding a different way to the imagine psychologies and related bodies 
that I might encounter in ‘the real’, and forming some relation to them as ‘living’ entities, 
which I approximated by using simulated bodies in the game world and treating them as 
‘types’ rather than specific humans. Adding balloon-like qualities to the Unity3D bodies that 
originally had limited agency, animation, and AI in the game, was akin to reanimating a 
corpse, turning it into a clown, seeing it come alive through a clumsy and comic 
approximation of liveliness. What occurred with the treatment of these ‘dolls’ as objects was 
a kind of cruel but humorous, critical distancing. The nature of the forms – blobby, sagging, 
organic, faceless – was a kind of slapstick reduction of any idealized form that Grindr might 
represent.  
  
 
 
 
Selfie (2014) 
The second method I used was a bit more creative than the first. I had been 
experimenting with 3D scanning methods for a few years, but only recently discovered photo 
scanning in 2013. After some initial experiments with photo-scanning the sculptures I had 
made with modelling clay (which became the main process for incorporating characters into 
G-Net, see chapter 4) I considered using 360-degree screenshots of video game content for 
the same photo-stitching process. For this procedure I used both Autodesk’s 123D Catch and 
Agisoft’s Photoscan.  
 
The first games I attempted to create photo scans from were Skyrim (Bethesda 
Softworks, 2011) and Star Wars: The Old Republic (Bioware, 2011) because I knew that in 
these games, the camera could be easily controlled to capture screenshots of a character from 
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the variety of angles needed to produce an accurate scan. Unfortunately, due to the low 
resolution of screenshots in comparison to digital SLR camera photos, the photo-scanning 
process often produced a result with little data, and not enough visual interest to be used for 
artworks. This is because areas of flat colour and little detail work against the software, as it 
needs to use complicated patterns and a variety of colours to use as reference points when 
constructing the perspective of a 3D space from a series of 2D images. 
 
I then attempted to use this same process in The Sims 3. It was even easier to control 
the camera in The Sims 3 because it has a built in 360-degree camera function for players 
who wish to record the progress of their Sims families’ lives from all angles and share them 
online. Such screenshots can also be recorded from all angles while the game is paused, 
making it much easier to capture a still scene. If things are moving, a successful photo scan is 
less likely although aesthetically strange and interesting mistakes can occur. At first, my 
scans were unsuccessful as they had the same issues as the previous games, in fact even more 
so, because the large areas of flat blue sky and green grass offered no distinct perspectival 
reference points for the photo scanning software.  
 
My solution however came in The Sims 3’s features of being able to build and alter 
the environment. I started setting up very strange looking spaces to stage my characters in, 
with lots of odd patterned carpet squares and distinctly patterned, coloured, or shaped objects 
in various locations to act as reference points for the software. The first scans done in this 
manner produced successful and even quite poetic results; the environment was accurately 
portrayed in some areas due to the density of visual pattern, but the character I was trying to 
capture at the center of this information was often only partially captured because I had used 
flat colour on their clothing. Here are two of my first results imported into Unity3D: 
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Figure 40 Tom Penney, 2013, Untitled, digital image produced from 3D models based on 
screenshot scans. 
 
 
Figure 41 Tom Penney, 2013, Untitled, digital image produced from 3D models based on screenshot 
scans. 
 
 
These experiments, representations of myself and a friend, felt successful because their 
partial portrayal of their subjects with a still fairly accurately captured environment resonated 
with the concept of a digital identity, appearing muddled or lost, poorly approximated by a 
digital screen. I enjoyed the way the photo-stitching algorithms interacted with the photo-
stitching software, and lost the true nature of the characters at the centre of each scene. I 
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decided to extend these experiments to the creation of some more generic gay ‘types’ in The 
Sims.  
 
I created some households populated by these characters; matching the generic 
‘tribes’ you could label yourself on Grindr. I created a bear (hairy bearded man), a twink 
(skinny effeminate man), a jock (sporty, gym-fit man) and others. These characters made full 
use of the nude mods I had installed, allowing them to operate normally as family members 
but be completely naked all the time. I wanted to incorporate the smartphone into these 
scenes to represent these characters as Grindr users. What was interesting here is that to get 
my characters to pose and take selfies, I had to actually play them for a while. The game did 
not include ‘take selfie’ as a default command; I could only get my Sims to take selfies after 
having skilled up in the ‘jock’ skill-line. I enjoyed the concept that to make my Sims 
appropriately, I would have to sculpt them into the very gym-fit standards that Grindr 
demands. I bought Sims sports equipment and got them to play ‘beer pong’ until they were 
all ‘jock’ enough to take selfies. I then worked on 3D scanning them from photos of them 
holding their smartphones up to take photos of themselves.   
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Figure 42 Tom Penney, 2014, Selfie 2, digital image 
 
 
Figure 43 Tom Penney, 2014, Selfie 1, digital image 
 
Figure 42 and 43 are two of the most successful selfie-scanning outcomes. Only the bodies 
and the ground are made from the The Sims scans. They were then placed into Unity3D 
where I added a background and manipulated the lighting. I then took high-resolution shots 
of the scenes using Megagrab, a Unity3D plugin, which can output pixilated images of any 
resolution keeping the crisp features of the vector-based mesh. 
 
I then moved the images into Photoshop, enhanced the colour, and added a Grindr-
themed bar across the top. This is basically the old header of the iPhone Grindr app with all 
stats and other information removed so that only the colour remains. Additionally, I added a 
crisper iPhone model into the scene so that it had a more distinct presence. I like to imagine 
that the represented fragmented and distorted scene is the ‘selfie’ that the phone camera has 
taken of the central body and has misinterpreted their identity. For the 2014 Tabularium 
exhibition, I printed the second image in large format and face-mounted it to perspex, which 
resembled a glass screen. 
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Figure 44, Tom Penney, Selfie, 2014, Tabularium, Slopes Gallery, Melbourne. Installation 
image. The artist and Kati Elizabeth look at the art. 
 
 
Figure 45, Tom Penney, Selfie, 2014, Tabularium, Slopes Gallery, Melbourne. Digital print 
face-mounted to perspex. 
 
At first, the scans produced partial bodies as in the images above. Then, in some instances, I 
added hair to all of the bodies in order to create more pattern-based information on their skin 
so that it wouldn’t completely disappear. The following image shows a scan where the bodies 
were more complete because of the body hair information. This image was used for the 
phone menu background of the web-based component at the Tabularium exhibition. I had 
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additionally created a museum-like scene with statues of male bodies that I blurred and used 
for the background of the whole webpage. As the exhibition more generally was about digital 
archiving and took its title from ancient Rome, I wanted to reflect the male-centric notion of a 
symposium through the incorporation of these bodies and the parallels to the male-centric 
world and idealized body standards of Grindr. 
  
 
Figure 46, Tom Penney, Untitled, 2014, digital image 
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Figure 47, Tom Penney Museum, 2014, screenshot of website for the Tabularium exhibition. 
 
From the processes I developed on The Sims bodies, I began to construct an idea of what 
‘critical play’ or ‘critical distance’ mean in terms of ‘play’ for this project. Here it consisted 
of a perverse manipulation of bodies and representations of typical gay identities. Play really 
refers less to the play of the game, than to the playful manipulation of external 
representations of bodies for the purposes of critique, parody, or humour. As discussed in 
chapter 5, I’ve used a degree of reduction and essentialisation for the purpose of critique of 
Grindr just as much as Grindr itself has been discussed as doing the same to others.  
 
The Sims and the Family 
Grindr is like a complete inversion of a family or representation thereof. Like a dolls house, 
it presents a series of squares with windows into the lives (or bodies) of others, as in the 
cutaway rooms of a Victorian dolls’ house. The bodies, as objects, partial objects or dolls in 
these spaces exist in terms of the gaze of the individual, the master-user, the app-God or the 
game player. Affection with the Grindr app constitutes a banal everydayness, a perverse 
domesticity, a silent yet extimate ‘family’ that does not return gratifying affection like those 
in proximity to you might, especially if one is single or lonely. Users of Grindr even see the 
same users around them in their area every day but do not speak to each other. Indeed, the 
concept of ‘family’ in general often butts heads with queer or homosexual identities, who flee 
Freudian Oedipal structures of family, home and domestic life, seeking to ‘construct their 
own’ family from friends and supporters. With this notion of ‘family’ and the ‘the domestic’ 
 120 
in mind I produced another work from my play with The Sims as a medium: a family 
Christmas portrait.  
 
Originally this work was going to be based on scans of my mother’s doll collection: 
she owns over 600 vintage Sindy dolls, Barbie dolls and others. My father too has avidly 
collected The Lord of the Rings figurines. When we were kids everyone had their own 
collections of things at home, including my parents, such as Cadbury Yowies (an Australian 
chocolate containing animal toys like a Kinder Surprise), stuffed toys and so forth, generally 
it was a kind of middle-class consumer mania. Collections, figurines and toys run in the 
family. So I suppose I am navigating my family of collectors of toys as a collection of toys 
when I invoke the concept of doll-play in the context of queerness and critical play. At first I 
asked my mother to prepare a selection of twenty or so dolls for which she had designed her 
own clothing. I proceeded to 3D photo scan these dolls. I never actually used them for a 
work, it just never came together quite right, although I think the process was important. I 
didn’t really know what to do with them other than hold onto them as a collection of distorted 
digital approximations of her own handiwork. Perhaps just as scans they are interesting 
enough as a series of digital artifacts.  
 
   
Figures 48 and 49, Tom Penney, 2015, digital 3D models produced from photo scans of Barbie dolls 
dressed by Sal Penney. 
 
Concurrent to creating my gay Sims households for the above artworks and scanning my 
mother’s dolls, I also had a replica made of my own family’s house, in Adelaide, within The 
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Sims 3. I then used this as the basis for a portrait, which can also be thought of as a 
‘caricature’. I took great pleasure in approximating their house with the Sims-based catalogue 
of furniture and decoration, probably because the translation of the space was like kitsch-
ifying the already-kitsch. The kitsch logic of the middle-class domestic space with cat 
photographs, Christmas tree, and dog toys perfectly translated into the colourful, generic 
objects provided by the Sims game. I created all the characters and had them sit and watch 
television in the living room. A challenge here was to make them all sit at the same time, as 
their conflicting AIs often saw them get bored, or fidget, or get up and move around. I had to 
use the “move objects” cheat to be able to manipulate their positions in the scene.  
 
Once they were seated I paused the game, and took my 360-degree screenshots for the 
3D scan. This work is different to the previous Sims-based works in that it is not just an 
image. It functions in real-time 3D; the work is actually a very simple Unity3D app with a 
scene that rotates over time so you can see it from all angles. The additional element in this 
‘domestic’ scene from works previous was the incorporation of 3D portraits of my family’s 
heads. I extracted their heads from 3D photo scan portraits I did for them the day after 
Christmas, in which they all wore their Christmas cracker dinner party hats for some extra 
kitsch. I then placed those heads on their respective Sims equivalent bodies.   
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Figure 50, Tom Penney, Penney Family Christmas, Unity3D application, original 2014 version. 
 
 
Figure 51, Tom Penney, Penney Family Christmas, 360-degree digital image, 2016 version. 
 
Orientation through play  
From the process in the development of the above works we can extend the idea of ‘play’ to 
involve a personal degree of subversion and queerness in the form of artwork. Sarah 
Ahmed’s discussion of a queering through turning-towards objects is important here, as 
playing The Sims, using Grindr, making art in a digital software package or being in a family, 
have all come to demonstrate queer orientation through the repetition of actions over time; 
the being-with and manipulation of the bodies, forms and subject matter.  
 
Altogether, while being critical of Grindr, the treatment of representations of bodies 
in the creation of digital artwork has been informed by it. The artistic critical distance and 
treatment of digital bodies mirrors the kind of detached, inquisitive consumption of images of 
bodies that happens in online dating. The use of the mouse in 3D imaging software and 
games in real-time to pose, move, alter, and transform digital bodies, both in this project and 
informed by continued use of games and apps throughout my life, has demonstrated an 
affinity with this screen-based orientation towards a perverse desire for bodies. 
 
Ahmed’s discussion of orientation and the family has its origins in Freud; that 
heterosexual or ‘normal’ family identifications fall ‘in-line’. A “family love requires 
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‘following’ a certain direction, or even having a certain orientation” (Ahmed 2006, p.73) to 
continue the family line, or in Freudian terms, the line of the father. In my family portrait, my 
father stands alone; his gaze is different to the others and is not fixed on the television screen. 
Something is queer, for, if we are to take a psychoanalytical and normative model, his 
direction should be setting the line of the gaze, setting the object of desire, for his family to 
follow. Something is awry in this kitsch, middle-class paradise, and speaks (at least from my 
perspective) of the failure of a middle class dream with the father at the wheel of the ship. 
 
 Similarly, common groups like families share ego-identifications in the form of 
desire for similar objects in line with this Oedipal and father-centric model. In my work we 
can see this shared identification in the form of a tendency towards games, toys, dolls and 
representations of this kind. In my case however, it is clear in the denial of my own family 
relations (I am not present in my family portrait, I am the observer, the manipulator of their 
representations), my own queer ‘fleeing from’ this normative structure, that this manifests as 
a subversive or critical tendency in representing such subject matter rather than unashamedly 
and irony-free. There is no Jeff Koons here. It is as if criticism becomes the excuse to enact 
shared identifications with the family but remain distant, and so a joking and paradoxical 
logic is required, a ‘critical affection’ with subject matter concerning the family. 
 
By taking of all of these elements together (family, games, gay dating, art), on paper, 
or in words, it is difficult to draw parallels between them or see them in the same context. In 
artwork however, which is particular to a subject’s personal life, an artist has an opportunity 
to bind such things into a judgement based on their own connections and logic, a sort of unity 
where they come together and make sense in the context of a practice. What is queer or 
subversive about these ideas together lies in this joke-like logic (see chapter 3); the artworks 
together represent judgments on the nature of Grindr, family and play by finding parallels 
between them. The binding-together of these disconnected elements forming the ‘joke’ 
comes in the form of the artworks themselves, which are a nexus for these embedded 
judgements (or essentialisations, caricatures).  
 
The artworks I’ve discussed take families or dolls, but mix them with the 
representations of games, gay people, and app usage. Such parallels constituting these 
judgements are based on metaphors between the personal screen and the ‘God gamer’, the 
fine line between ‘world builder’ and ‘narcissist’; paradoxes that present the critical and non-
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critical, artist and world, critic and the critiqued, with the same essentialisations, reductions, 
symbols, and logic. My practice, which does not ‘burrow-deep’ but presents many facets, is 
based on a perverse surface-play, which, as discussed in chapter 3, mirrors this critically 
distant, joke-like logic by jumping around and making connections in a light, playful and 
distant way. It gets bored, it needs a new desire, and so, it finds new connections to subvert, 
complain about, critique. 
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7 Conclusion – The Artist as Player 
 
In discussing the ‘artist as player’ I wish to solidify as part of my contribution to artistic 
practice, games studies and play-thinking how play is an activity that facilitates the 
production of identity through the testing of simulated identities against play scenarios. Play 
helps to render some consistency to the chaos of self-identification by providing fixed 
‘frames’ that propose possibilities for orientations, or for selves to become, for a time, in a 
play scenario. These can either be assimilated into an identity or kept as a distanced state but 
they will always have some influence over individuation however infinitely small or large. 
Something this dissertation and my practice as a whole has explored, has been the rapid 
binding and skipping over perverse surfaces. Identity play here features the testing of what a 
self can be, a maintaining of plateaus of perverse intensity in and against scenarios 
represented by play activity, although this does not have to be in the context a game.  
 
The Aesthetic Tradition of Play Theory 
In Play Matters (2014) Miguel Sicart identifies many different traditions in which play is 
theorised. These include play in anthropology, childhood development, games studies, design 
and importantly, aesthetics, within which my own, and Mary Flanagan’s work is situated. 
Contributions to the idea of play in the aesthetic tradition have philosophical roots in the 
German Humanist and Romantic traditions, which I thought through in chapter 1 given the 
writings of Schiller, Kant, and Huizinga. Instead of following games studies or design from 
this point, play has been examined primarily through the artistic and aesthetic tradition of 
subversion (Sicart refers to this as the carnivalesque) as evident in the surrealist, dadaist and 
fluxus movements, and from there, postmodern and contemporary forms of art in the 20th and 
21st centuries. My own practice and reflections have illustrated this rhetoric of artistic 
subversion through the production of concepts and works involving caricature, queerness, 
humour, campness and perversion.  
 
Play as a process of re-ontologising 
Sicart proposes that “play is probably the dominant way of being in the modern world” 
(Sicart 2014a, para.33) especially due to the advent of ubiquitous digitisation. Does this mean 
we have entered the society that Schiller (see chapter 1) dreamt of? Sicart suggests that this is 
because computers are perfect mediums for play: 
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Computable worlds tend to be playable worlds because they have clear rules, similar to the 
rules we use when we play. Both play and computation reduce the world; they create these 
circles of magic, bounding the world (Sicart 2014a, para.14). 
 
Sicart tells us that computers can perform very fast calculations, store and manipulate data, 
sense the world and participate in networking (Sicart, 2014a). This allows them to produce 
multiple new realities through appropriation and language. These reductions ‘frame’ 
snapshots of the world and these snapshots are produced according to the rules of languages 
of the computer. Sicart references Luciano Floridi’s philosophy of information here when 
theorising play; that play, in relation to the digital, reflects the process of Floridi’s “re-
ontologising” (Floridi, 2014). Play is an activity that re-ontologises; that is, it is a way of 
appropriating the world and making new sense of it. It both understands what ‘is’ as well as 
produces new versions of what ‘is’ in the form of playful propositions, appropriations, games 
or subversions. Play and its capacity to re-ontologise is based in its prior understanding of the 
world but also in the products of its subversions of the world. The process of maintaining this 
flux of identities is a playful re-ontologising, or, play itself. Sicart’s other name for this in the 
context of computing machinery is “Quixotean play: a negotiated appropriation of the world” 
(Sicart, 2014c). 
 
Sicart’s use of the term “Quixotean play” for re-ontologising forms of play is 
modelled by the story of Don Quixote. In the story a “man goes crazy from reading too many 
books” and thus “his reality constantly clashes with fiction” (Sicart 2014a, para.3). The 
message here is that in play, worlds are created from language but such new worlds also 
produce new realities for our existing world. Creative and playful acts reduce the world and 
its elements to languages we can understand and control. This is an act of domination over 
the content that it appropriates. Like Baudrillard’s concept of simulation (1983), the resulting 
representation, as an aspect of the world reduced to a form of language, goes on to construct 
our reality just as much as the original did. Deleuze and Guattari also refer to Don Quixote in 
their discussion of faciality, as they see Quixote’s hallucinations as schizoid (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1988, p.203). 
 
Just as artists dominate and control their materials and content, contorting them into 
new visions, so too is play a “[…] a way of taking over the world and making sense of it, of 
 127 
putting deeply complex assemblages together” (Sicart, 2014, p.11) but at the same time 
binding them to rules and languages in order to create the collective conditions required to 
communicate, understand and participate in play. The digital exacerbates this relationship 
play has to the world, because computers also dominate their content, computationally 
reducing the world to the language of computers and thus re-ontologising the world using 
their own kind of computational sense.  
 
Digital Artistic Practice and Play 
 If play is and will be a dominant way of being in the contemporary world, has not artistic 
practice always been a playful way of being? I see artistic engagement with the world as a 
subset of playful engagement. I think that play is broader than artistic practice, and when 
looking back to the ideas of Schiller, Kant, or Huizinga (chapter 1) we can see that, Schiller 
especially, considered art to be a form of playful engagement and a way of being in society 
rather than play being a subset of an artistic engagement or a ‘way of seeing’. Play is broader 
than both aesthetics and politics. In a Deleuzian sense play is a way of maintaining chaotic 
precariousness but also a way of rendering the rate of this chaotic precariousness at a speed 
that is pleasurable and comprehensive.  
 
Gilbert Simondon states of ontogenesis, that “[…] it could be said that the sole 
principle by which we can be guided is that of the conservation of being through becoming” 
(Simondon 1992, p.301). At the conclusion of this dissertation we could interpret play as an 
activity that attempts to honour this “conservation of being through becoming” via play as a 
process of re-ontologising, that is, as a process that permits the free-form and chaotic 
changing of identity through time, but renders identifications through comfortable rules, 
languages and roles, fixes them and stops them from flying away at an infinite speed. This 
rendering in Critical Affection has taken place through digital reduction, representation, 
caricature, and comic judgement: the speed has been set by a creative perversity. 
 
Play and Chaos 
If art is intended to disrupt clichés, we might think of queerness, which for Ahmed disorients 
us in the face of normative orientations, or critical play, which renders clichés as uncanny 
representations before adding unstable or subversive elements. In What is Philosophy? (1991, 
pg.?) Deleuze speaks of the “daughters of chaos”; the “chaoids”, that is, three fields (science, 
art, and philosophy) that have a creative relationship between chaos and society, and that 
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maintain chaos at a rate fathomable by human beings. Humans generally consume clichés to 
protect themselves from the fear of chaos, rather than face chaos itself. To Deleuze chaos is 
infinite speed, the speed of the universe as incomprehensible to human beings. Chaoids 
function to help us get a grip on chaos, to make it palatable, in the form of novel ideas and 
perspectives that give it consistency. Science does this through axioms and formula, 
philosophy through the creation of concepts and art through the distillation of affects and 
percepts of a non-human nature. What of play? Deleuze does not mention it, but we will.  
 
If play is, as Clint Hocking claims, the universal structure or broad attitude, “The 
dominant cultural form of the 21st Century” (Hocking 2011, para.1) that Sicart investigates, it 
certainly has a relationship to chaos, maintaining it, or rendering elements of chaos 
accessible. Play navigates a tension between chaos and order; it allows chaos to be glimpsed 
at but at the same time contains it in the form of rules, languages and roles. I address this as a 
major element of my contribution to the expanded idea of what it means to be an artist as a 
‘player’, particularly through the lens of identity play as it has appeared throughout this 
dissertation.  
 
Identities as Chaotic 
Normally, defining who or what our ‘selves’ are is a difficult and turbulent exercise where 
we risk sounding either too rigid or too vague depending on our self-image.  As I have 
already discussed, in play we have the opportunity to conceive of ourselves in a simulated 
role, to take a break from the immediate terror (chaotic possibility) of the question ‘what / 
who am I?’ Through play, we place the hard-to-navigate infinitudes of self-definition on hold 
by conceiving of ourselves as a representation such as a player character, pieces on a 
chessboard, or a role marked by a special costume. To Deleuze “[…] there is not an I that 
produces, but a process of production of which the I is a kind of product […] the finite 
subject’s relation to an infinite process of which it is a residuum” (O’Sullivan 2006, p.170). 
An identity is a dynamic construct in progress, something that is different at every moment, 
as forces both small and large interact with it at every moment through time. If play has a 
relation to chaos its function would include giving consistency to the chaos of a subject that 
is never fixed, by symbolizing possibilities for the self within play roles. These roles frame 
the subject who might be for a time, and are, what I come to call ‘play frames’.  
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Time, Play and Identity 
Miguel Sicart’s “Quixotean Play”, a re-ontologising conception of play, can be read using 
Gilbert Simondon’s concepts of individuation and “ontogenesis” (Simondon, 1992). 
Ontogenesis refers to beings as constant products of individuation (a process of becoming) 
and not the other way around, that is, as things that have individual states a-priori before 
deciding to change. 
 
Key to my development of the idea of a ‘play frame’ is the relationship between time, 
play and identity. As above, Deleuze believes an identity is defined by its rate of change over 
time, rather than by any individual states in an individuating process. We can additionally 
refer to Simondon in the discussion of identities, play and time to whom there is no 
‘individual’, only a perpetual process of individuation (Nash and Penney 2015, p.5). Time 
has always played a part in contemporary identity politics. As discussed in chapters 1–3, 
Judith Butler asserts that masculinity relies on the performance of acts deemed masculine 
over time, and that identities are based in the fixation of ritualised performativity (Butler 
1990, p.192).  
We could say that play activities such as games are performative in this sense, as they 
require the deployment of various patterns of role-play over time. Take two examples; 
playing World of Warcraft (Blizzard Entertainment, 2004-present), and playing The Sims. In 
both of these games players have an opportunity to create roles based on a series of options 
that are selected and packaged into one or more playable characters. In World of Warcraft 
these roles take the appearance of classic fantasy role-playing archetypes (a thief, a mage, a 
warrior, a cleric) but a player can dress and tweak their character for personal preference.  
 
In The Sims a player may construct a character that reflects a contemporary suburban 
or domestic reality. In either case, we can render specific roles consistent over time, saying 
something like ‘I always play as a caster (mage)’ in World of Warcraft or ‘I always make a 
character that is close to myself and my own home in The Sims’, for example, or we can test 
different ones over time; ‘I have eight different alts (alternative characters) on WOW that I 
play’ or, ‘I have made a whole neighbourhood of different Sims that I like to play one after 
the other’. Through the former approach, players may tend towards consuming play roles that 
are assimilated into fairly fixed patterns of self-representation, while in the latter, play is an 
opportunity to become or test one’s self against many different roles that are subsequently 
drawn into an individual. Through this activity, one is producing an identity in tandem with 
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the game either by consuming a pattern in relation to themselves or producing variance in 
order to incorporate difference into one’s experience.  
 
We have seen further evidence of identity play at work in art. As I discussed in 
chapter 2, Mark Amerika (2008) refers to his digital media arts practice as being 
“technomadic”, a process of constantly resolving his ‘self’ against his ‘not-self’ through the 
constant play of the self on different territories. By ‘territories’ he generally means artistic 
media, but acknowledges that an artistic medium in the digital age could be anything. This 
constitutes an interrogative practice that facilitates a rapid testing of how the self can be 
applied when delivering different concepts, in disregard of an identity becoming fixated on 
specific media. It is a form of identity play for artists to be able to “[…] step into the fold and 
‘play themselves’ – even if that means having to reinvent their artistic personas over and over 
again” (Amerika 2008, p.82). The ‘playing of oneself’ refers to the ability for an artist to test 
whether it is possible to incorporate a different perspective into their identity, and to push the 
capacity for ones self to further incorporate multiple perspectives. This belies a clear 
influence of the Deleuzean term ‘becoming’, and Amerika’s use of the term ‘nomadism’ here 
clearly riffs on its Deleuzian provenance. 
 
Play Frames 
Play in the context of art must always be some form of identity play, ontologically speaking. 
Artistic play is identity play and identity play is the process of Sicart’s re-ontologising; the 
extraction of stages of individuation in Simondonian ontogenesis and subsequent reduction of 
these stages to forms of language to be manipulated. What a Deleuzian/Simondonian 
perspective has offered my thinking, as it has been discussed through the lens of identity 
play, is that play is a way to contain, render consistent, or otherwise represent the chaos of 
identity within this ontogenesis which can be referred to as re-ontologising. I am not, at the 
end of this dissertation proposing a contribution to philosophies of ontology, but rather using 
such a provocation as rhetoric, and as useful for future interventions in play thinking. Sicart 
has helped us to consider this in the space of the digital.  
 
If “[i]ndividuation corresponds to the appearance of stages in the being, which are the 
stages of the being” (Simondon 1992, p.301) then (identity) play must be the attempt at 
proposing these appearances of stages for beings as propositions for identity-constants but 
still granting them an interchangeable impermanence in the form of roles or representations. 
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The phrase that I will use is a ‘play frame’, not in the sense of framing of an object, as in art 
or a still picture, but more like the frames of a movement-image, a way to distil a moment of 
chaotic individuation and propose its reality for longer, in order to, for a time, orient the 
world around a fixed snapshot in a process of becoming, or at least propose a fixed state of 
this becoming. If, say, I have too many roles to choose from, too many potential selves, or I 
am overwhelmed by the spiralling abyss of identity politics, a play process through art or 
games allows for a fixation and escape from endless diversification through a particular 
stereotype, caricature, archetype, behaviour or other trait for a time. In this sense pattern-
consumption is very enjoyable, relaxing, a breather in the midst of computational and digital 
chaos. To Sicart our enjoyment of computational play with computers as “dumb machines” 
(Sicart 2014a, para.10) shows our predisposition towards fixed languages, just as how we 
enjoy playing out the reductive stereotypes and languages that come with comedic humour 
and parody.  
 
We could invoke Barthes’ here in his famous discussion in Mythologies (1973 p.15-
26) of wrestling matches; people attend the wrestling match to consume the pattern 
recognition of eternally good and evil characters battling each other in the ring; they already 
know which one is going to win in the larger-than-life performance. We could think of these 
roles as the frozen stages of an ontogenetic process; lifted out of flux and rendered or 
proposed as eternal and enduring but which we can easily discard and identify with another if 
we choose.   
 
We can think of play as it has been discussed throughout various artistic strategies via 
the lens of my own practice as interventions into the process of individuation. Caricature has 
become a spiteful arrest; a freezing of the individuating nature of represented subjects (a 
denial of access to this natural process) and role-play has become the proposal of suspended 
solutions to selves that change over time in the face of the chaos of self-identification. While 
playful gestures such as these have predictably traversed binaries of self/other, 
chaotic/contained, or open/reduced, many of them have been meta-playful in the sense that 
they can be seen to spitefully intervene in the process of individuation itself, and not just 
towards representations that are merely symptoms of a broader socio-political context of 
relating individuating subjects and machines. Such gestures – of caricature, jokes, perversity, 
unplaying, rewriting, scatology, representing partial objects etc., violently reach into a 
chaotic series of individuating states and pull out representations in garish forms, as if to say 
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‘well here you bloody well go; isn’t it ridiculous that we fixate on objects (as ‘frames’), or 
obsess about identities, but at the same time desire the stability they represent, in the form of 
fetishes, domestic roles, symbolic reductions or otherwise?’  
 
Profound Anxiety 
I return to the broader context of digital media here and some of my original inspirations and 
frustrations for writing this dissertation to which I responded in thought and the production of 
artistic work. The kind of play discussed in this dissertation has represented a spitefulness 
towards the state and promise of popular identity politics in general, as well as towards the 
hegemony of overarching digital systems in contemporary capitalism that hijack our desire 
for the privilege of identity politics yet provide or operate through some other axiomatic 
perversion – such as Grindr providing its own ‘frames’ for represented bodies and associated 
identities to represent themselves within, the terror of familial domestic roles, the way 
Google compiles information on individuals, or the echo-chamber effects of social media.  
 
Adam Nash highlights this tension in Affect, People and Digital Social Networks 
(2014) – a tension between the desire for fixation and the actual potentiality of selves is 
something that digital social networks exploit, almost through the same use of ‘play frames’ 
that I have identified. They manipulate the fact that individuals are “individual and more-
than-individual; [that a subject] is incompatable with itself” (Combes 2013, p.32), and that 
“[i]t is understandable that a subject may attempt to resolve the tension by doing the opposite, 
by turning inward and looking […for a…] mode of relations that reinforces a static sense of 
individuality” (Nash 2014, p.4). The outcome of this is the maintenance of plateaus of 
anxiety in individuals, the maintenance of the questioning of identity, a rapid breaking down 
and re-enforcement of identifications and the manipulation of desire to represent frames of 
the self. A product of this state of play is anxiety (of identity) itself. 
 
Critical Play and Critical Distance 
At the outset of this dissertation, Flanagan’s Critical Play was responded to and critical 
distance was desired in reaction to a perpetual loop of affectivity in the context of digital 
cultures. But at this concluding point, the negotiated form of this idea of ‘being critical’ is 
that play cannot ever purely rely on critical distance, and requires that players are also bound 
to the rules of the world in which they are representing, distilling, reducing or binding 
through play. This is illustrated in the notion of a ‘play frame’, which is only ever the illusion 
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of a fixed role, and acts to soften anxiety towards the infinite speed of individuation. Such a 
frame can be treated like an object, to step away from, examine, laugh at or critique, before 
being discarded for another and before plunging back into the affective intersection of play 
and ‘the world’. 
 
Play rather maintains a relationship between the two, allowing the flow between fixed 
and fluid, distant and overwhelmed, to be palatable. I claim here that critical distance is only 
one half of critical play, and that the critical component of play is not to be distant but instead 
to be a custodian of the precarious relationship between critical distance and overwhelming 
identification. Identity play becomes the expressive arm of a ubiquitous state of unresolved 
anxiety. States of anxiety, as discussed above, in which fixed identification cannot ever 
resolve itself against individuation expresses itself through identity play where identifications 
and roles are used as intense foci against perpetual and chaotic states – allowing us to ‘have 
our cake and eat it too’ by using these foci to maintain an illusion of fixation whilst we 
continue to develop as individuals at infinite individuating speeds. In this sense, the concept 
relates to my earlier discussion of perversity (chapter 3) in which plateaus of intensity are 
maintained through the rapid shifting through these frames of identification.  
 
On Critical Affection 
The title of this dissertation is, of course, Critical Affection which itself represents the tension 
that I articulate in this final chapter; the desire to freeze and distil, to distance, to step away 
from (‘critical’), yet also to become absorbed in a process and connect others, objects and 
orientations (‘affection’). This is the realm of artists, who are constantly overwhelmed by the 
realities they critique but are situated in and participate in. They simultaneously distance 
themselves from and fetishise objects in this reality on their own terms – a love/hate 
relationship.  
 
I would like to claim that artists-as-players are people who produce and maintain 
‘play frames’ in order to test the tension between fixed and chaotic stages of individuation; 
they participate in Sicart’s Quixotean re-ontologising. They undertake this production as a 
critical exercise; playing with the distance between chaotic individuation and the distortion of 
this process by freezing individuation in states of language, rules, representation – ‘play 
frames’. In my practice and that of others this has looked like role-play, caricature, jokes, 
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symbolic reduction, subversion, the representation of partial-objects, fetishisation and 
language games.  
 
I want to here draw attention back to the artistic community of practice discussed in 
chapter 1 that has evolved in a similar thematic and material field to my own over the course 
of my PhD. These contemporary digital artists particularly engage with digital bodies and 
identity representations in a playful, digital way using similar imagery and exposing similar 
lines-of-flight from the normative boundaries of games, art, bodies, identities etc. They often 
use digital means of representing bodies to expose the failure of computers in attempting to 
dominate organic forms to their own rules and languages. In this sense they are all artists-as-
players, simultaneously fetishizing yet trying to send-up and laugh at the content they create 
and which they criticise through subversion. 
 
The conclusion of this dissertation is not only a closing-off but also an opening-out. 
The opening that proceeds from this point is a question of ethics where play, critique, and 
affection intersect. If we have entered a state of ubiquitous play what then are the ethics of 
practicing in this way? 
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